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ABSTRACT 
This paper proposes a model that can be used to predict the likely impacts of tobacco tax 
increases and harmonisation in the East African Community. The model has five sections, 
one for each EAC country. These sections consider different cigarette market segments 
based on tax or price differentials. The model can therefore calculate the likely effects of 
excise tax increases and harmonisation on the retail selling price of cigarettes, cigarette 
consumption, government revenue and industry revenue for each individual country and for 
the EAC as a whole.  
 
Two Scenarios are presented in this paper. Scenario 1 explores an increase in the current 
excise tax rates and a harmonisation across the EAC of a uniform specific tax of UDS 0.60. 
A sensitivity analysis is conducted to assess the robustness of the assumptions in this 
scenario. Scenario 2 discusses the use of a mixed tax structure with a specific excise tax of 
USD 0.60 or an ad valorem excise tax of 40% of the retail selling price, whichever is higher. 
The advantages and disadvantages of a uniform specific excise tax and other tax structures 
such as tiered specific taxes, ad valorem taxes and mixed tax structures are explored. 
Factors such as administrative ease, predictability of revenue flows, inflation and income 
growth are discussed. A uniform specific tax is shown to be the most preferable excise tax 
structure, even over a mixed tax structure. 
 
The results show that, with an assumed price elasticity of demand of -0.6, as excise tax is 
increased in the region, consumption decreases and government revenue increases. 
Scenario 1 shows a decrease in consumption by around 2.3 billlion cigarettes, or 18%, 
compared to current consumption levels across the EAC of around 12.9 billion cigarettes. 
Scenario 2 shows a slightly higher decline in consumption of 2.7 billion cigarettes or 21%. In 
terms of government excise revenue, Scenario 1 shows an increase of around USD 140 
million or 80% from the current government revenue of around USD 176 million across the 
EAC. The second scenario reveals an even greater increase of USD 173 million or 98%. 
These results show that excise tax increases and harmonisation will contribute to public 
health and financial objectives of governments in the region. 
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Section 1 Introduction 
 
The topic of Tobacco Control (TC) measures and their effects has become a well-
documented discipline. The harmful effects of smoking cannot be denied. More than 40 
years of epidemiological research has shown that smoking is damaging global health at an 
unprecedented level (Jha & Chaloupka, 2000). Disturbingly, the economics of TC in 
developing countries received little attention from researchers or policymakers before 1990. 
Thereafter, rapid globalisation created opportunities for multinational cigarette companies to 
diversify into the growing developing world (IARC, 2011). Against this background an 
empirical literature on the demand for tobacco in developing countries emerged. The focus 
area of much of this literature has been in the developing nations of Eastern Europe and 
Asia, with little focus on Africa (other than South Africa). 
A 1999 World Bank report, Curbing the Epidemic, examines the effectiveness of TC 
interventions and concludes that both price measures such as taxes, and non-price 
measures such as media campaigns, smoking restrictions and advertising bans can reduce 
the demand for cigarettes. Non-price measures address health aims, put forward by the 
Ministry of Health (MoH) in national TC policy. These health objectives include decreases in 
smoking initiation and smoking intensity as well as increases in smoking cessation (Guindon 
et al., 2002). Price measures, on the other hand, address fiscal aims, put forward by the 
Ministry of Finance (MoF). These fiscal aims include increases in government revenue 
through increased excise tax levied on tobacco. This may further result in total tax increases 
via the sales tax. Tax increases like these have been found to be the single most effective 
intervention to reduce the demand for tobacco (Chaloupka et al., 2010b). If cigarette prices 
rise due to increased tobacco taxes then individuals who do not currently use tobacco 
products may refrain from starting, and therefore avoid addiction. Higher prices can also 
induce current smokers to consume less, persuade them to quit or prevent ex-users from 
starting again. In this way, fiscal objectives and health objectives are met simultaneously 
through pricing measures such as increased excise tax.  
This paper will analyse the effect that tax and price increases have on smoking behaviour. It 
will review the effects of excise tax increases and harmonisation on cigarettes in the East 
African Community (EAC), a regional organisation comprising of Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, 
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Burundi and Rwanda. The global literature on the effects of tax increases on the 
consumption of cigarettes is substantial, however, these studies are all but non-existent for 
individual countries in the EAC.  
Efforts within countries to limit the consumption of tobacco must be seen in light of 
international TC policy, specifically the World Health Organisation (WHO) Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC), the first international health treaty negotiated under 
the auspices of the WHO (WHO, 2003). As the director general of the WHO stated in 1999 
“tobacco related disease…  is  not a challenge confined to independent states. It is a global 
challenge” (Feldman & Bayer, 2011). All of the EAC countries have signed and ratified the 
FCTC and the enforcement of that treaty can only be accomplished by national 
governments. This paper is concerned mainly with article 6 of the FCTC which declares 
“each Party should take account of its national health objectives concerning TC and adopt or 
maintain, as appropriate, measures which may include: (a) implementing tax policies and, 
where appropriate, price policies, on tobacco products so as to contribute to the health 
objectives aimed at reducing tobacco consumption” (WHO, 2003). Different tax and price 
policies in the EAC will be reviewed, taking into consideration that these policies must take 
account of, amoung other things, inflation levels, income levels and administrative concerns 
(Chaloupka et al., 2010a). The EAC, a customs union, also provides the platform for regional 
co-operation in matters of TC. This paper will focus specifically on the effects of excise tax 
harmonisation on individual countries within the EAC and the region as a whole.   
According to the literature one would expect that as excise taxes are raised, the price of 
cigarettes increase, leading to a decrease in the demand for cigarettes. The price elasticity 
of demand (εP) is estimated to be between -0.2 and -1.0 for developing countries (IARC, 
2011). Cigarette demand is typically more elastic in developing countries compared to 
developed countries, given the much lower per capita income levels. A relatively inelastic εP  
of -0.6, the midpoint of the IARC range, means that on average, a 10% increase in the real 
price of cigarettes would reduce cigarette consumption by about 6% in low or middle income 
countries (LMIC). Jha and Chaloupka (2000) suggest that this figure is around 4% for high 
income countries. This thesis will use a sensitivity analysis to estimate the impact of different 
elasticities in the EAC as no price elasticity studies for tobacco have been done in the EAC 
to date.  
The layout of the paper is as follows. Firstly an overview of TC and the EAC will be given 
with a focus on the interplay between the two. This will be followed by an explanation and 
presentation of the model. The model will show the possible effects of an increase in the 
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excise tax across all EAC countries and the knock-on effect this increase will have on the 
retail selling price, cigarette consumption, government revenue, and industry revenue. 
Lastly, a discussion of the results for each country and for the EAC region will be given, 
followed by a sensitivity analysis and brief policy recommendations. 
1.1. Background of EAC 
The East African Community (EAC) was originally founded in 1967, collapsed in 1977, and 
was revived on July 7, 2000. Originally only Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda were party to the 
EAC, but Burundi and Rwanda were later accepted in July 2009. All of the EAC countries 
are classified as low-income countries (LICs) according to the World Bank (World Bank, 
2011). The United Nations (UN) further classify Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda as land-
locked Least-Developed Countries (UN,2010). 
The geographical region encompassed by the East African Community (EAC) covers an 
area of 1.82 million square kilometres, this is roughly the size of Sudan. It furthermore has a 
combined population of about 133 million, 2% of the global population (EAC, 2012). The 
EAC was founded with the view to establish an East African Federation, a proposed 
federation of the five EAC members into a single state. It is hoped that the wider market will 
increase the region's ability to attract investments, nurture economic growth, improve 
economic efficiency and reduce poverty (Miriri, 2010). In 2010, the EAC launched a common 
market for goods, labour and capital within the region, with the goal of a common currency 
by 2012 and a full political federation by 2015 (Miriri, 2010).  Since its inception the EAC has 
made strides towards the abovementioned integration process, but it has not met the 
deadlines initially set. The Customs Union’s basic foundations are in place and the 
implementation of the common market is at various levels in different countries.  The 
Monetary Union, however, is only in the discussion phase and the political federation is 
currently in the research phase (Ministry of EAC, 2012).  
All of the EAC countries, apart from Tanzania, belong to the Common Market for Eastern 
and Southern Africa (COMESA), a free trade area stretching across twenty member states. 
Tanzania is one of 15 member states belonging to the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC). In 2008 it was decided that a free trade area would stretch across 
COMESA, SADC and the EAC (COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite, 2012). 
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1.2. Tobacco Control Legislation and Ratification of the FCTC 
 
Tobacco Control (TC) pricing measures in each EAC country should be considered with 
respect to their overarching TC legislation.  All of the EAC countries signed and ratified the 
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) by June 30th 2007 (see Table1.2.1). The 
ratification of the FCTC implies that all countries should have made steps towards TC 
legislation in line with FCTC recommendations. Table 1.2.2 below shows the compliance of 
EAC states to some of the WHO MPOWER policies. The MPOWER reports are used to 
track countries interventions for monitoring tobacco use, protecting people from tobacco 
smoke, offering help to quit, warning people about the dangers of tobacco, enforcing bans 
and raising taxes on tobacco products. This section will note the tobacco legislation and 
compliance of each EAC member state, serving to establish a baseline for a discussion on 
Article 6 of the FCTC involving tax and pricing demand measures.  
Table 1.2.1: EAC Countries Signing and Ratifying the FCTC 
 
Country Signature Date Ratification 
Burundi 16 June 2003 22 November 2005 
Kenya 25 June 2004 25 June 2004 
Rwanda 2 June 2004 19 October 2005 
Tanzania 27 January 2004 30 April 2007 
Uganda 5 March 2004 20 June 2007 
          (source: WHO, 2012) 
 
Table 1.2.2: MPOWER Compliance 
Country Does Smoke-free 
legislation exist 
for Health Care, 
educational and 
government 
facilities? (Y/N) 
Does the 
National law 
require 
fines for 
smoking? 
(Y/N) 
Is there a toll-
free 
telephone 
quitline? 
(Y/N) 
Does the Law 
mandate that 
Health 
Warnings 
Appear on 
packages? 
Are there direct 
bans on tobacco 
advertising for 
national TV and 
Radio or 
newspaper or 
billboards? 
What is the excise 
tax structure and 
its proportion of 
retail price (for 
the most popular 
brand in 2010)?  
Burundi N N N - N Ad Valorem: 36% 
Kenya N Y N Y Y Specific: 50% 
Rwanda N N N N N Ad Valorem: 51% 
Tanzania N Y N Y Y Specific: 11% 
Uganda Y Y N N N Specific: 29% 
*bold letters indicate that from reporting to present these compliance status’s may have changed     (source: WHO, 2011) 
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Kenya was the first country in the EAC to sign and ratify the FCTC on the 24 June 2004. It 
can be considered the leading EAC country with respect to TC, not only because of its 
speedy ratification, but also because of enforced tracking and tracing measures to prevent 
illicit trade, and more recently its focus on implementing graphic health warnings on tobacco 
packages (CTCA(b), 2012).  The Tobacco Control Act of 2007 is the principal law governing 
TC in Kenya. Article 12(a) of this Act states that the Minister of finance shall implement tax 
policies and where appropriate, price policies on tobacco and tobacco products so as to 
continue the objectives of this Act (CTFK, 2012). 
Tanzania passed the Tobacco Products Regulation Act of 2003 (TPRA), before any of the 
EAC countries had signed the FCTC (CTFK, 2012). This law imposes restrictions on tobacco 
industry promotion, as well as health warnings and an increase in the legal age of smoking 
to 18 years. The TPRA, however, is still not consistent with FCTC standards. For example, 
tobacco advertising and sponsorship continues in the music industry (IDRC, 2011). 
Furthermore, there are no obligatory TC pricing measures (i.e. tax or price increases) 
documented in the TPRA. Tanzania signed the FCTC in 2004 but did not ratify it until April 
2007. Tanzania should update the TPRA according to FCTC standards.  
Uganda signed the FCTC on the 5th March 2004 and ratified on the 20th June 2007. Despite 
ratification, the Ugandan Tobacco Control Bill (UTCB) is still in progress (CTCA(a), 2012). 
The UTCB is said to be in the final stages, with the Ministry of Health (MoH) passing the 
relevant policy (CTCA(a), 2012). The UTCB proposes that excise tax on tobacco should be 
at a minimum of 75% of real retail price. It also proposes that the government shall dedicate 
3% of all taxes levied on tobacco and tobacco products to implementing tobacco control 
programmes (Businga, 2012). Currently the only existing TC law is the National Environment 
Law of 2004 which bans smoking in public places (Zakumumpa, 2011).  
Rwanda signed the FCTC on the 2nd June 2004 and ratified it on October 19th 2005. The 
Rwandan Minister of Health, Richard Sezibera, introduced a Tobacco Control Bill to the 
Rwandan Parliament for floor action on June 7th 2010 (Musoni, 2010). The Senate passed 
the Tobacco Control Bill in October 2012 (AllAfrica, 2012). The passing of the bill was said to 
be motivated by declining tax revenues. Rwanda’s tax revenues from imported tobacco 
shrunk 63% from January to June 2012 (AllAfrica, 2012). The Rwandan Tobacco Control Bill 
prevents advertising, sponsorship and smoking in public places. However, owners are still 
able to designate smoking areas (Library of Congress, 2010).  
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Burundi signed the FCTC on June 16th 2003 and ratified on 22 November 2005. There are 
no national regulations on smoke free environments in Burundi according to the WHO 
country profiles. Griffith (2008) reports that smoking restrictions in Burundi only apply to the 
Ministry of Health. 
Although Kenya, Tanzania and Rwanda have comprehensive TC legislation in place, the 
smoke-free laws do not fully meet the FCTC requirements as they allow for specially 
designated smoking areas (Tumwine, 2011). Burundi currently has no TC legislation in 
place, even though the country has ratified the FCTC. Effort should be made to implement a 
comprehensive TC Act in Burundi. Kenya is also the only EAC country to specifically 
address pricing measures in its national legislation. One of the major shortfalls in Kenya, 
Tanzania and Uganda is also the lack of enforcement surrounding existing legislation (IDRC, 
2011). An increase in the monitoring and enforcing of TC legislation in the EAC should assist 
in decreasing smoking prevalence in the region. 
1.3. Smoking Prevalence in the EAC 
The most reliable source of smoking prevalence in the EAC is the Demographic and Health 
Surveys (DHS) which provide country specific and comparable data on population, health 
and nutrition in over 90 developing countries. The DHS is funded by USAID with 
contributions from other donors. The sample sizes used in the standard DHS survey range 
from 5 000 to 30 000 households (DHS, 2012). The DHS gives the crude smoking 
prevalence, a summary measure of tobacco use in a population. The crude rate, expressed 
as a percentage of the population, refers to the number of smokers per 100 people in the 
population. When the crude prevalence rate is multiplied by the population, this yields the 
number of smokers in the whole country (WHO, 2011). In the DHS, however, the range of 
ages in the samples are limited to 15-49 years or 18 years and over for women; and 15-54 
or 15-59 years for men because the DHS is designed to estimate fertility (Pampel, 2008). 
This may bias crude estimates of tobacco use among all adults.  
The DHS reports that in Kenya, 2008, and Tanzania, 2010, crude smoking prevalence was 
around 18% for males and less than 1% for females. In Uganda, 2006, the crude smoking 
prevalence was 23% for males and 4% for females. The 2010 DHS results for both Rwanda 
and Burundi are around 12% for males and less than 1% for females. Table 1.3.1 below 
gives a summary of all the crude prevalence figures obtained from the DHS surveys for all 
EAC countries. In the most recent prevalence estimates it can be seen that Uganda has the 
highest prevalence rates, followed by Kenya, Tanzania, Burundi and Rwanda. 
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Table 1.3.1: DHS Smoking Prevalence Results 
 
Country DHS 1st prevalence 
recording (%) 
DHS 2nd Prevalence 
Recording (%) 
Difference in 
Prevalence rates 
from 1st to 2nd 
recording 
Prevalence Ranking 
for the most recent 
recording (1 being 
the highest) 
Burundi 2010 
Male: 12.15 
Female:0.7 
 - 4 
Kenya 2003 
Male: 23 
Female: 0.7 
2008 
Male: 18.8 
Female: 0.5 
 
Male: -4.2 
Female:-0.2 
2 
Rwanda 2005 
Male: 14.2 
Female: 0.3 
2010 
Male: 12.1 
Female: 0.3 
 
Male:-2.1 
Female:0 
5 
Tanzania 2003 
Male:20.8 
Female: 0.5 
2010 
Male: 18.1 
Female: 0.3 
 
Male:-2.7 
Female:-0.2 
3 
Uganda 2000 
Male: 18 
Female: 1.2 
2006 
Male: 23 
Female: 4 
 
Male:5 
Female:2.8 
1 
 
The World Bank predicts that if Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda maintain their growth 
momentum, that is, the average growth from 2000-2009, and if Kenya accelerates, all four 
countries will reach Middle Income status, above USD 1000 per capita, within the next ten 
years (Fengler, 2012). One would expect the DHS prevalence rates to also increase over 
time due to increasing income levels in the region. Many studies, especially in developing 
countries, have found a positive relationship between income and smoking prevalence 
(IARC, 2011). 
Looking at males only, one can see that instead of increasing, the prevalence rates for 
Kenya decreased by 4.2% from 2003 to 2008 (see Table 1 above). In Rwanda this decrease 
was 2.1% from 2005 to 2010 and in Tanzania this decrease was 2.7% from 2003 to 2010. 
These decreases could be related to the FCTC ratification and national legislation. For 
example, the first DHS smoking prevalence recording in Kenya was taken in 2003, thereafter 
Kenya signed and ratified the FCTC in 2004 and instituted the Tobacco Control Act of 2007, 
raising the excise tax on cigarettes. The second prevalence reading was taken in 2008 after 
these tobacco control interventions. Similarly, in Tanzania, the first prevalence recording was 
in 2003, followed by the TPRA in 2003 and FCTC ratification in 2008. The latest prevalence 
study in Tanzania was conducted in 2010, after legislative measures had taken place.   
The only country to demonstrate increasing prevalence rates over time is Uganda, with male 
prevalence increasing from 18% in 2000 to 23% in 2006. This may also be explained by the 
FCTC and national legislation. The FCTC was only ratified by Uganda in 2007 after the last 
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DHS prevalence recording. Furthermore, a national Tobacco Control legislation document is 
still pending, indicating that prevalence rates may have increased due to a lack of legislation. 
Though prevalence rates for women are reported to be around 1%, which is extremely low, 
there are widespread concerns about the empirical accuracy of these rates (IDRC, 2011). 
Oftentimes the DHS is administered to the head of the household, which in many instances 
is a man. This may lead to respondent bias because it is culturally inappropriate for women 
to smoke (IDRC, 2011). In general, other sources reflect low smoking prevalence amoung 
women, possibly for the same reasons mentioned above. Pampel (2008) finds that in Kenya 
and Uganda the DHS figures for women are much lower than in the Tobacco Control 
Country Profiles (2000) compiled under the auspices of the American Cancer Society (ACS).  
Other notable prevalence studies have been done by the Economic Research Council (ERC, 
2010). The ERC estimates the 2008 adult smoking prevalence to be 48% in Kenya and 54% 
in Tanzania. The ERC does not explain their methodology in obtaining this data. Kolawole et 
al. (2009) summarises a number of smaller Kenyan studies focused on specific vocations 
such as health practitioners. In these studies male prevalence lies between 50% and 65%, 
and female prevalence between 3% and 7%. The sample size of these studies range from 
150 to 672 people, a lot smaller than the DHS study. Furthermore the definition of ‘current 
smoker’ varies across these studies.  
 
Research conducted by the MoH in Rwanda found 16.1% of all males in Rwanda between 
the ages of 15 and 59 are smokers and 3.6% of women between the ages of 15 and 49. 
These prevalence figures are similar to those found in the DHS. Most of the prevalence 
studies above do not describe their methodology and others cannot directly be applied to 
this paper so, although they are interesting, the DHS prevalence rates are preferred. 
 
The Global Youth Tobacco Survey (GYTS) is a notable study indicating prevalence among 
school-going children (13–15 year olds). The GYTS results show that the average smoking 
prevalence from the most recent surveys in the EAC region to be around 4.5%, with the 
male prevalence slightly larger than the female prevalence, except for Kilimanjaro, Tanzania 
(CDC, 2008). The highest smoking prevalence amoung the youth in the EAC can be found in 
Kenya at 8.2% and the lowest in Rwanda at 1.8%. Table 1.3.1 below represents each 
country’s smoking prevalence results from the GYTS.  
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Table 1.3.1: EAC GYTS Smoking prevalence Comparison 
 
Country have ever smoked 
cigarettes(%, M;F) 
have ever 
smoked 
cigarettes(%, 
M;F) 
currently 
smoke 
cigarettes (%, 
M;F) 
currently 
smoke 
cigarettes (%, 
M;F) 
Never smokers 
likely to initiate 
in the next year 
(%) 
Never 
smokers likely 
to initiate in 
the next year 
(%) 
Burundi  2008 
19.1 (23.9; 
14.1) 
 2008 
4.6 (5.8; 3.2) 
 2008 
17.8 
Kenya 2001 
13.1 (17.6; 8.9) 
2007 
24.4 (33;15.5) 
2001 
6.6 (8.7; 4.7) 
2007 
9.8(12.7;6.5) 
2001 
21.2 
2007 
19.4 
Rwanda  2008 
16.3 (23.5; 9.5) 
 2008 
1.8 (3; 0.9) 
 2008 
10 
Tanzania 2003 
Arusha 
7 (11.6; 3.4) 
Dar es Salaam 
10 (17.9; 8.5) 
Kilimanjaro 
6.9 (11.4; 5.7) 
 
2008 
Arusha 
6.2 (7.5; 4.9) 
Dar es Salaam 
9.2(12.7;6) 
Kilimanjaro 
14.1 (16.3; 
11.8) 
2003 
Arusha 
1.8 (3.8; 0.4) 
Dar es Salaam 
2.9 (4.3;2.4) 
Kilimanjaro 
1.6 (3.2; 1.3) 
<6.3> 
2008 
Arusha 
1.7 (2.2;1.1) 
Dar es Salaam 
2.6 (4.6; 0.7) 
Kilimanjaro 
3.6 (3.3; 3.8) 
<7.9> 
2003 
Arusha 
2.5 
Dar es Salaam 
3 
Kilimanjaro 
4.6 
2008 
Arusha 
3 
Dar es Salaam 
2 
Kilimanjaro 
2.2 
Uganda  2007 
15.6 (19.2; 
11.2) 
 2007 
5.5 (6.6; 4) 
 2007 
6.7 
(Source: CDC & WHO, 2008) 
Only Kenya and Tanzania have GYTS results for more than one year which allows us to 
determine possible trends. The Tanzanian results are seperated into regions, whereas all 
the other EAC GYTS data is national data. The Kenyan GYTS results show that between 
2001 and 2007 there has been an increase of around 11 percentage points in the youth who 
have tried smoking and an increase of 3.2 percentage points in current smokers (CDC, 
2008). The Tanzanian data also shows an increase in the youth who have tried smoking  on 
average and in current smokers (an average of 0.53 percentage points increase) between 
2003 and 2008. This increasing prevalence amoung the youth shows that future 
development of the market remains on an upward trend despite decreasing prevalence rates 
shown in the DHS. 
1.5 Tobacco and Cigarette Production and Consumption 
The table below shows how the tobacco area harvested in all EAC countries has changed 
from 2000 to 2009 as well as the relationship between tobacco growing and cigarette 
production. This table summarises the major tobacco growing countries in the EAC and the 
major cigarette producing countries, indicating likely trade flows from the growers to the 
producers and from the producers to the consumers. 
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Table 1.5.1: Tobacco Area Harvested and Cigarette Production in the EAC 
 
Country Tobacco Area 
Harvested in 
2000 
(Hectares) 
Tobacco Area 
Harvested in 
2009 
(Hectares) 
Percentage 
change in 
Tobacco Area 
Harvested 
Local 
Production 
(billion 
cigarettes) 
Local 
Consumption 
(billion 
cigarettes) 
Difference 
Imported (-)or 
Exported 
(billion 
cigarettes) 
Burundi 705 1 497 112.3 0.47 0.48 -0.01 
Kenya 14 160 20 642 45.8 14.9 5.7 9.2 
Rwanda 3 634 4 459 22.7 0 0.27 -0.27 
Tanzania 44 000 41 000 -6.8 5.87 5.5 0.37 
Uganda 13 712 14 000 2.1 0 0.92 -0.92 
(Source: Tobacco Atlas 2012 & Sources noted in Appendix B) 
The area dedicated to tobacco harvesting in Burundi has grown by 112.3% from 2000 to 
2009, followed by Kenya at 45.8%, Rwanda at 22.7% and Uganda at 2.1%. The tobacco 
area harvested in Tanzania has declined by 6.8 percent, albeit from the highest base of 
44 000 Ha. Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda are the largest tobacco growers in the EAC. 
Tobacco growing makes up around 5% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in Tanzania and 
Uganda. In Kenya this figure is around 7%, which translates to around USD 65million in 
exports (Gichane, 2012).  
The major cigarette producing countries are Kenya and Tanzania, producing around 14.9 
billion cigarettes and 5.87 billion cigarettes respectively. This implies that some of the 
tobacco grown in Tanzania and most of the tobacco grown in Uganda and Rwanda is 
exported to Kenya for production. Kenya and Tanzania are the only net exporters of 
manufactured cigarettes in the EAC, exporting around 9.2 billion cigarettes and 370 million 
respectively. Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda are net importers of cigarettes, importing around 
10 million, 270 million and 920 million respectively.  
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Section 2 Excise Taxation 
2.1 Tax Structures and Tax Burdens 
Excise taxes can be either specific taxes, based on quantity, or ad valorem, based on value 
or a mixture of both (Sunley et al., 2000). Ad valorem taxes can be structured on the base of 
the Cost Insurance Freight (CIF) value, ex-factory price, the wholesale price or the Retail 
Selling Price (RSP).  This section will look at each EAC country’s current cigarette excise tax 
structure and tax burden. This will be followed by a discussion on the positive and negative 
aspects of specific, ad valorem and a mixed excise tax structure, so that tax 
recommendations can be made for the EAC. 
The Ministry of Finance in Kenya raised taxes on cigarette products by 10 percent each year 
from 2007 to 2009. For tax increases to work as a public health strategy, increases must 
keep up with changes in inflation and income. However, in the 2009–10 budget, there was 
no increase (IDRS, 2011). In Kenya the finance minister has the authority to adjust taxes for 
inflation. A clear principle should be placed on the excise tax so that it is automatically 
indexed for inflation (Chaloupka 2010a). The table below shows the Kenyan excise tax 
structure in 2011.  
Table 2.1.1: Kenyan Cigarettte Excise Structure in 2011 
 
Categories: Post 2008 definitions Specific Tax per mille 
(KSH) 
Specific Tax per 
mille (USD) 
Specific tax per pack 
(USD) 
Plain cigarettes or plain cigarettes RSP of up to Ksh 
2,500 per mille 
700 8.45 0.17 
Soft Cap cigarettes of <72mm or soft cap cigarettes 
with RSP of Ksh 2501 - 3,500 per mille 
1000 12.08 0.24 
Soft cap cigarettes of >72 mm or soft cap cigarettes 
with RSP of Ksh 3501 -Ksh 4,500 per mille 
1500 18.12 0.36 
Hinge lid or RSP of more than Ksh 4,500 per mille 2500 30.19 0.60 
 
In 2011 the International Institute for Legislative Affairs (ILA) commissioned a study on the 
economics of tobacco taxation in Kenya. The study found that due to the constant state of 
flux of the excise tax system it was difficult to predict the impact of excise tax changes on 
tobacco consumption and government excise revenue. It was reported that in many 
instances the policy changes led to “revenue losses, suggesting that the design and 
administration of the excise duties is problematic” (Kimosop et al., 2012). After the study was 
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conducted there was a call for simplification of the tobacco excise structure in line with WHO 
recommendations.  
In June 2011, the Finance Bill which was tabled in the Kenyan parliament proposed a 
simplified excise tax structure. Due to several reasons, including political ones, the Bill was 
tabled and withdrawn several times but was finally enacted in April 2012. The excise tax 
structure changed from the four tiered specific tax system to a mixed structure of ad valorem 
(35% on retail price) and specific tax of KSH 1200 per mille (USD 14.49), whichever is 
higher (Kimosop et al., 2012).  
Table 2.1.2: Kenyan Cigarettte Excise Strucure in 2012 
 
Categories Specific Tax per 
mille (KSH) 
Specific Tax per 
mille (USD) 
Specific tax per 
pack (USD) 
Ad valorem Excise 
All cigarettes 1200 14.49 0.29 35% of RSP 
 
The table above shows the specific tax and ad valorem tax for all cigarettes in Kenya. The 
binding tax is the specific tax of USD 0.29 (KSH 24) per pack for all market segments. The 
specific tax acts as a tax floor and the ad valorem tax only serves to increase the excise tax 
for higher priced brands (i.e. when the price is greater than USD 0.29 or KSH 24  per pack). 
This is a hybrid tax system in that the ad valorem component only comes in on top of the 
specific tax for higher priced brands. This tax structure is much simpler than the tiered 
structure, although it is more complex than a uniform specific tax. It also ensures that all 
tobacco products are taxed equally, to prevent tobacco users from switching tobacco brands 
and types due to price differences. It further prevents manufacturers from switching from one 
tax band to another. An example of this occurred in December 2010, when the Finance 
Committee of Parliament amended the finance Act of 2010 to eliminate an earlier inclusion 
of length as an excise tax determinant. This amendment would have placed Mastermind’s 
Supermatch and BAT’s Sportsman brands at the same tax level. In response, BAT Kenya 
reduced the price of the Sportsman brand from Ksh 95 to Ksh 75 per pack, shifting it to a 
lower tax class, costing the government around Ksh 2 billion (USD 24 million) foregone in 
excise tax revenue (Wahome, 2011).  
In Tanzania the cigarette excise tax is a three tiered specific tax. One of the main aims of the 
2012/2013 budget was to increase domestic revenues from 16.9% of GDP to 18% of GDP 
(PWCb, 2012).  To this end excise taxes for alcohol, carbonated soft drinks and tobacco 
have all increased. In 2011 excise taxes were increased by 10% in line with inflation. In 2012 
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all tiers have been increased by 20% in accordance with the 2012/2013 National Budget 
objectives mentioned above (PWCb, 2012).  Cigarettes without a filter containing more than 
75% domestic tobacco are taxed at TZS 8210 per mille (US$ 5.15) (PWCb, 2012). 
Cigarettes with a filter, containing more than 75% domestic tobacco are taxed at a rate of 
TZS 19410 per mille (USD 12.18) (PWCb, 2012). All other cigarettes are taxed at a specific 
rate of TZS 35117 per mille (USD 22.04).  The table below gives a breakdown of cigarette 
excise taxes in Tanzania (2011-2012) and the US dollar equivalents per pack.  
Table 2.1.3: A 20% Increase in the Tanzanian Cigarette Excise Taxes  
 
Category of Excise tax Current Specific Tax 
per mille (TZS) 
2012 
Specific tax per pack 
(USD) 
Previous Specific 
Tax per mille (TZS) 
2011 
Previous Specific 
tax per pack (USD) 
Without a filter containing 75% local 
content 
8210 0.10 6830 0.09 
With a filter containing 75% local 
content 
19410 0.24 16224 0.20 
Other 35117 0.44 29264 0.37 
          (source: PWCb, 2012 and own calculations) 
The above tax rates imply that imported filter cigarettes pay 81% (35117/19410-1) more 
excise than filtered cigarettes with 75% local content. This practice is discriminatory towards 
the importation of any cigarettes and a single tiered specific tax would serve to remedy this 
bias.  
Uganda has a three-tiered specific excise tax based on packaging characteristics and the 
location of raw materials and production of the cigarettes. The tax rates are different for soft 
cup and hinge lid packaging. Soft cup packaging is of paper construction which offers less 
protection to the cigarette and is cheaper to produce than the hinge-lid packaging which is 
made from rigid cardboard (Marden, 2007). The rationale for this differentiation is that the 
soft cup packaging usually contains the cheaper brands and the hinge-lid packaging the 
premium brands (Sunley, 2009). It must be noted, however, that some premium brands are 
sold in soft cup packaging (Sunley, 2009). The excise taxes for Uganda can be seen in the 
table below: 
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Table 2.1.4: Ugandan Cigarette Excise taxes 2012 
 
Category Specific Tax per Mille (UGS) Specific tax per pack (USD) 
Soft cap with greater than 70% local constituents 22000 0.19 
Other Soft caps 25000 0.22 
Hinge Lid 55000 0.48 
other - - 
        (Source PWC, 2012 and own calculations) 
In Uganda, soft cup cigarettes with more than 70% local constituents are taxed at UGS 
22000 per mille (USD 9.54), while soft cup cigarettes with less than 70% local constituents 
are taxed at UGS 25000 per mille (USD 10.85). Hinge lid cigarettes are taxed at UGS 55000 
per mille (USD 23.86) (PWC, 2012). There is a lack of clarity surrounding the “local 
constituent” in the Ugandan excise tax. It is unclear whether the “local constituent” is the 
leaf, other raw materials or labour etc. There is also no independent check or prescribed 
process for confirming that the 70% “local constituent” requirement has been fulfilled. Other 
cigarettes that do not fall into these three tiers are taxed at an ad valorem rate of 160% on 
the ex-factory price.  
Tanzania and Uganda’s use of tiered specific excise tax shows that these governments have 
pursued other goals, in addition to revenue generation, through the types of taxes that are 
applied. Some countries use high customs duties to protect domestic tobacco growers or 
industries from outside competitors while others have done the same by applying excise tax 
(WHO, 2010). This may be seen as discriminatory according to WTO best practice. 
Discrimination is prohibited in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, whereby 
imported products are not to be subject to internal taxes or charges in excess of those 
applied to domestic products (Sunley et al., 2000).  These countries should employ a 
uniform specific tax that is non-protectionist in the excise tax context. They can, however, 
impose import tariffs, which would have the same effect as differential excise taxes. In 
Tanzania and Uganda the tiered excise tax especially affects imports from EAC countries as 
the 35% import tariff for Tanzania and the 25% import tariff for Uganda do not apply (see 
Appendix B). In Tanzania this is not a major issue as imports from other EAC countries do 
not even make up 1% of total consumption. In Uganda, however, imports from other EAC 
countries make up 100% of domestically consumed cigarettes.  
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
 
 
17 
The excise tax on cigarettes in Rwanda is currently 150% ad valorem tax on the Net of Tax 
(NOT) value for locally produced goods and 150% on CIF value for imported goods (Rwanda 
Revenue Authority, 2012). There are no locally produced cigarettes in Rwanda, therefore, all 
excise is based on the CIF value. Excise duty in Rwanda is levied in accordance with the 
2010 Law No 28/2010 which modifies the 2006 Law No 26/2006 (Institute of Policy Analysis 
and Research- Rwanda, 2011). 
 In Burundi the excise tax is 100% ad valorem on the ex-works price (Peterson, 2010). The 
legal base for this is the Budget Law of 2009. The table below separates the different tax 
structures used in the EAC. It looks at the excise tax burden and the total tax burden as a 
percentage of the average retail selling price. This is followed by a graph depicting the tax 
burdens.  
Table 2.1.5 Comparing the Current Tax Burdens as a percentage of Retail Selling Price 
(RSP) 
 
Country 
Weighted Average 
RSP (USD/pack) 
Specific excise (% 
of RSP) 
Ad valorem excise 
(% of RSP) 
Average Excise 
Tax (USD/pack) 
Total tax including 
import tariff and 
sales tax (% of 
RSP) 
Kenya 0.89 48.0 35.0 0.32 51.0 
Tanzania 1.25 18.0  0.44 33.4 
Uganda 0.85 26.2  0.22 41.5 
Burundi 0.64  28.2 0.18 43.5 
Rwanda 0.87  36.3 0.31 51.6 
      (Source: PWC, 2012 and own calculations) 
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Graph 2.1.1 The Current Tax burdens as a percentage of RSP 
 
  
The graph above shows that Kenya and Rwanda have the highest average excise tax as a 
percentage of RSP, with figures of around 37% and 36% respectively. This is followed by 
Burundi with around 28%, Uganda with 26% and Tanzania with 18%. These figures fall 
below those recorded for other low income countries which average at around 41% 
(Chaloupka et al., 2011). Furthermore, The World Health Organisation (WHO) recommends 
that excise taxes should form 70% of the retail price of cigarettes (WHO, 2010).  
Economic theory shows that the choice of tobacco excise tax structure will have a significant 
impact on government’s ability to achieve its public health and fiscal objectives (WHO, 
2010). The health objective is to decrease consumption levels and give the message that all 
brands are equally harmful while the fiscal objective is to increase government revenue and 
ensure predictable revenue streams. Other considerations when comparing excise tax 
structure are the administrative costs and the real value of the tax. The real value of the tax 
can be reduced through rising inflation and income levels (WHO, 2010). 
Ad valorem excise taxes are less beneficial than specific taxes from a health and fiscal point 
of view. They are also more difficult to administer than uniform specific taxes. The ad 
valorem excise structure weakens the revenue impact of the taxes and requires a 
determination of value and thus a strong tax administration to deter tax evasion (Chaloupka 
et al., 2011). Burundi and Rwanda practice ad valorem taxes based on the ex-factory price 
or CIF. These value based taxes are likely to incur undervaluation of the tax base which 
negatively affects health objectives (Perucic, 2012). This will be discussed in greater detail in 
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section three. Government revenue projections are also more uncertain under ad valorem 
tax structures because of tax evasion, sensitivity to industry pricing decisions and 
substitution effects between brands (Chaloupka et al., 2011). The substitution effect occurs 
because the value based tax creates greater gaps in prices between high and low priced 
brands, leading to greater availability of relatively low priced, low ‘quality’ products 
(Chaloupka et al., 2010a). Ad valorem excise taxes create the impression that all brands are 
not equally harmful; the lower excise burden per stick on cheaper brands cannot be justified 
by health concerns.  
Ad valorem taxes based on the Retail Selling Price (RSP) such as those recently applied in 
Kenya can have the advantage of a tax multiplier effect, where part of any increase in the 
consumer price goes to the government as excise revenue. For example, if the tobacco 
industry in Kenya were to raise the NOT price of cigarettes by 20% from around KSH 45 to 
KSH 54 in the high price segment, the excise tax would increase by 20% from KSH 30.5 to 
KSH 36.6. The VAT amount would increase by 20% from KES 12 to KSH 14.4 and the retail 
price would increase by 20% from KSH 87 to KSH 105. It is best practice to use the RSP as 
the base when imposing ad valorem excise tax to avoid industry manipulation and to incur 
the multiplier effect shown above. Kenya uses a mix of ad valorem taxes based on RSP and 
specific excise, incorporating the strengths of both types of excises, but at the cost of adding 
to the administrative complexity (Chaloupka et al., 2010a).  
Tiered specific tax structures, like those found in Tanzania and Uganda, are also very 
complex tax structures and lead to greater variability in the price of different brands and 
tobacco products. This creates opportunities for the substitution effect to cheaper brands or 
products in response to increased taxes. In addition these tiered taxes are more difficult to 
administer and can undermine the health impact of tobacco excise taxes by creating greater 
opportunities for tax avoidance and tax evasion (Chaloupka et al., 2011).  
From a public health perspective, a strong argument can be made for a high, uniform 
specific tax on cigarettes (Chaloupka et al., 2010a). Uniform specific taxes are relatively 
easy to administer (Chaloupka et al., 2010a). They also guard governments financially by 
protecting against industry price wars or price reductions (Sunley et al., 2000). In this way 
uniform specific taxes allow fiscal revenue streams to be more predictable. They also ensure 
that the tax burden is the same per cigarette. This sends the public health message that all 
brands are equally harmful.  A uniform specific tax is especially helpful for countries with 
large price discrepancies between brands and tobacco products (Guindon et al., 2002).  
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The real value of specific taxes will erode over time, unless tax rates are regularly adjusted 
for inflation and income growth (Chaloupka et al., 2010a). In order to prevent erosion of the 
tax due to inflation, specific taxes should be indexed for inflation, increasing by at least the 
same rate as inflation per year. Ad valorem taxes are not exempt from devaluation as they 
can decline with price cuts initiated by the industry. Both ad valorem and specific taxes need 
to be increased at the rate of income growth to prevent the real reduction of the tax and 
increase the affordability of tobacco products. Affordability looks at the impact of price and 
income on consumption. An increase in price results in cigarettes becoming less affordable 
whereas an increase in income results in them becoming more affordable (Blecher & van 
Walbeek, 2009).  From 2005 to 2012, average per capita income growth in the EAC was 
3.7%. This is higher than that of sub Saharan Africa (3, 2%) (Shinohara, 2012). Excise tax 
increases should lead to price increases that are in line with inflation and income increases. 
This is particularly difficult to achieve with ad valorem taxes due to the industry’s ability to 
manipulate the NOT price. 
If inflation is high and expected to remain high, ad valorem taxes are preferred as they 
automatically self-adjust for inflation (Yurekli et al., 2011). According to the World Bank the 
annual inflation in Uganda was 18.7% in 2011. This figure was 14% in Kenya, 12.7% in 
Tanzania, 9.7% in Burundi and 4.9% in Rwanda (World Bank, 2011). Inflation rates in the 
EAC are quite high, implying these countries may benefit from an ad valorem tax; however, 
a uniform specific tax that adjusts for inflation is still preferable in this case. Specific taxes 
should be automatically adjusted for inflation by referring to the consumer price index (CPI). 
It is critical that the tax adjustment be automatic by administrative order and not require 
approval from a legislative body (Yukreli et al., 2011). This will serve to bypass 
administrative inefficiencies. 
2.2 Global Overview 
The World Health Organisation (WHO) completed a study in 2009 looking at 182 countries 
and categorising them according to their income level and excise tax structure (WHO, 2010). 
Across WHO regions the European region was found to have the highest average retail price 
and total tax share of average RSP (USD 3.87/pack and 63% respectively), mainly because 
of the European Union (EU) countries. The Eastern Mediterranean region had the lowest 
average consumer price and tax share, with the African region being second lowest (WHO, 
2010).  
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The WHO recorded that a large number of countries, 60 in all, rely on ad valorem excises 
only, while 55 countries impose only a specific excise (WHO, 2010). About one quarter (48 
out of 182) levy both specific and ad valorem excises. Furthermore it was found that 19 out 
of 182 countries do not levy any excises on cigarettes (WHO, 2010). In general, low-income 
countries are more likely to use an ad valorem excise whereas the trend for middle income 
countries was less clear. The WHO (2010) study found that 28 out of 40 low-income 
countries that levy an excise tax on cigarettes had ad valorem tax only compared to 10 that 
apply only a specific tax, while 2 use a combination of the two. In contrast, high-income 
countries are less likely to lean towards an ad valorem excise. Only 2 of 38 high-income 
countries rely on an ad valorem tax, while 11 rely on a specific tax and 25 use a mixture of 
both excises. These are mostly EU countries because of the EU excise tax directive.  
2.3 The EU Example 
The European Union (EU) is the worlds largest common market and has adopted a large 
number of directives that harmonise taxes across the 27 member states. Many groups of 
countries that aim to integrate their economies, look to the EU as a prototype. Within this 
context it makes sense to briefly discuss the rather complicated harmonised excise tax 
system on cigarettes in the EU. 
In each member country of the EU, the excise duty on cigarettes consists of two parts: one 
specific and one ad valorem (Yurekli et al., 2011). The specific element must represent 5–55 
percent of the total tax burden (excise duty and VAT) of the most popular price category 
(MPPC) sold in that country under Directive 77/805/EEC of 1977 (Delipalla & O’Donell, 
1998). The ad valorem component may be anything between 45% and 95% tax (Townsend, 
1996). This combination of tax types reflects a political compromise that enhanced the then-
current tax regime for cigarettes. The EU was divided into two opposing camps with respect 
to their preferred structure of taxation. In general, the northern European countries preferred 
specific taxation and the southern countries ad valorem (Delipalla & O’Donell, 1998). These 
differences led to major difficulties in trying to reach agreement on the harmonisation of 
taxes on cigarettes in the EU.  
After several years of disagreement among EU member states, in 1992, it was agreed that a 
minimum excise tax burden as well as a specific excise tax floor, measured in euros per 
mille would be implemented. Since 1993, the overall excise tax should be no less than 57% 
of the Weighted average selling price (WAP), unless the tax is already at least 101 euros per 
mille and not less than 64 per mille (Commission for the European Communities, 2002). The 
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specific tax must be between 5 and 76.5% of the WAP. The ad valorem tax therefore must 
be between 23.5 and 95%. These directives imply an excise tax floor of €1.28 per pack of 20 
cigarettes and a minimum overall tax level of 70% of the retail price. 
The minimum excise tax burden of 57% of the retail price does not ensure the same level of 
cigarette prices across the EU. Chaloupka et al. (2010a) further argue that the above 
agreement does not reduce the wide range of tax levels in the EU. These disparities in price 
could lead to incentives for cross-border buying and declining average cigarette prices. 
Other incentives for cross border-buying include government corruption, an established 
informal market, and a well-organized criminal establishment (Merriman et al., 2000). Cross-
border buying for personal use to evade tax and for resale to make a profit, that is 
bootlegging, was found to be a problem between Poland and Germany where the price 
differential was €2.98 as well as in Finland and Estonia (€2.85), and Greece and Bulgaria 
(€1.56) according to 2006 figures (Cnossen, 2006).  
To address the incentive of price disparities, there is strong rationale for harmonising taxes 
and prices upwards in the EU to prevent bootlegging between high and low tax countries. 
There is furthermore incentive to raise the minimum tax rate and implement a specific rate 
rather than an ad valorem rate because the industry has more control over the quantum of 
tax per pack when it is entirely or mainly levied as an ad valorem tax. For example a high 
percentage ad valorem tax which incentivises the industry to decrease the NOT price will 
result in a lower price that will yield a lower tax as is the case in Spain and much of southern 
Europe (Townsend, 1996). In this instance, the price paid by consumers, even after 
application of a high ad valorem tax, is still relatively low, which encourages tobacco 
consumption.  
Guindon et al. (2002) argues that neighbouring countries can minimise the incentive for 
cigarette smuggling by harmonising taxes on tobacco products. In early 2000, Lithuania, 
Latvia, and Estonia announced plans to harmonise their tobacco fiscal policies as they were 
required to raise their rates to qualify for membership in the EU. This suggests that spillover 
effects from tobacco tax harmonisation in the EAC could be seen in neighbouring countries 
such as South Sudan and Somalia as they have applied for EAC membership (Nkwame, 
2012). 
In 2010, the EU strengthened the tobacco tax requirements for member states, effective as 
of 1 January 2014. These requirements include an increase in the excise tax benchmark 
from 57% to 60% of WAP and the total minimum excise has increased from €64 (USD 102) 
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to €90 (USD 144) per 1000 cigarettes (Council of the European Union, 2011). The specific 
tax will therefore lie between 7.5 and 76.5%. This will result in an increase in the tax floor 
from €1.28 (USD 2) per pack to €1.80 (USD 2.8) per pack, which acts as a minimum specific 
tax. This 41% increase in the binding constraint will drive tax increases throughout the EU 
over the next few years, reducing price differentials within the EU. This will help to reduce 
tax avoidance and evasion, as well as reduce cigarette affordability. It must be noted that the 
most effective mechanism for reducing the price differential in the EU is not the excise 
burden component but rather the excise tax floor which acts as a minimum specific tax. 
It is estimated that cigarette consumption in the EU is lower in countries that rely more on 
specific excise taxes. This conclusion was made drawing on the findings of an assessment 
on tax structures and cigarette prices (Chaloupka et al., 2010a). From a financial 
perspective, greater reliance on the specific tax in the EU is associated with higher excise 
tax revenues and less variability in these revenues in the long run. 
The public health impact of specific taxes was a key factor in the new directive on tobacco 
taxes that raised the minimum tax for each member state and increases the emphasis on 
specific taxes (Council of the European Union, 2011). This directive reflects ‘best practice’ 
principles found in the WHO's Technical Manual on Tobacco Tax Administration. These 
principles include simpler tax structures that rely more on specific taxes (WHO 2010). 
2.4 The Recommended Excise Tax for the EAC 
From the health perspective, where the primary purpose of the tax is to discourage 
consumption of cigarettes, a strong case can be made for specific excises in the EAC. 
Specific taxes are also preferred if tax administration is weak as it is easier to determine the 
physical quantity compared to the value of the cigarettes (Yurekli et al., 2011). Also, from the 
financial perspective, increases in specific taxes have more predictable consequences 
regarding industry responses and government excise revenue streams than increases in ad 
valorem excise tax. 
In light of the above discussion, from the health and financial perspective, one can deduce 
that including a specific tax component indexed for inflation and income growth is optimal for 
the EAC. The EU example shows that specific taxes will best serve to harmonise taxes and 
prices upwards across all EAC countries and prevent smuggling.  Furthermore best practise 
suggests that a uniform specific tax should be used across all market segments. This will 
especially serve to rule out discrimination against imported products within the EAC. If the 
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aim is to protect local producers from competition of imported cigarettes then imported 
cigarettes should be taxed through import tariffs rather than differential excise taxes.  
 
Currently, the highest average excise tax is in Kenya at USD 0.32 per pack (see Appendix 
B). This is very low compared to the new directive in the EU which states that the minimum 
excise must be USD 2.8 per pack. The EU excise tax is more than twice the average Retail 
Selling Price (RSP) of a pack in the EAC. Taking this into consideration, one can speculate 
that a specific uniform excise of between USD 0.40 and USD 1 indexed for inflation and 
income growth should be considered. A mixed system, like that of Kenya could also be 
explored. Examples of a mixed structure could be a specific tax of USD 0.60 or an ad 
valorem tax of 50% of RSP, whichever is higher. In this way the specific tax acts as the tax 
floor, as in the case of the EU. This tax structure will result in premium brands being taxed 
more than lower priced brands. A fiscal advantage of this structure is that it may result in 
higher revenue streams. 
 
Sunley et al., (2000) notes that when setting the level of cigarette excise tax, factors that 
must be considered to reduce the risk of smuggling include the tax rate in neighbouring 
markets and the effectiveness of the tax authorities to enforce compliance. In light of this, 
Monitoring and Evaluation Specialist, Kellen Nyamurungi, said that Kenya has implemented 
a good policy for tracking manufactured tobacco products, “but its neighbours are yet to 
implement these measures, leading to the smuggling of tobacco products especially along 
common borders" (The Daily Monitor, 2012). Nyamurungi added that harmonization of 
tobacco control in the East African region is critical. This paper will explore the effects of a 
harmonised uniform specific excise of USD 0.6 across all EAC countries. This excise tax 
rate and structure will be adjusted in the sensitivity analysis to determine the change in 
health and fiscal benefits. Assuming the NOT price does not change with an increase in the 
excise tax, the effect of a USD 0.60 uniform specific excise tax on the tax burdens can be 
seen in the table and graph below. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.4.1: Comparing the Results of a USD 0.60 Specific Excise Tax across the EAC 
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Country  Weighted Average RSP 
(USD/pack) 
Specific excise (% of 
RSP) 
Average Excise Tax 
(USD/pack) 
Total tax including 
import tariff and sales 
tax (% of RSP) 
 Current 
Situation 
After tax 
Change 
Current 
Situation* 
After tax 
Change 
Current 
Situation 
After tax 
Change 
Current 
Situation 
After tax 
Change 
Kenya 0.89 1.22 48.0*/35.0 49.2 0.32 0.60 51.0 63.2 
Tanzania 1.25 1.71 18.0* 35.1 0.44 0.60 33.4 50.5 
Uganda 0.85 1.30 26.2* 46.2 0.22 0.60 41.5 61.7 
Burundi 0.64 1.15 28.2 52.2 0.18 0.60 43.5 67.3 
Rwanda 0.87 1.22 36.3 49.2 0.31 0.60 51.6 65.4 
            *Corresponds to Specific Tax 
Graph 2.4.1: The Proposed Tax Burdens as a Percentage of RSP 
 
 
After the new specific excise tax of USD 0.60 is simulated the excise tax burden in all EAC 
countries increases as seen above. In Tanzania this increase is 17% from 18% to 35% of 
the RSP. The highest excise tax burden originally found in Kenya also increased from 37% 
to 49% of RSP. The largest increases in tax burdens of around 20% can be seen in Uganda 
and Burundi. The range of excise burdens in the EAC would fall between 35% and 53% of 
RSP (18% range) with a harmonised excise tax of USD 0,6 (see table 2.4.1). This is a 
smaller range than that of the current scenario, between 18% and 48% of RSP (30% range). 
Section 3 Industry Strategy 
3.1 Industry Responses to Increases in Excise Tax 
0.0
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The cigarette-manufacturing industry in the EAC is highly concentrated as it is in most other 
countries, and individual firms have significant control over the Net of Tax (NOT) price. The 
tobacco industry has a number of options in responding to an increase in the excise tax. 
These responses include no change in the NOT price or adjusting the NOT upwards or 
downwards in different percentage intervals. The response to an increase in the excise tax 
employed by the industry is motivated by profit margins and market shares. These industry 
responses effect the health and financial policy objectives of the excise tax change.  
 
The tobacco industry can employ a one-to-one strategy, or under- or overshift excise taxes; 
their tactics depend on the market and excise tax structures and the economic context 
(Gilmore et al., 2012). Firstly, the industry can cause the retail price to increase by the full 
increase of the tax; that is, a change in the excise tax is assumed to be fully passed on to 
the smokers. This assumes that as the excise tax is increased and/or changed to a specific 
tax, the price of cigarettes will increase by the same amount as the increase in the excise tax 
for all market segments because the industry does not alter the NOT price. In some cases, 
the retail price might increase by slightly more than the increase in the excise tax quantum if 
the sales tax is levied on the excise tax as well. Secondly, the industry can pass on more 
than the value of the increase in the excise tax by increasing the NOT price; this is known as 
overshifting the tax. Thirdly the tobacco industry can pass on less than the value of the tax 
increase by decreasing the NOT price, this is known as undershifting the tax.  
 
If the industry overshifts the tax then the industry increases the NOT price, coincident with 
the excise tax increase (van Walbeek, 2010). The retail price will increase by a greater 
percentage than had only the excise tax been increased. This enhances the consumption-
reducing public health impact of the tax increase (Gilmore et al., 2012). Overshifting may 
lead to increased industry profits and greater declines in consumption than expected if the 
absolute value of the price elasticity of demand |εP| is less than 1. 
 
Overshifting is most popular when the excise tax is levied as a specific tax (Gilmore et al., 
2012). If cigarette smoking is in a declining phase then the optimal industry strategy 
employed by the tobacco industry is to overshift the tax to extract as much consumer surplus 
as possible (Barnett et al. 1995 in van Walbeek, 2010). Van Walbeek (2010) found this to be 
the case in South Africa where a significant proportion of the increase in the real retail price 
since 1994 was due to increases in the net-of-tax price, rather than increases in the excise 
tax. While this is less of an issue for public health because consumption is declining at a 
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greater rate due to higher prices, it highlights a missed fiscal opportunity for the government 
to increase tobacco excise (Gilmore et al., 2012). The government could have increased the 
tax by a greater amount, possibly increasing government excise revenues but instead the 
industry profits are enhanced through this strategy. Overshifting greatly enhances the public 
health benefits of an excise tax increase. However, the industry's client base shrinks at a 
faster rate than if a one-to-one strategy were employed. Furthermore, a strategy of 
overshiting the tax increases the motive for competitors to join the market.  
 
In the case of an ad valorem excise tax increase the industry has an incentive to undershift 
the tax (Gilmore, 2012). This means that they have an incentive to reduce the NOT price, 
coincident with the excise tax increase. This may result in a less than expected increase in 
the retail price because the increase in price would be less than the increase in the tax. This 
strategy undermines the health and fiscal aims of the government. Under-shifting is most 
likely to occur when the tobacco industry is entering the market or trying to gain market 
share, particularly with the youth (Gilmore et al., 2012).  
 
Depending on the |εP| undershifting may be employed if the industry is trying to grow the 
market. Becker et al. (1994) argue that, given the addictiveness of nicotine, it is rational for 
cigarette companies to keep prices below profit maximising levels in the short term to ensure 
that their brands remain affordable, especially to those initiating smoking. It must be noted 
that the Becker example is from the US where the industry is less concentrated than the 
EAC. However, the point still holds and they argue that each addicted smoker provides an 
annuity income flow to the tobacco company until the smoker quits or dies. The crucial point 
is that the tobacco industry undershifts the tax in order to make tobacco products more 
affordable to the youth, hooking smokers when they are young and ensuring a lifetime 
revenue stream from that individual (Perry, 1999). Kostova et al., (2011) estimate that youth 
in low to middle income countries have a price elasticity of demand for tobacco of -2.11. 
Other studies on youth in Michigan estimate elasticity values of -1.31 (Chaloupka & 
Grossman, 1996). These youth elasticity values are much higher than those of the overall 
population, given by the IARC estimates, revealing that large increases in tax and price will 
lead to reductions in youth smoking, unless the industry undershifts the tax in all or at least 
some market segments.  
 
In order to prevent the tobacco industry from targeting the youth by undershifting the excise 
tax, Gilmore et al., (2012) recommends substantial increases in the excise tax. Substantial 
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increases of this kind were noted in the Czech Republic during their accession into the EU. It 
has since been cited as an example in the prevention of undershifting. Substantial increases 
in the excise tax will prevent the industry from lessening the increase in price by 
undershifting the tax.  
 
The industry can also employ a mixed strategy where overshifting and undershifting occurs 
in different market segments. One can speculate that the industry may also overshift the tax 
in the premium priced market segments to retain profits and undershift in the lower priced 
segments to grow their market share. The fact that adults have relatively lower price 
elasticity than youth means that the industry can increase revenue from the adult population 
by overshifting the tax in higher priced segments. This strategy ensures that the increase in 
revenue from the higher prices will offset the decrease in revenue from the lower sales. The 
industry still attracts the youth and other possible initiators by under-shifting the tax in the 
low-priced segments to make cigarettes more affordable to these markets. 
3.2 Trade Margins and Tax Burdens 
The Industry has an incentive to undertake transfer pricing in Burundi and Rwanda due to 
the ad valorem excise tax structure calculated on the ex-works price. Transfer pricing in this 
context is an accounting method used by large multi national corporations (MNC’s) in which 
they artificially lower or increase the price of goods to evade tax. This is possible firstly 
through relationships with distributors and secondly through relatively high trade margins. 
Within the tobacco industry, BAT has the most vertically integrated agricultural supply chain, 
obtaining most of their tobacco directly from contracted farmers (BAT, 2012). There is also a 
large incentive for upward vertical integration in order to gain market power. Sunley (2009) 
suggests that where excise tax is calculated ad valorem on the ex-works price then the 
industry has the incentive to manipulate the ex-works price downwards by selling to related 
distributors in order to evade tax. The examples below of vertical integration demonstrate 
that the tobacco industry stands to gain from upward vertical integration because of the profit 
incentives through tax evasion via transfer pricing, and restricted competition. With the 
control of export and import in many EAC countries BAT is able to undergo a level of transfer 
pricing in order to lower the ex-works price and ultimately the excise tax on cigarettes. 
The Legacy Tobacco Documents Library (LTDL) holds tobacco industry internal corporate 
documents produced during litigation between 46 U.S. states and the seven major tobacco 
industry organizations (LTDL, 2012). These documents show evidence of Memorandum of 
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Understandings (MoU’s) being signed between the tobacco industry and distributors (Legacy 
Document: 321766670, 2000). A tobacco company, namely The Jerusalem Cigarette 
Company Ltd. (JCC) whose registered office was at El-Azariya, Jerusalem also owned a 
distribution company as a wholly owned subsidiary. The distribution company owned by JCC 
further entered into an MoU with BAT Limited (UK and Export), namely a “distribution 
agreement” ensuring sole distribution of certain brands, financial kickbacks per case and 
confidentiality protection (Legacy Document: 321766670, 2000).  This type of vertical 
integration, which enables transfer pricing, is still believed to be a key strategy of BAT today. 
In the first quarter of 1997 in Kenya RJ Reynolds accused BAT of influencing distributors 
and stockists against selling competing brands (UNCTAD, 1999). When BAT was 
approached by the Monopolies and Prices Comission (MPC) they conceded to entering into 
a ‘gentleman’s agreement’ with distributors. Investigations carried out by the Commission 
established that BAT had exclusive dealing arrangements with its distributors and they had 
stopped supplying BAT cigarette products to those who stocked the RJ Reynolds Aspen 
brand of Cigarette. The Commission considered these to be restrictive trade practices 
according to the Kenyan competition law. However, before the Commission could invoke 
section 15 of the Act, which empowers the Commissioner to propose appropriate remedial 
measures, the managing director of RJ Reynolds informed the Commission that BAT had 
ceased its unfair business practices (UNCTAD, 1999). The case was thereafter dismissed. 
The above examples of ‘distribution agreements’ and ‘gentlemen’s agreements’ are a means 
for the tobacco industry to undergo transfer pricing in order to evade tax and increase profit 
margins.   
 
Secondly, with respect to trade margins, Sunley (2009) looks at Mexico as an example of a 
state with a single rate ad valorem excise on cigarettes. The ad valorem rate in Mexico in 
2009 was 160% on the wholesale price, that is, the retail price excluding VAT, excise tax 
and the retail margin. The base of the wholesale price includes the wholesale margin and 
therefore the incentive is not as big for the industry to artificially lower the ex-works price but 
rather the wholesale price. In this case Sunley assumes the retail margin alone to be 25% of 
the wholesale price. The Tobacco Atlas reports the retail and wholesale margin combined to 
be around 50% of the ex-works price (Eriksen et al., 2012). These large trade margins 
indicate that some level of transfer pricing was likely to have been initiated by the industry. 
 Another example of high retail and wholesale margins can be found in the Legacy 
Documents. These documents contain a Lucky Strike Implementation Plan explicitly for 
Africa (Legacy Document: 503965451, 1994). In this report BAT assume the importers 
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margin to be 20%, the wholesale margin to be 6% and the retail margin to be 15%. These 
margins were shown in the financials to be cumulative margins in that each margin is based 
on the previous figure. As an example the financial structure for Lucky Strike imported into 
Ghana, albeit in 1994, is shown below: 
Table 3.1.1: Retail and Wholesale Margins Reported for Ghana in the Legacy 
Documents 
 
GHANA  
CIF Landed per mille USD 15.1 
Exchange on 7th March (US$1:GHC900) 13590 
Excise tax 170.5% on CIF 23171 
ADD: Tax 17.5% on CIF 2378 
ADD: Import duty 25% on CIF 3397.5 
ADD: Special tax 40% on CIF 5436 
TOTAL LANDED COST 47972 
Importers Margin 20% of Total Landed Cost 9595 
Total After Importers Margin 57567 
Wholesale Margin 6% of Total after importers Margin 3454 
Total After Wholesale Margin 61021 
Retailers Margin 15% of Total after wholesale margin 9153 
Retail Selling Price 70174/mille 
In-store price per pack GHC 110.2  
       (Source: Legacy Document: 503965457, 1994) 
The excise tax in Ghana is 170.5% of the CIF value. This excise percentage, which is 
comparable to Rwanda and Burundi, sounds relatively high but it is only 33% of RSP 
(23171/70174)*100%. If one includes all other taxes, the tax burden is 49% 
((23171+2378+3398+5436)/70174)*100%. There is a strong incentive for the tobacco 
industry to reduce the CIF value, while increasing the margins of importers, wholesalers and 
retailers. These margins in the table above are 20%, 6% and 15% respectively. Although 
these margins seem reasonable, they are cumulative. The importers margin,  wholesale 
margin and retail margin are 71%, 25% and 67% on CIF respectively.  
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A similar example is given for Kenya in Legacy Document 2074331342. The excise tax in 
Kenya in 1997 was 135% based on the ex factory price. The excise tax burden was 32% of 
RSP and the overall tax burden was 45% of RSP including the 25% import duty and 16% 
VAT (Legacy Document: 2074331342, 1998). The trade margin in Kenya was 11.8% of the 
RSP.  
The financial structures described above are assumed to be similar to that of Burundi and 
Rwanda, due to the similar tax structure of high ad valorem excise rates calculated on the 
CIF value and the ex factory price. BAT, the importer of Lucky Strike in the Ghana case, 
continues to dominate market share in the EAC.  It was not possible to obtain the wholesale 
and retail margin for Burundi and Rwanda, specifically, but one can assume these margins 
to be similar to those found in the example of Ghana above. The model will incorporate 
similar margins in the base case for countries with ad valorem excise tax, but these margins 
will remain variable. 
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Section 4 Methodology and Workings 
4.1 Price elasticity 
As excise taxes are increased, cigarette prices typically increase, as taxes are shifted to 
consumers. Cigarette consumption changes as a result of the price change, the magnitude 
depending on the price elasticity of demand (εP). The greater the price elasticity of demand 
(in absolute terms), the greater will be the reduction in consumption and the smaller the 
increase in government revenue (Sunley, 2009). The εP value for the model will start at −0.6. 
This figure is based the IARC Handbook (2011) where it was found that the static εP in low 
and middle-income countries lies between −0.2 and −1.0 and the dynamic εP lies between 
−0.1 and −0.7. Other static price elasticities to consider for the model include -0.4 and -0.8.  
Since the price change is a discrete amount, that is, not infinitesimally small, it is appropriate 
to use the arc elasticity formula, also known as the midpoint formula, rather than the point 
elasticity formula, to estimate the new point of consumption. The distinguishing characteristic 
of this formula is that percentage changes are calculated based on the average of the initial 
and ending values of each variable, rather than just the initial values. For minor changes in 
the price, the midpoint and the point elasticity formulas provide similar answers. However, 
for large price increases the point formula is inappropriate since it yields implausible 
answers. An example is given in van Walbeek (2010) with a price elasticity of −0.6 and a 
hypothetical 200% price increase. When the point elasticity formula is used, consumption 
would decrease by 120%, which is mathematically impossible. The arc formula would predict 
a more plausible decrease of 41.2%. 
Once the new level of consumption has been calculated, the model calculates a new level of 
excise tax revenue, industry revenue and total consumption expenditure, based on the new 
consumption figures. The model then calculates percentage changes in the retail price, 
cigarette consumption, excise revenue, industry revenue and consumption expenditure. For 
most tobacco control advocates and policy makers, these are most important outputs of the 
model.  
The value of the εP influences the relative size of the public health and fiscal benefits of an 
excise tax increase (van Walbeek, 2010). If the demand is more price elastic then the public 
health benefit is greater and the fiscal benefit smaller. However, if the demand is less price 
elastic then the fiscal benefit is greater and the public health benefit smaller.  
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4.2 Model Inputs  
The model focuses on short-term (one-year) impacts of once-off changes in the excise tax. 
The input variables considered in the model include current consumption of imported and 
locally produced cigarettes, quantified in millions of sticks. The locally produced consumption 
is separated into up to four different market segments based on tax or price differentials. 
Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda are separated into market segments for domestic 
consumption, broken down according to price or tax, the segments range from low prices or 
taxes to high prices or taxes. Other input variables include the Net-of-Tax (NOT) price of 
cigarettes, the current excise tax rates, whether they are ad valorem or specific tax 
structures, import tariffs (MT), current VAT rates and the combined wholesale and retail 
margin (WRM) for countries with ad valorem tax structures only, i.e. Burundi and Rwanda. 
All import tariffs within the EAC region are 0% due to the common union agreement (EAC, 
2012).   
4.3 Mathematical Derivation of the Model 
The model consists of (A) an initial equilibrium, (B) a subsequent excise tax change, which 
changes the price of each market segment as well s overall consumption and (C) a new 
equilibrium (van Walbeek, 2010). The model considers the change in a number of variables 
between the two equilibrium states. In the following derivation subscript 1 refers to the 
baseline equilibrium (A) and subscript 2 to the equilibrium after the change (C).  
The retail price (P) can be subdivided into five components: the excise tax (ET), the import 
tariff (MT), a general sales tax or VAT (ST) and the remainder, the net-of-tax price (NOT), 
which in turn is the ex-works price (EW) plus the absolute value of the retail and wholesale 
margin (RWM). The NOT price data for different market segments was not accessible. I 
therefore calculated the NOT price working backwards from the retail price. If the quantum of 
the excise tax, VAT, import tariff and retail price are known then one can calculate the NOT 
price. The calculations employed in the model are shown below.  
P = NOT + ET + MT + ST          (1) 
A Sales tax of (100.α) % is levied on (NOT+ET+MT) for all EAC countries (Deloitte, 2011). 
Thus follows: 
P = (NOT + ET + MT) (1+α)          (2) 
Where NOT=EW+ RWM 
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4.3.1 Specific Excise Tax 
 
In the case of a specific tax, the ET is determined independently of the NOT price. The 
Retail and Wholesale Margin (RWM) is levied as a percentage 100(β)% of the Ex-works 
price (EW). The import tariff is also levied as a percentage 100(ζ)% on the ex works price. 
The EW is calculated as follows: 
P = [EW+RWM+MT +ET](1+ α)   (3) 
P= [EW + βEW + ζEW + ET](1+ α)        (4) 
P/(1+ α)= EW(1 +β+ζ)+ET         (5) 
EW=[P/(1+ α)-ET]/(1+β+ ζ)         (6) 
Total cigarette consumption at the outset is Q1. Aggregate values are obtained as follows: 
 Total expenditure by consumers: P1 xQ1      (7) 
 Total excise revenue: ET x Q1 
 Total industry revenue: EW x Q1 
 
4.3.2 Ad Valorem Excise Tax 
 
In the case of an ad valorem tax, the Excise tax (ET) is levied as a percentage (Ψ)% on the 
ex-works price (EW).  
The equation for the retail price can be seen below: 
P = EW(1+β+Ψ+ζ)(1+ α)          (8) 
The Ex Works price is calculated as follows: 
P/(1+ α)= EW(1+β+Ψ+ζ)          (9) 
EW=[P/(1+ α)]/(1+β+Ψ+ ζ)                   (10) 
4.3.3 The New Equilibrium 
 
Once the initial equilibrium has been set up and the inputs of the model are in place then the 
new hypothetical specific or ad valorem excise tax (ET2) is inputted together with the price 
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elasticity of demand (εP). As discussed earlier, tobacco companies have some control over 
the industry price (EW), given the highly concentrated nature of the industry. Often the 
industry will change the EW price for each market segment when the excise tax increases 
are instituted in line with government policy. 
For a (100ω) % increase in the EW, the new industry price for each price segment is 
calculated as 
EW2= EW1(1+ω)         (11) 
Where MT2 =ζ(EW2) and NOT2=EW2+RWM2 
ST2=[NOT2+ET2+MT2] α         (12) 
If the excise tax is levied as a specific tax, the new retail price (P2) is calculated as  
P2= [EW2 + βEW2 + ζEW2 + ET2](1+ α)      (13)  
    = [EW2(1+ β + ζ) + ET2](1+ α) 
If the excise tax is levied ad valorem, the new retail price is calculated as: 
P2 = EW2 (1+β+Ψ+ζ)(1+ α)        (14) 
The new retail price P2 for each market segment is calculated as follows:  
P2= NOT2+ ET2 + MT2 + ST2        (15) 
The average price based on the price in each market segment (ms) can be calculated as 
follows:  
P2 ∑      2.msi 
Where 
P2. msi= NOT2 msi + ET2 msi + MT2 msi + ST2 msi  
Once the price for each market segment (P2) has been calculated, one can use the arc 
formulation of the price elasticity      (         
     
 
     
     
 ) to solve for Q2 as follows: 
          (
     
     
)       (
     
     
)  
One can then calculate the following aggregates: 
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 Total expenditure by consumers: P2 xQ2  (16) 
 Total excise revenue: ET2 x Q2 
 Total industry revenue: EW2 x Q2 
 
In the final step, the model calculates the growth rates in the following variables: (1) average 
excise tax (2) average retail price, (3) consumption, (4) total expenditure, (5) total excise tax 
revenue and (6) total industry revenue. 
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Section 5 Data Analysis  
5.1 Data Discussion 
The major challenge of this paper has been acquiring accurate information for the inputs of 
the model for each of the EAC countries. An extensive list of input variables including the 
year and source of the data can be found in Appendix B. The two major data incongruencies 
have been firstly, data confusion caused by different sources reporting different values for 
the same input variables and secondly, missing data for certain inputs.  The former can be 
clearly demonstrated by prevalence figures for all EAC countries. Adult prevalence in Kenya 
2008 ranged from 18.8% for males and 0.5% for females in the DHS to 48% adult 
prevalence reported by the ERC (ERC, 2010).  I had to decide which prevalence rates were 
more credible depending on the definitions, methodology used and background reading. For 
prevalence figures I decided that the DHS is the most reliable source.  
The Net of Tax (NOT) prices for different market segments are available from the respective 
Ministries of Finance (MoF) or the tobacco Industry. The MoF for countries that imposed an 
ad valorem excise tax were unresponsive in e-mail and telephone communication. 
Furthermore, due to the sensitive nature of this information and the industry practice of 
transfer pricing the industry do not publish NOT values or make them accessible to the 
public. As a result I had to calculate the ex-works price and the NOT price using algebraic 
equations, making assumptions about the Retail and Wholesale Margins (RWM) for 
countries that impose specific and ad valorem taxes. Based on research on the Legacy 
Documents, expounded in Section 3 above, the analysis regarding the RWM is based on 
educated guesses. Firstly, the RWM would be unimportant for countries that imposed a 
specific excise tax as there is less incentive for the industry to manipulate the NOT price 
downward. Secondly, I assumed that although the RWM would remain variable as a 
percentage of the ex-works price in the model, the base scenario and simulation would have 
a RWM of 100% of the ex works price for countries with an ad valorem excise tax, i.e. 
Burundi and Rwanda.  
The excise tax structure in Uganda is separated into soft cup cigarettes with less than 70% 
local constituents and those with more than 70% local constituents. Cigarettes that meet the 
local constituent requirement are taxed around USD 0.20 less per pack (p.p.) than those that 
do not. As explained in Section 2 it is difficult to ascertain those that meet the requirement as 
all cigarettes are imported, and information regarding the local constituents is unavailable. 
Furthermore, data regarding the category for ‘other cigarettes’ in Uganda was unobtainable. 
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For this reason it was assumed that all soft cup packs are taxed at the higher tax of UGS 
25000 per mille (USD 10.85) and there are no ‘other cigarettes’ taxed at an ad valorem rate 
of 160%. 
Another variable that was difficult to obtain was the percentage of the market for the four 
price or tax segments. This information was available for Kenya and Tanzania; however the 
values for Kenya were taken across a number of different years, affecting the quality of the 
data. It is for this reason that the values for Tanzania were imputed to Uganda, Burundi and 
Rwanda, where market segments could not be found (see Appendix B). Furthermore, it is 
assumed that the low priced market segment does not contain a filter and the middle to 
premium segments do contain a filter.   
The market shares in Kenya for the low priced segment were taken from the 2009 market 
share for plain cigarettes in the ERC report (ERC, 2010). The premium segment  was 
calculated from the hard cap market segment in the ERC report, with the most recent 
available data being from 2004 (ERC, 2010). The remainder of the market share, 79.2%, 
was the overall market share for soft caps. This 79.2% of the market was divided into two 
segments, 84.5% for brands shorter than king size and 15.5% for king size brands according 
to 2009 statistics (ERC, 2010) The soft caps shorter than king size include brands such as 
Safari Regular and Rooster. These brands have been classified in the model as medium 
priced brands. The soft cap cigarettes longer than 72mm include brands such as Sportsman 
and Safari Kings. These brands have been classified as high priced brands. Locally 
produced cigarettes were classified as explained above, whereas imported cigarettes were 
separated into segments where possible. 
Cigarettes that were imported to Kenya and Tanzania were assumed to belong to the 
premium price category only. The rationale for this being that Kenya and Tanzania produced 
all of the low, middle and high price segments locally. Kenya imports 1.8% of their domestic 
consumption from countries outside of the EAC, while Tanzania imports 1.3% from Kenya 
and countries outside of the EAC (ERC, 2010). Uganda, Burundi and Rwanda import all of 
their consumption from within the EAC, mainly from Kenya. It has been assumed that all four 
price segments are included in the imports from Kenya and are broken up into the ratios 
imputed from Tanzania. Other than imports from Kenya, Uganda imports 1.4% from 
Tanzania which is assumed to be of the high price market segment (ERC, 2010). Rwanda 
imports 99% of their total consumption from Kenya and 1% from Burundi, the latter being 
assumed to be of the high priced market segment only. Burundi imports 3.9% of their total 
consumption, almost all of which is imported from Kenya. In Burundi, the imports from Kenya 
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are assumed to be of the high price market segment only and those from other countries 
outside of the EAC are assumed to be of the premium priced market segment.  
The excise tax for Burundi is 100% ad valorem. The base of the ad valorem tax was very 
difficult to obtain and therefore the base for Rwanda, the ex-works price, was imputed for the 
ad valorem excise in Burundi. Lastly production figures for Uganda and Rwanda are 
assumed to be negligible as there is no data available for production in these countries. 
BAT’s production activities have been centralized in Kenya after the closure of its production 
plants in Uganda and Rwanda in 2006 (BAT Kenya, 2007). It is unclear whether there is a 
small amount of local production that remains within these countries. 
The industry revenue in the model is calculated by multiplying the NOT price by the number 
of packs sold. This assumption was made considering the discussion above on trade 
margins and tax burdens. The Legacy Documents discussed in Section 3 revealed MoU’s 
between the tobacco industry and distributors inferring that these entities are often related 
(Legacy Document: 321766670, 2000).  
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Section 6: Results 
6.1 Base Scenarios 
The tables below present the base scenario for each of the five EAC countries. The base 
scenario summarises the current position for each of the various price segments, as well as 
the total or average outcomes. The outcomes are given in the local currency for policy 
recommendations and in USD for comparative analysis. 
The source of the input variables can be found in Appendix B and exchange rates in 
Appendix C.  As discussed in section 5 above, the base scenario assumes a retail and 
wholesale margin (RWM) of 100% of the ex-works price for countries with an ad valorem 
excise tax, namely, Burundi and Rwanda.  
Noteworthy points from the Kenyan base scenario are that the low priced brands is the only 
market segment bound by a specific tax, resulting in an excise tax rate of 48% of RSP i.e. 
KSH 24 or USD 0.29 (line 1 & 2) . All other price segments in Kenya are bound by the ad 
valorem excise of 35% on RSP (line 3 & 19). The value of these taxes range from KSH 25 
(USD 0.30) per pack for the medium priced brands to KSH 49 (USD 0.59) for the premium 
priced brands (line 9 & 14). In this way the Kenyan specific tax acts as a tax floor, similar to 
that of the European Union.  
The RSP in Kenya can bee seen to range from KSH 50 (USD 0.60) per pack  for the low 
priced brands to KSH 140 (USD 1.69) for the premium priced brands (line 11 & 16). The 
consumption figures in line 21 are broken up according to the market shares found in line 5. 
The highest consumption levels are found in the medium priced brands (66%) at 3746 
million cigarettes, followed by the low priced brands (16%) at 884 million cigarettes and the 
medium priced brands (12%) at 687 million cigarettes. The premium priced cigarettes have 
the lowest market shares, with 5% being locally produced (280 million cigarettes) and 2% 
being imported (102 million cigarettes). 
The Excise revenue in Kenya totals around KES 7669 million or USD 93 million (line 23 & 
27). The medium priced brand contributes the most to this total, around KES 4589 million or 
USD 55 million due to the high market share of this brand alone. In the same way, the 
medium priced brand contributes the most to the industry revenue total (KES 6714 million or 
USD 81.09 million). Industry revenue totals around KES 10417 million or USD 126 million 
(line 24 & 28) 
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Table 6.1.1 Base Scenario: Kenya 
 
      BASE SCENARIO       
Line   Premium brand High priced 
brand 
Medium Priced 
Brand 
Low 
priced 
brand 
Imported 
premium 
Total or 
Average 
  Inputs         
1 Specific excise tax p.p. local 
currency 
N/A N/A N/A 24.0 N/A  
2 Specific excise tax p.p. USD   0.29   
3 Ad valorem excise rate 35% on RSP 35% on RSP 35% on RSP N/A 35% on RSP  
4 VAT rate (%) 16 16 16 16 16   
5 Market share (percentage) 5 12 66 16 2   
6          
7 Outputs         
8 NOT price (KES p.p.) 72 46 36 19 53 37 
9 Excise tax (KES p.p.) 49 32 25 24 49 27 
10 VAT  (KES p.p.) 19 12 10 7 19 10 
11 Retail price (KES p.p.) 140 90 70 50 140 74 
12          
13 NOT price (USD p.p.) 0.87 0.56 0.43 0.23 0.64 0.44 
14 Excise tax (USD p.p.) 0.59 0.38 0.30 0.29 0.59 0.32 
15 VAT  (USD p.p.) 0.23 0.15 0.12 0.08 0.23 0.12 
16 Retail price (USD p.p.) 1.69 1.09 0.85 0.60 1.69 0.89 
17          
18 Binding excise tax  Ad valorem Ad valorem Ad valorem Specific Ad valorem   
19 Excise tax as % of RSP 35 35 35 48 35 37 
20          
21 Cigarette consumption (million 
cigarettes) 
280 687 3746 884 102 5700 
22          
23 Excise revenue (million KES) 686 1082 4589 1061 250 7669 
24 Industry revenue (million KES) 1003 1584 6714 845 271 10417 
25 Total Consumption Expenditure 
(million KES) 
1959 3092 13112 2211 714 21089 
26          
27 Excise revenue (million USD) 8.28 13.07 55.43 12.82 3.02 92.62 
28 Industry revenue (million USD) 12.12 19.12 81.09 10.20 3.27 125.81 
29 Total Consumption Expenditure 
(million USD) 
23.66 37.35 158.36 26.71 8.62 254.70 
*p.p. = per pack  
The base scenario for Tanzania, presented in the table below, reveals that it has the lowest 
average excise tax in the EAC, of only 18% of RSP (line 19). It also has the lowest excise 
tax across all cigarette brands in the EAC, with an excise of only 10% of RSP for premium 
brands such as Marlboro. The excise rate has a small range, reaching its highest at only 
19% for medium priced brands. The average excise tax, in monetary terms, however,  is 
USD 0.22 p.p. (line 14). This is equal to the excise quantum in Uganda and higher than that 
of Burundi (USD 0.18 p.p.). 
The relatively low excise tax rates in Tanzania results in government excise revenue of only 
USD 62 million (line 27) compared to that of Kenya, USD 93 million. Total government 
excise revenue in Tanzania is much lower despite the higher average retail price of USD 
1.25 per pack (p.p.) compared to the average retail price in Kenya of USD 0.89 p.p. (line 16). 
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Kenya’s consumption exceeds Tanzanian consumption by 180 million cigarettes or 3% (line 
21). Although the excise tax revenue in Tanzania is lower, the industry revenue is much 
greater than in Kenya (USD 126 million) at USD 229 million. It is in fact greater than all other 
EAC industry revenue figures combined (line 28). A contributing factor is the high average 
NOT price of USD 0.83 p.p. (line 13).  
Table 6.1.2 Base Scenario: Tanzania 
 
      BASE SCENARIO         
Line   Premium 
Brand 
High 
Priced 
Brand 
Medium 
Priced 
Brand 
Low 
Priced 
Brand 
Imported 
premium (non-
EAC) 
Imported 
premium (EAC) 
Total or 
Average 
  Inputs          
1 Specific excise tax p.p. local 
currency 
388 388 388 164 702 702   
2 Specific excise tax p.p. USD 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.10 0.40 0.40  
3 Ad valorem excise rate N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A  
4 VAT rate (%) 18 18 18 18 18 18   
5 Market share (percentage) 1 6 75 16 1 1   
6           
7 Outputs          
8 NOT price (TZS p.p.) 3002 2154 1353 683 1991 2687 1324 
9 Excise tax (TZS p.p.) 388 388 388 164 702 702 356 
10 VAT  (TZS p.p.) 610 458 313 153 610 610 303 
11 Retail price (TZS p.p.) 4000 3000 2055 1000 4000 4000 1989 
12           
13 NOT price (USD p.p.) 1.88 1.35 0.85 0.43 1.25 1.69 0.83 
14 Excise tax (USD p.p.) 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.10 0.44 0.44 0.22 
15 VAT  (USD p.p.) 0.38 0.29 0.20 0.10 0.38 0.38 0.19 
16 Retail price (USD p.p.) 2.51 1.88 1.29 0.63 2.51 2.51 1.25 
17           
18 Binding excise tax (specific or ad 
valorem) 
Specific Specific Specific Specific Specific Specific   
19 Excise tax as % of retail price 10 13 19 16 18 18 18 
20           
21 Cigarette consumption (million 
cigarettes) 
60 349 4142 899 42 28 5520 
22           
23 Excise revenue (million TZS) 1164 6770 80396 7383 1475 983 98171 
24 Industry revenue (million TZS) 8997 37569 280274 30721 4181 3762 365504 
25 Total Consumption Expenditure 
(million TZS) 
11990 52320 425591 44963 8400 5600 548863 
26           
27 Excise revenue (million USD) 0.73 4.25 50.47 4.63 0.93 0.62 61.63 
28 Industry revenue (million USD) 5.65 23.58 175.94 19.28 2.62 2.36 229.44 
29 Total Consumption Expenditure 
(million USD) 
7.53 32.84 267.16 28.23 5.27 3.52 344.55 
*p.p. = per pack 
In Uganda, like Tanzania, the binding excise tax is specific across all price segments (line 
18), with an average excise quantum of USD 0.22 p.p. (line 14), 26% of RSP (line 19). The 
excise tax for all price segments, except for the imported premium brands, is USD 0.22 p.p. 
due to the structure of the excise and accompanying assumptions explained in section 5 
above.  The total government excise revenue in Uganda is USD 10.17 million (line 27) and 
total industry revenue is USD 23.44 million (line 28). The average NOT price of USD 0.51 
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p.p. (line 13) is the second highest after Tanzania, while the average retail price is USD 0.86 
p.p., with a range of around USD 1.10 from low to premium priced brands (line16).  
Table 6.1.3 Base Scenario: Uganda 
 
      BASE SCENARIO       
Line   Imported 
Premium 
brand (KE) 
Imported High 
priced brand 
(KE) 
Imported Medium 
Priced Brand 
(KE) 
Imported low 
priced brand 
(KE) 
Imported high 
priced brand 
(TZ) 
Total or 
Average 
  Inputs         
1 Specific excise tax p.p. local 
currency 
1100 500 500 500 500   
2 Specific excise tax p.p. USD 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2   
3 Ad valorem excise rate N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A  
4 VAT rate (%) 18 18 18 18 18   
5 Market share (percentage) 1 6 75 17 1   
6          
7 Outputs         
8 NOT price (UGS p.p.) 2290 1619 1195 771 1619 1166 
9 Excise tax (UGS p.p.) 1100 500 500 500 500 506 
10 VAT  (UGS p.p.) 610 381 305 229 381 301 
11 Retail price (UGS p.p.) 4000 2500 2000 1500 2500 1973 
12         
13 NOT price (USD p.p.) 0.99 0.70 0.52 0.33 0.70 0.51 
14 Excise tax (USD p.p.) 0.48 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 
15 VAT  (USD p.p.) 0.26 0.17 0.13 0.10 0.17 0.13 
16 Retail price (USD p.p.) 1.74 1.08 0.87 0.65 1.08 0.86 
17         
18 Binding excise tax (specific or 
ad valorem) 
Specific Specific Specific Specific Specific   
19 Excise tax as % of retail price 28 20 25 33 20 26 
20          
21 Cigarette consumption (million 
cigarettes) 
9 55 695 155 13 927 
22          
23 Excise revenue (million UGS) 503 1371 17366 3885 325 23450 
24 Industry revenue (million UGS) 1046 4438 41503 5991 1052 54031 
25 Total Consumption Expenditure 
(million UGS) 
1828 6855 69466 11654 1625 91428 
26          
27 Excise revenue (million USD) 0.22 0.59 7.53 1.69 0.14 10.17 
28 Industry revenue (million USD) 0.45 1.93 18.01 2.60 0.46 23.44 
29 Total Consumption Expenditure 
(million USD) 
0.79 2.97 30.14 5.06 0.70 39.66 
*p.p. = per pack 
In Burundi and Rwanda, tabulated below, the binding excise tax on all price segments is ad 
valorem (line 17) with average excise rates of 28% and 36% of RSP respectively (line 18). 
The Retail and Wholesale Margin (RWM) is assumed to be 100% on the ex works price as 
discussed previously (line 4). The NOT price can be broken down into 50% ex-work price 
and 50% RWM for both Burundi and Rwanda according to the assumptions. 
The lowest average retail price in the EAC is found in Burundi at an average of USD 0.64 
p.p. (line 15). This is in spite of the fact that retail prices for premium brands in Burundi are 
higher than all other premium brands sold in the EAC at USD 3.08 p.p. (line 15). This reveals 
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how relatively cheap the low priced brands are at only USD 0.38 p.p. (line 15). NOT prices in 
Burundi also have a high range, from USD 0.22 to USD 1.74 (line 12). 
Table 6.1.4 Base Scenario: Burundi 
 
*p.p. = per pack 
In the base scenario for Rwanda, the average excise tax is USD 0.31, second only to Kenya 
(line 13). Rwanda also has the second highest average excise tax rate, at 36% of RSP (line 
18), only 1% behind Kenya (line 19). The high excise rate contributes to greater excise revenue 
because although local consumption of cigarettes is only 277 million cigarettes (line 20), the 
lowest of all EAC countries, the total excise revenue is USD 4.36 million, only slightly less than 
that of Burundi at USD 4.45 million (line 26). Local cigarette consumption in Burundi is almost 
double that of Rwanda at 489 million cigarettes (line 20). 
Line 15, below, shows that the retail price p.p. in Rwanda ranges from USD 0.50 to USD 2.20, 
with an average of USD 0.87, while the NOT price has a range of USD 0.74 (line 12). The 
      BASE SCENARIO         
Line   Premium 
brand 
High 
priced 
brand 
Medium 
Priced 
Brand 
low 
priced 
brand 
Imported 
premium from 
other 
Imported high 
priced brand 
from EAC 
Total or 
Average 
  Inputs          
1 Ad valorem excise rate (% on EW) 100 100 100 100 100 100  
2 VAT rate (%) 18 18 18 18 18 18   
3 Market share (percentage) 1 6 73 16 0 4   
4 Retail & Wholesale margin (% on 
ex-works price) 
100 100 100 100 100 100   
5           
6 Outputs          
7 NOT price (BIF p.p.) 2260 734 452 282 2119 734 473 
8 Excise tax (BIF p.p.) 1130 367 226 141 1059 367 236 
9 VAT  (BIF p.p.) 610 198 122 76 610 198 128 
10 Retail price (BIF p.p.) 4000 1300 800 500 4000 1300 836 
11           
12 NOT price (USD p.p.) 1.74 0.57 0.35 0.22 1.63 0.57 0.36 
13 Excise tax (USD p.p.) 0.87 0.28 0.17 0.11 0.82 0.28 0.18 
14 VAT  (USD p.p.) 0.47 0.15 0.09 0.06 0.47 0.15 0.10 
15 Retail price (USD p.p.) 3.08 1.00 0.62 0.38 3.08 1.00 0.64 
16           
17 Binding excise tax (specific or ad 
valorem) 
Ad 
valorem 
Ad 
valorem 
Ad valorem Ad 
valorem 
Ad valorem Ad valorem   
18 Excise tax as % of retail price 28 28 28 28 26 28 28 
19           
20 Cigarette consumption (million 
cigarettes) 
5 30 357 78 0 19 489 
21           
22 Excise revenue (million BIF) 292 552 4036 548 1 349 5777 
23 Industry revenue (million BIF) 584 1105 8072 1095 1 697 11555 
24 Total Consumption Expenditure 
(million BIF) 
1034 1955 14288 1939 2 1234 20452 
25           
26 Excise revenue (million USD) 0.22 0.43 3.11 0.42 0.00 0.27 4.45 
27 Industry revenue (million USD) 0.45 0.85 6.21 0.84 0.00 0.54 8.90 
28 Total Consumption Expenditure 
(million USD) 
0.80 1.51 11.00 1.49 0.00 0.95 15.74 
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industry revenue in Rwanda is USD 5.81 million, almost USD 3.1 million less than Burundi (line 
27). 
Table 6.1.5 Base Scenario: Rwanda 
 
      BASE SCENARIO       
Line   Imported 
Premium 
brand (KE) 
Imported High 
priced brand 
(KE) 
Imported 
Medium Priced 
Brand (KE) 
Imported low 
priced brand 
(KE) 
Imported low 
priced brand 
(BU) 
Total or 
Average 
  Inputs         
1 Ad valorem excise rate (% on 
ex-works price) 
150 150 150 150 150  
2 VAT rate (%) 18 18 18 18 18   
3 Market share (percentage) 1 6 75 16 1   
4 Retail & Wholesale margin (% 
on ex-works price) 
100 100 100 100 100 100 
5        
6 Outputs         
7 NOT price (RWF p.p.) 581 508 242 145 508 250 
8 Excise tax (RWF p.p.) 436 381 182 109 381 187 
9 VAT  (RWF p.p.) 183 160 76 46 160 79 
10 Retail price (RWF p.p.) 1200 1050 500 300 1050 515 
11         
12 NOT price (USD p.p.) 0.98 0.85 0.41 0.24 0.85 0.42 
13 Excise tax (USD p.p.) 0.73 0.64 0.31 0.18 0.64 0.31 
14 VAT  (USD p.p.) 0.31 0.27 0.13 0.08 0.27 0.13 
15 Retail price (USD p.p.) 2.02 1.76 0.84 0.50 1.76 0.87 
16         
17 Binding excise tax (specific or 
ad valorem) 
Ad valorem Ad valorem Ad valorem Ad valorem Ad valorem  
18 Excise tax as % of retail price 36 36 36 36 36 36 
19          
20 Cigarette consumption (million 
cigarettes) 
3 18 208 45 3 277 
21          
22 Excise revenue (million RWF) 66 335 1892 247 53 2592 
23 Industry revenue (million RWF) 88 446 2523 329 70 3456 
24 Total Consumption 
Expenditure (million RWF) 
181 921 5210 679 145 7137 
25          
26 Excise revenue (million USD) 0.11 0.56 3.18 0.41 0.09 4.36 
27 Industry revenue (million USD) 0.15 0.75 4.24 0.55 0.12 5.81 
28 Total Consumption 
Expenditure (million USD) 
0.30 1.55 8.76 1.14 0.24 11.99 
*p.p. = per pack 
In all the EAC countries, the middle priced brands contribute the most towards total excise 
revenue, industry revenue and total consumption expenditure (line 27-29 & line 26-28). This 
is expected due to the high market share of around 76% for this brand alone (line 5 & line 3). 
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Table 6.1.6 Base Scenario Averages and Totals 
 
Base Scenario EAC Aggregates  
Line  Kenya Tanzania Uganda Burundi Rwanda EAC Averages 
or Totals 
1        
2 Excise Tax (USD per pack)  0.32 0.22 0.22 0.18 0.31 0.27 
3 Retail Price (USD per pack)  0.89 1.25 0.86 0.64 0.86 1.03 
4 Consumption (million 
cigarettes)  
5700 5520 927 489 277 12913 
5 Industry Revenue (million 
USD)  
126 229 23 9 6 393 
6 Government Excise 
revenue (million USD)  
93 62 10 4 4 173 
7 Total Consumption 
Expenditure (million USD)  
256 345 40 16 12 669 
8 Excise tax as a % of Retail 
Price  
37 18 26 28 36 28 
 
The table above compares each EAC country in terms of their aggregate excise tax, retail 
price, consumption, industry revenue, government excise revenue, total consumption 
expenditure and excise tax as a % of Retail Selling Price (RSP). Comparatively Kenya has 
the highest excise tax of USD 0.32 (37% of RSP) followed by Burundi at USD 0.31 (28% 
RSP) and Tanzania and Uganda at USD 0.22. The excise tax in Tanzania is 18% of RSP 
and in Uganda it is 26% of RSP (line 8). Rwanda has the lowest excise tax at USD 0.18, 
36% of RSP (line 2 & 8). Burundi has the lowest aggregate RSP of USD 0.64 followed by 
Uganda and Rwanda at USD 0.86, Kenya at USD 0.89 and Tanzania at USD 1.25 (line 3).  
Consumption figures have a large range across the EAC. Rwanda consumes the least 
amount of cigarettes at around 277 million, followed by Burundi with 489 million and Uganda 
with 927 million (line 4). Tanzania has the second highest consumption figures at 5.5 billion 
cigarettes and Kenya the highest at 5.7 billion cigarettes (line 4). Industry revenues are 
highest in Tanzania at USD 229 million, followed by Kenya at USD 126 million and Uganda 
at USD 23 million. Burundi has an industry revenue of USD 9 million and Rwanda has the 
lowest industry revenue of around USD 6 million. 
Government excise revenue is highest in Kenya at USD 93 million followed by Tanzania at 
USD 62 million and Uganda at USD 10 million. Burundi and Rwanda have the lowest excise 
revenue of around USD 4 million. Total consumption expenditure is highest in Tanzania at 
around USD 345 million, followed by Kenya at USD 256 million and Uganda at USD 40 
million. Total consumption expenditure drops to around USD 16 million in Burundi and USD 
12 million in Rwanda (line 7). 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
 
 
47 
Overall EAC Averages 
The domestic production of cigarettes in the EAC has a weighted average Retail Selling 
Price (RSP) of USD 1.04 p.p.. Imported consumption from EAC countries retails on average 
at USD 0.89 p.p. and those imported from non- EAC countries retail around USD 1.93 pp. 
The average RSP recorded in 2009 for low income countries is USD 1.06 p.p., this is similar 
to the weighted average retail price for domestic consumption in the EAC of USD 1.04 p.p. 
(IARC, 2012).  
The weighted average excise tax for domestic production in the EAC is 27% of RSP; for 
imported consumption from EAC countries this figure rises to 28%, and for imported 
consumption from non-EAC countries it increases to 29% of RSP. When comparing the 
average excise tax in the EAC as a percentage of RSP to those of other low-income 
countries, one finds that all EAC countries are below the low-income country average of 39% 
of RSP. Moreover, on average the tax rates for low-income countries are around 40% lower 
than those of high income countries (IARC, 2012). The global average excise tax rate 
recorded by the World Bank in 2009 was 50% of RSP, compared to 28% of RSP in EAC 
countries (line 8, IARC, 2012). The WHO recommends that countries should set an excise 
tax that is at least 70% of the retail price of a pack of cigarettes (WHO, 2010). 
In line with article 6 of the FCTC, global excise tax averages and WHO recommendations, 
this paper will simulate the effects of an increase in the excise tax rate together with a 
harmonized excise structure. The structures used will include a uniform specific tax and a 
mixed tax structure with a specific tax and an ad valorem excise based on the RSP, 
according to the discussion in section 2.  
6.2 Different Tax Scenarios 
This thesis will present a number of excise tax scenarios for the EAC below. These are the 
following: 
1. Increasing and harmonising the excise tax to a uniform specific tax of USD 0.60 on 
all market segments across all EAC countries. This scenario will assume a price 
elasticity (εp) of -0.6 and no change in the Net of Tax (NOT) price. 
 
The above assumptions will be tested for their robustness through the following sensitivity 
analysis: 
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A. An increase in the εp from -0.6 to -0.8 
B. A decrease in the εp from -0.6 to -0.4 
C. An increase in the NOT price of 20%, implying a strategy of overshifting the tax 
by the industry 
D. A decrease in the NOT price by 20%, implying a strategy of undershifting the tax 
by the industry 
E. An increase in the uniform specific tax from 0.60 to 0.80 
F. A decrease in the uniform specific tax from 0.60 to 0.40 
 
2. Increasing and harmonising the excise tax to a uniform specific tax of USD 0.60 or an 
ad valorem excise tax of 40% of RSP, whichever is higher. This adaptation from 
scenario 1 will be applied to all market segments across all EAC countries.  
 
The full results, together with the input values are shown in appendix D. The graphs below 
present a summary of the current and simulated excise tax for each market segment and 
country in the EAC.   
 
 
The graph above shows that in Kenya the excise tax in Scenario 1 and 2 is consistently 
higher than the current excise tax in the low, medium and high priced market segments. In 
the low and medium priced segments the excise tax is 100% greater in Scenario 1 and 2 
than in the base scenario. Lastly, Scenario 2 deviates from Scenario 1 with an increase of 
around 30% in the premium priced segments due to the 40% ad valorem component of 
Scenario 2. 
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In Tanzania, the excise tax in Scenario 1 and 2 is higher than that of the Base scenario 
across all market segments. The excise tax in Scenario 2 is also consistently greater than 
that of Scenario 1 in all market segments except for the low price market segment, where 
the tax is the same as in Scenario 1. The greatest difference in excise tax between Scenario 
1 and 2 is around USD1.10 found in the locally produced Premium price brand. 
 
 
The Ugandan graph shows that the excise taxes for Scenario 1 and 2 are 200% greater than 
the current excise tax, for all market segments except for the premium price category 
imported from Kenya. Scenario 2 shows an increase in the excise tax to around USD 0.90 in 
the imported premium segment. 
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
Low Price Medium
Price
High Price Premium
Price
Imported
Premium
(outside
EAC)
Imported
Premium
(inside
EAC)
E
x
ci
se
 T
a
x
 (
$
U
S
) 
Tanzanian Excise Tax Scenarios 
Current Excise Tax
Scenario 1
Scenario 2
0.00
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.80
1.00
Imported
Low Price
(KE)
Imported
Medium Price
(KE)
Imported
High Price
(KE)
Imported
High Price
(TZ)
Imported
Premium
Price (KE)
E
x
ci
se
 T
a
x
 (
$
U
S
) 
Ugandan Excise Tax Scenarios 
Current Excise Tax
Scenario 1
Scenario 2
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
 
 
50 
 
In Burundi, Scenario 1 and 2 both have an excise of USD 0.60 for all market segments 
except for the premium priced segments. In the premium priced segments Scenario 2 shows 
an increase in the excise tax to around USD 1.60 for the domestic premium brands and USD 
1.75 for imported premium brands.  
 
The above graph shows that Scenario 1 and 2 diverge in the high and premium priced 
segments, where the current excise tax is greater than that of Scenario 1. However, in the 
medium priced segment with the largest market share, the excise tax in Scenario 1 and 2 is 
100% greater than that of the base scenario.  
 
6.3 Scenario 1: Increasing and Harmonising the Excise Tax to a 
Uniform Specific Tax of USD 0.60 
The increase in the excise tax on all brands to a uniform specific tax of USD 0.60 was 
chosen because the USD 0.60 value ensures an increase in excise tax in all EAC countries 
and in most market segments. The uniform specific structure was selected because of the 
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benefits of a single specific tax, explained in section 2.4. This increase will have a significant 
impact on the retail price, especially those of low and medium priced brands. The differential 
impact on the retail price will also have a differential effect on the consumption of different 
brands of cigarettes. The results of the Base Scenario will be tabulated and compared with 
the results of Scenario 1. The percentage changes are noted for the excise tax, retail price, 
consumption, industry revenue and government excise revenue variables.  
Table 6.3.1: Comparing Selected Results from Scenario 1 to the Base Scenario: Kenya 
 
Kenya Scenario 1 
 
Line  Premium 
Brand 
High Priced 
Brand 
Medium 
Priced Brand 
Low 
Priced 
Brand 
Imported 
Premium 
Total or 
Average 
1 Base Excise tax (USD p.p.) 0.59 0.38 0.30 0.29 0.59 0.32 
2 Excise tax Scenario 1 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 
3 % change 1 58 103 107 1 89 
4 Base Retail price (USD p.p.) 1.69 1.09 0.85 0.60 1.69 0.89 
5 Retail Price Scenario 1 1.70 1.34 1.20 0.96 1.70 1.22 
6 % change 1 23 42 60 1 37 
7 Base Consumption (million 
cigarettes) 
280 687 3746 884 102 5700 
8 Consumption (million 
cigarettes) Scenario 1 
279 606 3043 670 102 4700 
9 % change  0 -12 -19 -24 0 -18 
10 Base Industry revenue 
(million USD) 
12.12 19.12 81.09 10.20 3.27 125.81 
11 Industry revenue (million 
USD) Scenario 1 
12.08 16.86 65.87 7.73 3.26 105.80 
12 % change 0 -12 -19 -24 0 -15.9 
13 Base Excise revenue (million 
USD) 
8.28 13.07 55.43 12.82 3.02 92.62 
14 Excise revenue (million USD) 
Scenario 1 
8.37 18.18 91.30 20.11 3.05 141.00 
15 % change 1 39 65 57 1 52 
 
Before the increase in the excise tax, the weighted average binding excise tax was USD 
0.32 per pack (line 1). If the excise tax were to increase to a specific excise of USD 0.60, the 
average Retail Selling Price (RSP) of all brands would increase from USD 0.89 to USD 1.22, 
an increase of 37%. The increase in RSP is highest for the low priced brands, with an 
increase of 60%, followed by the medium (42%) and high priced brands (23%). The increase 
in RSP is lowest for the premium brands with an increase of only 1% (line 6). This is 
expected as the tax is currently low on cheap cigarettes and high on expensive cigarettes 
due to the ad valorem component. A uniform specific tax will result in greater increases in 
the RSP of low priced cigarettes than on high priced cigarettes.  
Given an assumed price elasticity of demand of -0.6, total consumption decreases by around 
1 billion cigarettes from 5,7 billion to 4,7 billion, a decrease of 18% (line 7, 8 & 9). The low 
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priced segment has the largest consumption decline of 24% while both local and imported 
premium brands show negligible decreases in consumption. These percentage changes are 
almost identical to those of industry revenue, revealing that low and medium priced brands 
are the major contributors of the USD 21 million decline in industry revenue.  
The quantum of excise tax per pack increases by a weighted average of 89%. As a result of 
the 89% increase in the excise tax per pack and the 18% decrease in cigarette consumption, 
average excise revenue is expected to increase by 52% from a total excise revenue of USD 
92 million across all brands to USD 141 million (line 13, 14 & 15).  
Table 6.3.2: Comparing Selected Results from Scenario 1 to the Base Scenario: 
Tanzania 
 
Tanzania Scenario 1 
Line  Premium 
Brand 
High 
Priced 
Brand 
Medium 
Priced 
Brand 
Low Priced 
Brand 
Imported 
Premium 
(non-EAC) 
Imported 
Premium 
(EAC) 
Total or 
Average 
1 Base Excise tax (USD p.p.) 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.10 0.44 0.44 0.22 
2 Excise tax Scenario 1 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 
3 % change 146 146 146 482 36 36 190 
4 Base Retail price (USD p.p.) 2.51 1.88 1.29 0.63 2.51 2.51 1.25 
5 Retail Price Scenario 1 2.93 2.30 1.71 1.21 2.70 2.70 1.71 
6 % change 17 22 33 93 8 8 37 
7 Base Consumption (million 
cigarettes) 
60 349 4142 899 42 28 5520 
8 Consumption (million 
cigarettes) Scenario 1 
55 309 3500 611 40 27 4541 
9 % change  -9 -11 -16 -32 -4 -4 -18 
10 Base Industry revenue (million 
USD) 
5.65 23.58 175.94 19.28 2.62 2.36 229.44 
11 Industry revenue (million USD) 
Scenario 1 
5.15 20.90 148.65 13.10 2.51 2.26 192.58 
12 % change -9 -11 -16 -32 -4 -4 -16 
13 Base Excise revenue (million 
USD) 
0.73 4.25 50.47 4.63 0.93 0.62 61.63 
14 Excise revenue (million USD) 
Scenario 1 
1.64 9.27 104.99 18.32 1.21 0.80 136.24 
15 % change 124 118 108 295 30 30 121 
*p.p. = per pack 
In the base scenario, the weighted average binding excise tax in Tanzania was USD 0.22 
per pack. If the excise tax increased to a specific excise of USD 0.60, the average Retail 
Selling Price (RSP) of all brands would increase from USD 1.25 to USD 1.71 (line 5), an 
increase of around 37% (line 6). The increase in RSP is highest for the low priced brands, 
with an increase of 93%, followed by the medium (33%), high priced (22%), and premium 
(17%) brands. The increase in RSP is lowest for imported premium brands (EAC and non-
EAC) with an increase of around 8% (line 6), as the increase in the excise tax in these 
market segments is relatively low at USD 0.16 (line 1 & 2). 
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Total consumption in Tanzania would be expected to decrease by around 1 billion cigarettes 
from 5,5 billion to 4,5 billion (line 7 & 8), a decrease of around 18% (line 9). The low priced 
segment has the highest consumption decline of 32% followed by the middle (16%) and high 
priced brands (11%) (line 9). Both local and imported premium brands show small decreases 
in consumption, around 9% and 4% respectively. These percentage changes are almost 
identical to those of industry revenue (line 12), showing that increases in the excise tax in 
the low and medium priced brands contribute the most to the overall US$36 million decline in 
industry revenue (line 10 & 11). 
The quantum of excise tax per pack increases by 190%. As a result of this increase, average 
excise revenue is expected to increase by 121% from a total excise revenue of USD 61 
million across all brands to USD 136 million. Excise revenue increases by the most in the 
low priced brands (295%), followed by the premium brands (125%), high priced brands 
(118%), middle priced brands (108%) and, lastly, imported premium brands (30%). 
Table 6.3.3: Comparing Selected Results from Scenario 1 to the Base Scenario: 
Uganda 
 
Uganda Scenario 1 
Line   Imported 
Premium 
brand (KE) 
Imported 
High priced 
brand (KE) 
Imported 
Medium Priced 
Brand (KE) 
Imported low 
priced brand 
(KE) 
Imported 
high priced 
brand (TZ) 
Total or 
Average 
1 Base Excise tax (USD p.p.) 0.48 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 
2 Excise tax Scenario 1 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 
3 % change 26 177 177 177 177 175 
4 Base Retail price (USD p.p.) 1.74 1.08 0.87 0.65 1.08 0.85 
5 Retail Price Scenario 1 1.88 1.54 1.32 1.10 1.54 1.30 
6 % change 8 42 52 70 42 54 
7 Base Consumption (million cigarettes) 9 55 695 155 13 927 
8 Consumption (million cigarettes) Scenario 
1 
9 45 541 114 11 718 
9 % change  -5 -19 -22 -27 -19 -22 
10 Base Industry revenue (million USD) 0.45 1.93 18.01 2.60 0.46 23.44 
11 Industry revenue (million USD) Scenario 1 0.43 1.56 14.03 1.90 0.37 18.30 
12 % change -5 -19 -22 -27 -19 -22 
13 Base Excise revenue (million USD) 0.22 0.59 7.53 1.69 0.14 10.17 
14 Excise revenue (million USD) Scenario 1 0.26 1.34 16.24 3.41 0.32 21.57 
15 % change 19.8 124.7 115.6 102.5 124.7 112.0 
 
The current weighted average binding excise tax in Uganda is USD 0.22 per pack. If the 
excise tax were to increase to a specific excise of USD 0.60, the average Retail Selling Price 
(RSP) of all brands would increase from USD 0.85 to USD 1.30, an increase of 54% (line 4 
& 5). The increase in RSP is highest for the low priced brands imported from Kenya, with an 
increase of 70%, followed by the imported medium priced brand (52%) and high priced 
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brands (42%). The increase in RSP is lowest for the premium brands with an increase of 8% 
(line 6).  
With a price elasticity of demand of -0.6, total consumption decreases by around 209 million 
cigarettes from 927 million to 718 million, a decrease of 22%. The low priced segment has 
the highest consumption decline of 27% followed by the medium priced brand, high priced 
brands and premium brands with declines of 22%,19% and 5% respectively (line 9). These 
percentage changes are identical to those of industry revenue, showing that low and 
medium priced brands contribute the most to the USD 5 million decline in industry revenue 
(line 10 & 11).  
The quantum of excise tax per pack increases by 175% (line 3). As a result of this increase 
and the 22% decrease in cigarette consumption, average excise revenue is expected to 
increase by around 110% from a total excise revenue of USD 10 million across all brands to 
nearly USD 22 million (line 13 & 14).  
Table 6.3.4: Comparing Selected Results from Scenario 1 to the Base Scenario: 
Burundi 
 
Prior to the simulated increase in the excise tax, the average binding excise tax was USD 
0.18 per pack. If the excise tax increases to a specific excise of USD 0.60, the average 
Retail Selling Price (RSP) would increase from USD 0.64 in the base scenario to USD 1.15 
in Scenario 1, an increase of 80% (line 4 & 5). The increase in RSP is highest for the low 
Burundi Scenario 1 
Line   Premium 
Brand 
High 
Priced 
Brand 
Medium 
Priced 
Brand 
Low 
Priced 
Brand 
Imported 
Premium  
(non-EAC) 
Imported high 
priced brand 
(EAC) 
Total or 
Average 
1 Base Excise tax (USD p.p.) 0.87 0.28 0.17 0.11 0.82 0.28 0.18 
2 Excise tax Scenario 1 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 
3 % change -31 112 245 452 -26 112 252 
4 Base Retail price (USD p.p.) 3.08 1.00 0.62 0.38 3.08 1.00 0.64 
5 Retail Price Scenario 1 2.76 1.38 1.12 0.96 3.02 1.38 1.15 
6 % change -10 37 82 151 -2 37 80 
7 Base Consumption (million 
cigarettes) 
5 30 357 78 0 19 489 
8 Consumption (million cigarettes) 
Scenario 1 
6 25 251 46 0 16 343 
9 % change 7 -17 -30 -41 1 -17 -30 
10 Base Industry revenue (million USD) 0.45 0.85 6.21 0.84 0.00 0.54 8.90 
11 Industry revenue (million USD) 
Scenario 1 
0.48 0.70 4.37 0.50 0.00 0.44 6.50 
12 % change 7 -17 -30 -41 1 -17 -27 
13 Base Excise revenue (million USD) 0.22 0.43 3.11 0.42 0.00 0.27 4.45 
14 Excise revenue (million USD) 
Scenario 1 
0.17 0.75 7.54 1.37 0.00 0.47 10.30 
15 % change -26.4 75.6 142.7 225.7 -25.5 75.6 131.5 
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priced brands, with an increase of 151%, followed by the medium priced brands (82%) and 
high priced brands (37%). The premium brands show a decrease in RSP of 10% for the local 
brands and 2% for the imported brands, this is expected as there is a decrease in excise tax 
in these categories of 31% and 26% respectively (line 6). The imported premium brands 
from non-EAC countries also incur an import tariff of around USD 0.33, preventing a further 
decrease in RSP. However, the volumes of the premium brands are so small as to be 
negligable, making up  around only 1% of total market share (see Appendix A). 
Total consumption decreases by around 146 million, a decrease of 30%, given a -0.6 price 
elasticity of demand. The low priced segment has the highest consumption decline of 41% 
followed by the medium priced brand and high priced brands with declines of 30% and17% 
respectively. Consumption increases by 1% in the imported premium brand and by 7% in the 
imported premium brands because of the declining RSP. Again, the percentage changes for 
consumption are identical to those of industry revenue, showing that low and medium priced 
brands contribute the most to the USD 2.4 million decline in industry revenue.  
The quantum of excise tax per pack increases by 252% (line 3). As a result of this increase 
and the 30% decrease in cigarette consumption, average excise revenue is expected to 
increase by around 132% from a total excise revenue of around USD 4 million across to 
around USD 10 million (line 13 & 14).  
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Table 6.3.5: Comparing Selected Results from Scenario 1 to the Base Scenario: 
Rwanda 
 
*p.p. = per pack 
The current weighted average binding excise tax in Rwanda is USD 0.31 per pack. If the 
excise tax increases to a specific excise of USD 0.60, the average Retail Selling Price (RSP) 
would increase from USD 0.87 to USD 1.22, an increase of 44% (line 4 & 5). The increase in 
RSP is again highest for the low priced brands, with an increase of 98%, followed by the 
medium priced brands (41%). The high priced brands and premium brands show a decrease 
in RSP of 3% and 8%, this is expected as there is a decrease in excise tax in these 
categories of 6% and 18% respectively (line 6).  
With a price elasticity of demand of -0.6, total consumption decreases by around 53 million, 
a decrease of 19%. The low priced segment has the highest consumption decline of 33% 
followed by the medium priced segment (line 9). Consumption increases by 2% in the high 
priced segment and by 5% in the  premium priced segment because of the declining RSP 
(line 9). The percentage changes for consumption are almost identical to those of industry 
revenue, showing that the consumption decline in low and medium price segments 
 Rwanda Scenario 1 
Line  Imported 
Premium 
Brand (KE) 
Imported High 
Priced Brand 
(KE) 
Imported 
Medium Priced 
Brand (KE) 
Imported Low 
Priced Brand 
(KE) 
Imported HIgh 
Priced Brand 
(BU) 
Total or 
Average 
1 Base Excise tax (USD p.p.) 0.73 0.64 0.31 0.18 0.64 0.31 
2  Excise tax Scenario 1 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 
3 % change -18 -6 97 228 -6 103 
4 Base Retail Price (USD p.p.) 2.02 1.76 0.84 0.50 1.76 0.87 
5 Retail Price Scenario 1 1.86 1.72 1.19 1.00 1.72 1.22 
6 % change -8 -3 41 98 -3 44 
7 Base Consumption (M cigarettes) 3 18 208 45 3 277 
8 Consumption (M cigarettes) Scenario 
1 
3 18 170 30 3 224 
9 % change  5 2 -19 -33 2 -19 
10 Base Industry revenue (million USD) 0.15 0.75 4.24 0.55 0.12 5.81 
11 Industry revenue (million USD) 
Scenario 1 
0.15 0.76 3.45 0.37 0.12 4.86 
12 % change 5 2 -19 -33 2 -16.4 
13 Base Excise revenue (million USD) 0.11 0.56 3.18 0.41 0.09 4.36 
14 Excise revenue (million USD) 
Scenario 1 
0.09 0.54 5.09 0.91 0.08 6.71 
15 % change -14 -5 60 120 -5 54 
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contribute the most to the approximate USD 1 million decline in industry revenue (line 9 & 
12).  
The quantum of excise tax per pack increases by 103% (line 3). As a result of this increase 
and the 19% decrease in cigarette consumption, average excise revenue is expected to 
increase by around 54% from a total excise revenue of around USD 4 million across to 
around USD 7 million (line 13 & 14).  
Table 6.3.6 Base Scenario and Scenario 1 Averages and Totals 
 
Comparing Base Scenario averages with Scenario 1 Varieties 
Line  Kenya %  %change Tanzania %change Uganda % change Burundi % change Rwanda %change 
 Excise Tax 
(USD per pack) 
          
1 Base Scenario 0.32  0.22  0.22  0.18  0.31  
2 Scenario 1 0.60 89 0.60 190 0.60 175 0.60 252 0.60 103 
3 Retail Price 
(USD per pack) 
          
4 Base Scenario 0.89  1.25  0.86  0.64  0.86  
5 Scenario 1 1.22 37 1.71 37 1.30 54 1.15 80 1.22 44 
6 Consumption 
(million 
cigarettes) 
          
7 Base Scenario 5700  5520  927  489  277  
8 Scenario 1 4700 -18 4541 -18 719 -22 343 -30 224 -19 
9 Industry 
Revenue 
(million USD) 
          
10 Base Scenario 126  229  23  9  6  
11 Scenario 1 106 -16 193 -16 18 -22 7 -27 5 -16 
12 Government 
Excise revenue 
(million USD) 
          
13 Base Scenario 93  62  10  4  4  
14 Scenario 1 141 52 136 121 22 112 10 132 7 54 
15 Total 
Consumption 
Expenditure 
(million USD) 
          
16 Base Scenario 256  345  40  16  12  
17 Scenario 1 288 13 389 13 47 19 20 26 14 14 
18 Excise tax as a 
% of Retail 
Price 
          
19 Base Scenario 37  18  26  28  36  
20 Scenario 1 49 12 35 17 46 20 52 24 50 14 
 
The table above gives an overview of the aggregates and totals in each EAC country so that 
they may be easily compared across the base Scenario and Scenario 1. The notable 
additions in this table include total consumption expenditure and excise tax as a percentage 
of Retail Selling Price (RSP). Total consumption expenditure increases by 13% in Kenya and 
Tanzania from USD 256 million to USD 288 million and from USD 345 million to USD 389 
million respectively (line 16 & 17). In Rwanda the expenditure increase is 14% from USD 12 
million to USD 14 million and in Uganda the increase is 19% from USD 40 million to USD 47 
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million. Consumption expenditure increases by the greatest percentage, 26%, in Burundi 
from USD 16 million to USD 20 million. 
Line 19 and 20 show the differences in average excise tax as a percentage of RSP. This 
variable is used as a benchmarking tool internationally to encourage countries to increase 
their excise tax to 70% of RSP (WHO, 2010). In Kenya the average excise tax amount as a 
percentage of the retail price increases from 37% to 49% and in Tanzania it increases from 
18% to 35%. In Uganda the excise tax amount as a percentage of the retail price increases 
from an average of 26% to 46% and in Burundi it increases from 28% to 52%. Lastly, in 
Rwanda the excise tax amount as a percentage of the retail price increases from 36% to 
50%.  
6.4 Testing Assumptions for Robustness 
The table below presents each Scenario 1 variation and compares it to the base scenario, 
with the accompanying percentage changes. The Scenario 1 variations indicate the 
sensitivity of the price elasticity (Scenario 1A and 1B), industry response via NOT price 
changes (Scenario 1C and 1D) and excise tax variables (Scenario 1E and 1F). The 
adjustments made to scenario 1 are the following: 
A. An increase in the εp from -0.6 to -0.8 
B. A decrease in the εp from -0.6 to -0.4 
C. An increase in the NOT price by 20% 
D. A decrease in the NOT price by 20% 
E. An increase in the uniform specific tax from 0.60 to 0.80 
F. A decrease in the uniform specific tax from 0.60 to 0.40 
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Table 6.4.1: Comparing the Base Scenario with Scenario 1 Variations 
 
Comparing Base Scenario averages with Scenario 1 Varieties 
Line  Kenya %  %change Tanzania %change Uganda % change Burundi % change Rwanda %change 
 Excise Tax 
(USD per pack) 
          
1 Base Scenario 0.32  0.22  0.22  0.18  0.31  
2 Scenario 1 0.60 89 0.60 190 0.60 175 0.60 252 0.60 103 
3 Scenario 1A 0.60 89 0.60 187 0.60 175 0.60 252 0.60 103 
4 Scenario 1B 0.60 90 0.60 193 0.60 175 0.60 258 0.60 107 
5 Scenario 1C 0.60 90 0.60 191 0.60 175 0.60 256 0.60 106 
6 Scenario 1D 0.60 89 0.60 189 0.60 175 0.60 254 0.60 104 
7 Scenario 1E 0.80 152 0.80 285 0.80 266 0.80 373 0.80 173 
8 Scenario 1F 0.40 27 0.40 94 0.40 83 0.40 137 0.40 37 
9 Retail Price 
(USD per pack) 
          
10 Base Scenario 0.89  1.25  0.86  0.64  0.86  
11 Scenario 1 1.22 37 1.71 37 1.30 54 1.15 80 1.22 44 
12 Scenario 1A 1.23 38 1.72 38 1.31 53 1.16 84 1.22 56 
13 Scenario 1B 1.22 37 1.71 37 1.31 54 1.14 82 1.21 57 
14 Scenario 1C 1.33 49 1.91 53 1.43 67 1.24 97 1.31 70 
15 Scenario 1D 1.12 26 1.51 22 1.19 40 1.06 69 1.11 42 
16 Scenario 1E 1.46 64 1.95 57 1.55 82 1.39 120 1.45 85 
17 Scenario 1F 0.99 11 1.47 18 1.07 26 0.91 45 0.98 27 
18 Consumption 
(million 
cigarettes) 
          
19 Base Scenario 5700  5520  927  489  277  
20 Scenario 1 4700 -18 4541 -18 719 -22 343 -30 224 -19 
21 Scenario 1A 4403 -23 4257 -23 660 -29 287 -41 195 -29 
22 Scenario 1B 5011 -12 4845 -12 783 -16 376 -23 233 -16 
23 Scenario 1C 4483 -21 4261 -23 684 -26 315 -36 203 -27 
24 Scenario 1D 4952 -13 4883 -12 760 -18 346 -29 225 -19 
25 Scenario 1E 4242 -26 4205 -24 653 -30 299 -39 194 -30 
26 Scenario 1F 5341 -6 4972 -10 809 -13 372 -24 240 -13 
 Industry 
Revenue 
(million USD) 
          
1 Base Scenario 126  229  23  9  6  
2 Scenario 1 106 -16 193 -16 18 -22 7 -27 5 -16 
4 Scenario 1A 100 -21 182 -21 17 -28 5 -38 4 -26 
6 Scenario 1B 112 -11 204 -11 20 -15 7 -21 5 -14 
8 Scenario 1C 121 -4 216 -6 21 -11 7 -20 5 -10 
10 Scenario 1D 89 -29 166 -28 15 -34 5 -41 4 -33 
12 Scenario 1E 96 -24 179 -22 17 -29 6 -37 4 -28 
14 Scenario 1F 120 -5 210 -9 21 -12 7 -22 5 -1 
 Government 
Excise revenue 
(million USD) 
          
16 Base Scenario 93  62  10  4  4  
17 Scenario 1 141 52 136 121 22 112 10 132 7 54 
19 Scenario 1A 132 43 128 107 20 95 9 95 6 36 
21 Scenario 1B 150 62 145 136 23 131 11 156 7 61 
23 Scenario 1C 134 45 128 107 21 102 9 114 6 41 
25 Scenario 1D 149 60 146 138 23 124 10 135 7 56 
27 Scenario 1E 170 83 168 173 26 157 12 171 8 79 
29 Scenario 1F 107 15 99 61 16 59 7 69 5 11 
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An increase or decrease in the εp by 0.2 from the base of -0.6, shown in Scenarios 1A and 
1B ,does not have any effect on the excise tax and retail price variables. However, the εp 
variable has a significant effect on consumption levels, industry revenue and excise revenue. 
Consumption volumes decrease relative to Scenario 1 with an increase in the εp and 
increase with a decrease in the εp, as expected. The results from Scenario 1A show that in 
Kenya and Tanzania consumption decreases by around 300 million cigarettes (-5%) with an 
increase in εp of 0.2 (εp=-0.8) relative to Scenario 1. Scenario 1B shows that cigarette 
consumption in Kenya and Tanzania increases by around the same amount with a decrease 
in the εp (εp =-0.4). In the same way, consumption levels increase and decrease in Uganda, 
Burundi and Rwanda by around 50 million (6%/-7%), 8 million (7%/-11%) and 6 million 
cigarettes (3%/-10%) respectively.  
Industry revenues also decrease from Scenario 1 with an increase in the εp and increase 
with a decrease in the εp, as expected. In Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda industry revenue 
increase and decrease around Scenario 1 figures by around USD 6 million (+/-5%), USD 11 
million (+/-5%) and USD 1.5 million (7%/-6%) respectiv ly. Burundi and Rwanda, with 
smaller Scenario 1 bases, only deviate from Scenario 1 figures by around USD 1 million. 
The effect that a change in εp has on the government excise revenue variable is the most 
significant of all variables, with decreases in government revenue following increases εp. In 
Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda government excise revenue increases (1B) and decreases 
(1A) around Scenario 1 results by around USD 10 million (10%/-9%), USD 8 million (15%/-
14%) and USD 2 million (19%/-17%) respectively. Again, Burundi and Rwanda, with smaller 
bases, only deviate by around USD 1 million each. 
When looking at the Net of Tax (NOT) variable, considered in Scenarios 1C and 1D one can 
see that a 20 percent increase (Scenario C) or decrease (Scenario D) in the NOT price with 
an increase in the excise tax does not have any effect on the excise tax variable. The NOT 
price, however, has a significant effect on the retail price, consumption volumes, industry 
revenue and government excise revenue.  
The Retail Selling Price (RSP) of cigarettes increases with an increase in the NOT price and 
decreases with a decrease in the NOT price, as expected. For Scenario 1C and 1D the 
increases and decreases in RSP from Scenario 1 are around USD 0.10 for Kenya, Uganda, 
Burundi and Rwandi. In Tanzania, the deviations are double at around USD 0.20. Cigarette 
consumption decreases with an increase in the NOT price and increases with a decrease in 
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the NOT price, following the changes in the RSP. The results from Scenario 1C show that in 
Kenya and Tanzania consumption decreases by around 250 million cigarettes (-3% & -5% 
respectively) with a 20% increase in NOT price. Scenario 1D shows that cigarette 
consumption in Kenya and Tanzania increases by around the same amount (5% & 6% 
respectively) with a 20% decrease in the NOT price. In the same way, consumption levels 
fluctuate in Uganda by around 35 million cigarettes (-4%/4%). In Burundi and Rwanda the 
decrease in consumption of 23 million (-6%) and 21 million cigarettes (-8%) found in 
Scenario 1C is greater than the increase in consumption of 3 million (1%) and 1 million (0%) 
found in Scenario 1D. 
Industry revenue increases when the NOT price increases, and decreases when the NOT 
price decreases. Scenario 1C shows that with an increase of 20% in the NOT price, the 
industry revenue in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda increases from Scenario 1 figures by 
around USD 15 million (12%), USD 23 million (10%) and USD 3 million (11%) respectively, 
with Burundi and Rwanda not changing significantly. Scenario 1D shows that a 20% 
decrease in the NOT price causes industry revenue in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda to 
decrease by USD 17 million (-13%), USD 27 million (-12%) and USD 3 million (-12%) 
compared to Scenario 1. Industry revenue in Burundi and Rwanda decreased by USD 2 
million (-14%) and USD 1 million (-17%) respectively. 
In Kenya and Tanzania government excise revenue decreases with a 20% increase in the 
NOT price. Scenario 1C shows these decreases to be around USD 7 million (-7%) in Kenya 
and USD 8 million (-14%) in Tanzania. In Uganda, Burundi and Rwanda excise revenue 
decreases by around USD 1 million but the percentage decreases are 10%, 18% and 13% 
respectively. A 20% decrease in the NOT price, shown in Scenario 1D, causes government 
excise revenue to rise by around USD 8 million (8%) in Kenya, USD 10 million (17%) in 
Tanzania and USD 1 million (12%) in Uganda. Excise revenue in Burundi and Rwanda 
increase by 3% and 2%, but the dollar value to the nearest million remains unchanged. 
Scenario 1E and 1F consider an increase and decrease in the excise tax to USD 0.8 and 
USD 0.4 respectively. Changes in the excise tax have a significant effect on retail price, 
consumption, industry revenue and government revenue. The Retail Selling Price (RSP) of 
cigarettes increases with an increase in the excise tax and decreases with a decrease in the 
excise tax, as expected. For Scenario 1E and 1F the deviation in RSP from that of Scenario 
1 is around USD 0.25 for all EAC countries. 
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Cigarette consumption decreases from Scenario 1 figures with an increase in the excise tax 
and increases with a decrease in the excise tax, following changes in the RSP. In Scenario 
1E consumption in Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Burundi and Rwanda decline by around 500 
million (-8%), 300 million (-6%), 70 million (-8%), 40 million (-9%) and 30 million cigarettes (-
11%) respectively. Scenario 1F shows an increase in consumption relative to Scenario 1 
when the excise tax decreases to USD 0.40. Following the same order as above these 
increases are approximately as follows, 600 million (12%), 400 million (8%), 90 million (9%), 
30 million (6%) and 15 million cigarettes (6%).  
Industry revenue decreases with an increase in the excise tax (Scenario 1E) and increases 
with a decrease in the excise tax (Scenario 1F). When comparing Scenario 1 to Scenario 1E 
industry revenue decreases by around USD 10 million (-8%) in Kenya and 14 million (-6%) in 
Tanzania. Uganda, Burundi and Rwanda all show decreases of USD 1 million but the 
percentage decreases are 7%, 10% and  12% respectively. However, with a decrease in the 
excise tax relative to Scenario 1 like that of Scenario 1F, industry revenue increases by 
around USD 14 million (11%) in Kenya, USD 17 million (7%) in Tanzania and USD 3 million 
(10%) in Uganda. Burundi and Rwanda do not show increases to the nearest million, but the 
industry revenue increases by 5% and 15% respectively. 
In all EAC countries government excise revenue increases with an increase in the excise 
tax. Scenario 1E shows these increases to be around USD 29 million (31%) in Kenya, USD 
32 million (52%) in Tanzania and USD 4 million (45%) in Uganda. Burundi and Rwanda 
experienced increases of around USD 2 million (39%) and USD 1 million (25%) respectively. 
A decrease in the specific tax of USD 0.20, found in Scenario 1F, causes government excise 
revenue to fall by around USD 34 million (-37%) in Kenya, USD 37 million (-60%) in 
Tanzania and USD 6 million (-53%) in Uganda. In Burundi and Rwanda this decrease is 
USD 3 million (-63%) and USD 2 million (43%) respectively. 
6.5. Scenario 2: A mixed tax Structure of USD 0.6 or an ad valorem 
excise of 40% of RSP, whichever is higher. 
The mixed tax structure of USD 0.60  or an ad valorem excise of 40% of RSP was chosen 
because the specific component ensures an increase in excise tax in all EAC countries and 
the ad valorem component ensures an increase in excise tax across all market segments, 
even the premium brands. The mixed tax structure also contributes to government revenue 
benefits. However, this system adds administrative complexity as explained in section 2.4. It 
is only in the smallest market segment of premium brands that this tax will serve to increase 
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the percentage changes of the excise tax variable from the base case (see appendix D: 
tables 2.1-2.5). The results of the Base Scenario are tabulated below and compared with the 
results of Scenario 1 and 2. The percentage changes are noted for the excise tax, retail 
price, consumption, industry revenue and government excise revenue variables. 
Table 6.5.1: Comparing the Base Scenario with Scenario 1 and Scenario 2 
 
Comparing Base Scenario averages with Scenario 1 Varieties  
Line  Kenya %  %change Tanzania %change Uganda % change Burundi % change Rwanda %change Total EAC 
 Excise Tax 
(USD per pack) 
           
1 Base Scenario 0.32  0.22  0.22  0.18  0.31  0.35 
2 Scenario 1 0.60 89 0.60 190 0.60 175 0.60 252 0.60 103 0.6 
3 Scenario 2 0.61 92 0.78 266 0.60 176 0.61 255 0.62 107 0.76 
4 Retail Price 
(USD per pack) 
           
5 Base Scenario 0.89  1.25  0.86  0.64  0.86  1.29 
6 Scenario 1 1.22 37 1.71 37 1.30 54 1.15 80 1.22 44 1.58 
7 Scenario 2 1.24 38 1.92 54 1.31 54 1.16 81 1.24 46 1.77 
8 Consumption 
(million 
cigarettes) 
           
9 Base Scenario 5700  5520  927  489  277  12913 
10 Scenario 1 4700 -18 4541 -18 719 -22 343 -30 224 -19 10526 
11 Scenario 2 4678 -18 4264 -23 718 -23 342 -30 222 -20 10223 
12 Industry 
Revenue 
(million USD) 
           
13 Base Scenario 126  229  23  9  6  393.2 
14 Scenario 1 106 -16 193 -16 18 -22 7 -27 5 -16 327.8 
15 Scenario 2 105 -17 179 -22 18 -22 6 -28 5 -18 312.9 
16 Government 
Excise revenue 
(million USD) 
           
17 Base Scenario 93  62  10  4  4  273.2 
18 Scenario 1 141 52 136 121 22 112 10 132 7 54 315.8 
19 Scenario 2 143 54 167 171 22 113 10 136 7 58 312.9 
20 Excise tax as a 
% of Retail 
Price 
           
21 Base Scenario 37  18  26  28  36  28.6 
22 Scenario 1 49 12 35 17 46 20 52 24 50 14 40.4 
23 Scenario 2 50 13 41 23 46 20 53 25 51 15 63 
 
The table above shows that the average excise tax in Scenario 2 is almost identical to that of 
Scenario 1, with Tanzania as an outlier. The average excise tax increases by a maximum of 
USD 0.02, with differences in percentage changes of less than 5% for all EAC countries 
except Tanzania (line 2 & 3). In Tanzania only the low priced brand is bound by the uniform 
specific tax, whereas all other brands are bound by the ad valorem component raising the 
average excise tax to USD 0.78, causing a 76 percentage point difference between the 
Scenario 1 and Scenario 2 percentage changes (see appendix D: table 2.2).  
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When comparing Scenario 1 and 2, the table shows that the Retail Selling Price (RSP), like 
the excise tax also increases by a maximum of USD 0.02, with differences in percentage 
changes of less than 5% for all EAC countries except Tanzania (line 6 & 7). The RSP in 
Tanzania, however, is around USD 0.20 greater in Scenario 2 than in Scenario 1.  
When looking at consumption, the difference in percentage changes between Scenario 1 
and 2 are negligable for all countries other than Tanzania. In Scenario 2 consumption 
declines from Scenario 1 figures by around 20 million cigarettes in Kenya, 270 million in 
Tanzania, 1 million in Uganda and Burundi, and 2 million in Rwanda (line 10 & 11).  
Aggregate industry revenue and government excise revenue in Scenario 2 are almost 
identical to those of Scenario 1, except for Tanzania. The industry revenue declines by a 
maximum of USD 1 million, while excise revenue increases by a maximum of USD 2 million, 
except for Tanzania where it increases by USD 31 million (line 14 & 15 and line 18 & 19). 
For both industry revenue and excise revenue the difference in percentage changes from 
Scenario 1 to Scenario 2 is less than 5% for all EAC countries except Tanzania. In Tanzania 
the aggregate industry revenue for Scenario 2 is USD 179 million, causing a 6 percentage 
point difference between Scenario 1 and Scenario 2 (line 15).  
The analysis of Scenario 2 reveals that a mixed excise tax structure does not raise overall 
government excise revenue by a significant amount, nor does it alter other aggregated 
variables significantly, except in Tanzania. There is no particular reason to expect that 
Tanzania should an outlier in the EAC. This outcome could be due to data limitations 
discussed in section 5. The above results bring into question the viability of persuing a mixed 
tax system for ‘financial objectives’ at the expense of greater administrative complexity. As 
an alternative option, policymakers should consider raising the uniform specific tax by a 
marginal amount, for example by USD 0.05 to achieve financial objectives similar to that of a 
mixed tax system without the administrative difficulties.  
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Section 7 Summary and Conclusion 
 
This thesis has investigated the role of excise tax increases and harmonisation in the five 
members of the EAC. Excise tax increases on all tobacco products, serves to effectively 
address health and financial objectives of governments. These objectives are considered by 
including variables such as consumption volumes and government excise revenue. The 
effects of excise tax increases on the business sector have also been considered through 
the use of industry revenue.  
Health Objectives 
The base Scenario reveals that the total consumption of cigarettes across all EAC countries 
is around 12.9 billion cigarettes. In Scenario 1, with a simulated increase in the excise tax to 
a harmonised value of USD 0.60, consumption declines by around 2.3 billion (18%) to 10.5 
billion cigarettes. In Scenario 2, with a mixed excise tax of USD 0.60 or 40% of the Retail 
Selling Price (RSP) a slightly higher decline of 21% to 10.2 billion cigarettes is revealed. 
These decreases in consumption are caused by decreases in smoking intensity and 
increases in smoking cessation which is in line with society’s health objectives. 
Financial Objectives 
When considering government excise revenue across the EAC, Scenario 1 shows an 
increase of around 80% (USD 140 million), from USD 176 million to USD 316 million. 
Scenario 2 reveals an even greater increase in excise revenue compared to the base 
scenario of around  98% (USD 173 million) from USD 176 million to USD 349 million. These 
large increases in government revenue allow for increased government spending. The 
imposition of a uniform specific tax, as suggested by Scenario 1, provides the Treasury with 
more predictable revenue streams. 
Industry Effects 
Industry revenue across the EAC amounted to around USD 393 million in the base scenario. 
In Scenario 1 overall industry revenue declined by around USD 65 million (17%) to USD 328 
million. With the mixed tax structure in Scenario 2, industry revenue decrease by around 
USD 80 million (20%) to USD 313 million. The percentage decline in industry revenue is 
similar to the that of consumption, indicating that the industry is likely to forfeit some 
revenue. However, the highly concentrated nature of the tobacco industry allows it to use its 
market power to prevent this loss in revenue by overshifting the tax. This strategy was noted 
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in Scenario 1C where there was assumed to be an increase in the NOT price by 20% with 
an increase in the excise tax. This scenario revealed a total industry revenue of around USD 
370 million, USD 42 million more than Scenario 1. In Scenario 1C industry revenue still 
declines from the base scenario by USD 23 million, but this decline is less than that of 
Scenario 1. Scenario 1C also causes a reduction in government excise revenue from 
Scenario 1 by USD 18 million to USD 298 million. However, there are beneficial public health 
consequences of this industry strategy in that it reduces consumption relative to Scenario 1.  
Drawbacks of the model 
The results presented in this paper are outputs of a simulation model. The extent to which 
the parameter assumptions of the model are misrepresentative of reality, the results of the 
model will be proportionately flawed. The problem of missing and inacurate data for the EAC 
has led to many imputed assumptions in the simulation model. These parameter 
assumptions  include the Retail and Wholesale margins (RWM) and the price elasticity of 
demand (εp). Another drawback of the model is that it does not account for cross price 
elasticities. An increase in excise tax may have the effect of increasing the relative price of 
cigarettes in comparison to other tobacco products or non-tobacco products. This relative 
price increase can encourage substitution between tobacco products and brands as some 
become relatively more expensive. Ad valorem excise taxes often have the effect of 
increasing the difference in prices across brands, making health objectives more difficult to 
achieve. The model also does not account for illicit trade and random macroeconomic 
factors. 
Overall Excise Tax policy Recommendations for the EAC 
Chaloupka et al. (2011) recommends that countries relying on an ad valorem tax such as 
Burundi and Rwanda or countries that rely on a mixed structure should set a sizeable 
specific tax that applies to all brands with an ad valorem tax applied above this. This 
recommendation was explored in Scenario 2. Over time, they recommend that the ad 
valorem component be reduced, with greater increases in the specific tax so that the total 
tax increases as a share of RSP. Scenario 1 explores this recommendation where the ad 
valorem component has been reduced to zero and only the uniform specific tax remains. 
However, it is important to note that with a specific tax alone, there is an incentive for the 
industry and consumers to switch to cigarettes with a higher tobacco content such as king 
sized cigarettes as these become relatively cheaper. The uniform specific tax explored in 
Scenario 1 is also only equal to around 43% of the RSP across all EAC countries. Although 
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this is an increase of around 14 percentage points from the base scenario, where the excise 
tax is on average 29% of RSP, it is still below the WHO recommendations of 70% of RSP.  
The difference in health, fiscal and industry effects between Scenario 1 and Scenario 2, 
given above, could be reduced by simply raising the uniform specific tax in Scenario 1 to 
achieve the same results without compromising additional administrative difficulties. The use 
of a uniform specific tax across all market segments and harmonised across all EAC 
countries is preferred because of the health message that all brands are equally harmful and 
the administrative ease of the tax structure. It must be noted, however, that the specific tax 
must be increased with inflation and income growth so that cigarettes do not become more 
affordable over time. 
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Appendices: Appendix A: Data Figures and their sources 
 
Table A1: Data Figures and Sources for Kenya 
Variable Value Year Source 
Production  14,9 billion cigarettes 2009 ACS World Cigarettes Africa, 
Central Bank of Kenya 
Consumption 5,7 billion cigarettes 2010 ACS World Cigarettes Africa, ERC 
Group 
Import 102 million cigarettes, 
Switzerland 57m, UAE 25m, China 
and Poland 7m each 
2009 ACS World Cigarettes Africa, ERC 
based on UN trade statistics 
Exports to EAC 
countries 
113.7 million cigarettes 2009 ACS World Cigarettes Africa, ERC 
Group 
Exports to non-EAC 
countries 
9.1 billion cigarettes 2009 Own calculations based on ACS 
World Cigarettes Africa 
Market share for 
unfiltered 
cigarettes/soft 
cap<72mm/soft cap 
>72mm /hinge lid 
15.8/66,9/ 
12,3/5 
2009/2009/ 
2009/2004 
ACS World Cigarettes Africa, ERC 
Group & Maxwell 
Government revenue 
from Cigarettes 
Just over KSH 6000 2008 Implementing Article 6: Case 
Study of Kenya 
Import duty  35% 2010 ACS World Cigarettes Africa, ERC 
Group 
Retail price 50Kshs (Rooster)/70 Kshs (Safari 
Kings)/90 Kshs (Sportsman)/140 Kshs 
(Dunhill) 
1 March, 2010 ACS World Cigarettes Africa, BAT 
Kenya  
Excise tax 1200Kshs or 35% of Retail Selling 
Price whichever is higher 
2012 PWC East Africa Tax Report  
VAT 16% on the value of supply including 
excise duty  
2011 Deloitte East Africa Budget VAT 
Report, Section 9(2) of the Kenya 
VAT Act. 
 
Table A2: Data Figures and Sources for Tanzania 
Variable Value Year Source 
Production  5,68 billion cigarettes 2009 ACS World Cigarettes Africa, 
ERC estimates based on national 
trade statistics. Same figure found 
in the Tobacco Atlas 2012.  
Consumption 5,45 billion cigarettes 2010 ACS World Cigarettes Africa, 
ERC based on trade sources 
Import 70 million cigarettes, 
Portugal 32m, Kenya 28m, UAE 7m  
2010 ACS World Cigarettes Africa, 
ERC based on trade sources 
Market share for 
low/mid/high/premiumi 
 
 
16.5/76/ 
6.4/1.1 
2002 ACS World Cigarettes Africa, 
ERC based on trade sources 
Import duty  35% 2010 ACS World Cigarettes Africa, 
ERC Group 
Retail price TZS 1000/ TZS 2055 (Tobacco Atlas most popular 
brand 2012)/ TZS 4000 (Marlboro) 
1 March, 
2010 
WHO MPOWER, 2010 & Tobacco 
Atlas, 2012 
Excise tax Without a filter containing 75% local content 
TZS6830 per mille/ 
With a filter containing 75% local content 
TZS16224 per mille/ 
Other cigarettes TZS 29264 per mille 
2012 PWC East Africa Tax Report 
VAT 18% on the amount of the consideration excluding 
the VAT, including excise duty 
2012 PWC East Africa Tax Report, 
Deloitte East Africa Budget VAT 
Report. The Value Added Tax 
Act, Section 148, was enacted on 
21 October 1997 
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Table A3: Data Figures and Sources for Uganda 
Variable Value Year Source 
Production  No data 
Assumed 0 
2012 Tobacco Atlas 2012 
Consumption 972 million cigarettes 2009 ACS World Cigarettes Africa, ERC 
Group 
Import 972m cigarettes, 
Kenya 914m cigarettes, Tanzania 13m 
2009 ACS World Cigarettes Africa, ERC 
Group 
Market share for soft 
cap>70% local 
constituents/soft cap 
<70% local 
constituents /hinge lid 
17/76/ 
6/1 
- Based on Tanzania’s market 
share (source: ACS World 
Cigarettes Africa, ERC) 
Import duty  N/A   
Retail price UGX 1500 (Safari FF)/ UGX 2000 (Sportsman)/ 
UGX 2500 (Pall Mall) /UGX 4000  (Dunhill & Rex) 
1 March, 
2010 
WHO MPOWER Report 2010 , 
Presentation During the Regional 
Training Workshop on Tobacco 
Taxes in Nairobi, Kenya 
Presented by Susan Nakagolo, 
Ministry of Finance, Plannng and 
Economic Development Uganda 
Government revenue 
from Tobacco 
Products (assume all 
tobacco products) 
UGX 31,142 million 2009/2010 Presentation During the Regional 
Training Workshop on Tobacco 
Taxes in Nairobi, Kenya 
Presented by Susan Nakagolo, 
Ministry of Finance, Plannng and 
Economic Development Uganda 
Excise tax soft cap>70% local constituents 22000 per 
mille/other soft cap25000 per mille /hinge lid 55000 
per mille/others 160% ad valorem on ex-factory 
(not explicitly stated) 
2012 PWC East Africa Tax Report 
VAT 18% on the value of supply, including excise duty, 
if any, and any amount charged for advertising, 
financing, servicing, warranty, commission, 
transportation, etc. 
2012 PWC East Africa Tax Report, 
Deloitte East Africa Budget VAT 
Report, Following the revision of 
the Laws of Uganda in 2002, the 
VAT Act was revised to the Value 
Added Tax Act, CAP 349. 
 
 
Table B4: Data Figures and Sources for Rwanda 
Variable Value Year Source 
Production  No data 
Assumed 0 
2012 Tobacco Atlas 2012 
Consumption 277 million cigarettes 2009 ACS World Cigarettes Africa, 
ERC based on Kenya exports 
and referred to UN COMTRADE 
Import 276m Kenya, 1m Burundi  2009 ACS World Cigarettes Africa, 
ERC based on Kenya exports 
and cross referenced with UN 
COMTRADE 
Market share for 
low/mid/high/premium 
17/76/ 
6/1 
- Based on Tanzania’s market 
share (source: ACS World 
Cigarettes Africa, ERC) 
Import duty  N/A - - 
Retail price RWF300/ RWF 500/ RWF 1050/ RWF 
1200 
2010 WHO MPOWER, 2010 & 
Tobacco Atlas, 2012 
Excise tax 150% ad valorem on ex works price - Rwandan Revenue Authority 
VAT 18% on the value of supply, including 
excise duty 
 PWC East Africa Tax Report, 
Deloitte East Africa Budget VAT 
Report, 
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Table A5: Data Figures and Sources for Burundi 
Variable Value Year Source 
Production  470 million cigarettes 2012 Tobacco Atlas 2012 
Consumption 489 million cigarettes 2012 ACS World Cigarettes Africa & 
Tobacco Atlas 2012 
Import 19m Kenya 2011 ACS World Cigarettes Africa, 
ERC based on Kenya exports 
and cross referenced with UN 
COMTRADE 
Market share for 
low/mid/high/premium 
17/76/ 
6/1 
- Based on Tanzania’s market 
share (source: ACS World 
Cigarettes Africa, ERC) 
Import duty  N/A - - 
Retail price BIF 500 (Kiyago)/BIF 800 (Supermatch 
Ordinaire)/ BIF 1300 (Tobacco Atlas 
2012)/ BIF 4000  (Marlboro) 
2010 WHO MPOWER, 2010 & 
Tobacco Atlas, 2012 
Excise tax 100% ad valorem on ex works price 2010 (Peterson, 2010) and Rwanda 
imputation. 
VAT 18% on the sales price, including taxes, 
fees and levies of any kind with the 
exception of the VAT 
 Taxrates cc, 2012, Deloitte East 
Africa Budget VAT Report, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
 
 
77 
Appendix B: Exchange Rates 
Table B1: Exchange rates  
Currency unit per USD   
   
Kenya Shilling KES 82.8 
Burundi Franc BIF 1299 
Tanzania Shilling TZS 1593 
Uganda Shilling UGX 2305 
Rwanda Franc RWF 595 
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Appendix C: Tabulated Model Results for Scenario 1, 2 and 3 
Scenario 1 
Table 1.1 Scenario 1: Kenya 
      SIMULATION         
Line   Premium 
Brand 
High Priced 
Brand 
Medium 
Priced Brand 
Low 
Priced 
Brand 
Imported 
Premium 
(non-EAC) 
Total or 
Average 
  Inputs        
1 Price elasticity -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6   
2 Specific excise tax per pack local 
currency 
50 50 50 50 50   
3 Specific excise tax per pack USD 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6  
4 VAT rate 16% 16% 16% 16% 16%   
5 Perc. Change in NOT price  0 0 0 0 0   
6         
7 Outputs        
8 NOT price (KES per pack) 72 46 36 19 53 37 
9 Excise tax (KES per pack) 50 50 50 50 50 50 
10 VAT  (KES per pack) 19 15 14 11 19 14 
11 Retail price (KES per pack) 141 111 99 80 141 101 
12        
13 NOT price (USD per pack) 0.87 0.56 0.43 0.23 0.64 0.45 
14 Excise tax (USD per pack) 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 
15 VAT  (USD per pack) 0.23 0.19 0.17 0.13 0.23 0.17 
16 Retail price (USD per pack) 1.70 1.34 1.20 0.96 1.70 1.22 
17        
18 Binding excise tax (specific or ad 
valorem) 
Specific Specific Specific Specific Specific  
19 Excise tax as % of retail price 35 45 50 62 35 49 
20         
21 Cigarette consumption (million 
cigarettes) 
279 606 3043 670 102 4700 
22         
23 Excise revenue (million KES) 693 1505 7559 1665 253 11675 
24 Industry revenue (million KES) 1000 1396 5454 640 270 8760 
25 Total Consumption Expenditure 
(million KES) 
1964 3365 15096 2674 716 23814 
26         
27 Excise revenue (million USD) 8.37 18.18 91.30 20.11 3.05 141.00 
28 Industry revenue (million USD) 12.08 16.86 65.87 7.73 3.26 105.80 
29 Total Consumption Expenditure 
(million USD) 
23.72 40.64 182.31 32.30 8.64 287.61 
30         
31 Percentage changes        
32 Excise tax (KES per pack) 1.4 57.7 102.8 107.0 1.4 89.4 
33 Retail price (KES per pack) 0.6 23.4 41.7 59.6 0.6 37.2 
34 Cigarette consumption (million 
cigarettes) 
-0.3 -11.8 -18.8 -24.2 -0.3 -17.5 
35 Excise revenue (million KES) 1.0 39.0 64.7 56.9 1.0 52.2 
36 Industry revenue (million KES) -0.3 -11.8 -18.8 -24.2 -0.3 -15.9 
37 Total Consumption expenditure 
(million KES) 
0.2 8.8 15.1 20.9 0.2 12.9 
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Table 1.2 Scenario 1: Tanzania 
      SIMULATION           
Line   Premium 
Brand 
High Priced 
Brand 
Medium 
Priced 
Brand 
Low 
Priced 
Brand 
Imported 
Premium Brand 
(non-EAC) 
Imported 
Premium Brand 
(EAC) 
Total or 
Average 
  Inputs         
1 Price elasticity -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6  
2 Specific excise tax per 
pack local currency 
956 956 956 956 956 956  
3 Specific excise tax per 
pack USD 
0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6  
4 VAT rate 18% 18% 18% 18% 18% 18%  
5 Perc. Change in NOT 
price 
0 0 0 0  0 0  
6          
7 Outputs         
8 NOT price (TZS per pack) 3002 2154 1353 683 1991 2687 1351 
9 Excise tax (TZS per pack) 956 956 956 956 956 956 956 
10 VAT  (TZS per pack) 712 560 416 295 656 656 416 
11 Retail price (TZS per 
pack) 
4670 3670 2725 1934 4299 4299 2729 
12         
13 NOT price (USD per pack) 1.88 1.35 0.85 0.43 1.25 1.69 0.85 
14 Excise tax (USD per pack) 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 
15 VAT  (USD per pack) 0.45 0.35 0.26 0.19 0.41 0.41 0.26 
16 Retail price (USD per 
pack) 
2.93 2.30 1.71 1.21 2.70 2.70 1.71 
17         
18 Binding excise tax 
(specific or ad valorem) 
Specific Specific Specific Specific Specific Specific  
19 Excise tax as % of retail 
price 
20 26 35 49 22 22 35 
20          
21 Cigarette consumption 
(million cigarettes) 
55 309 3500 611 40 27 4541 
22          
23 Excise revenue (million 
TZS) 
2611 14775 167243 29190 1922 1281 217023 
24 Industry revenue (million 
TZS) 
8200 33299 236800 20867 4004 3603 306773 
25 Total Consumption 
Expenditure (million TZS) 
12757 56727 476771 59068 8646 5764 619733 
26          
27 Excise revenue (million 
USD) 
1.64 9.27 104.99 18.32 1.21 0.80 136.24 
28 Industry revenue (million 
USD) 
5.15 20.90 148.65 13.10 2.51 2.26 192.58 
29 Total Consumption 
Expenditure (million USD) 
8.01 35.61 299.29 37.08 5.43 3.62 389.04 
30          
31 Percentage changes         
32 Excise tax (TZS per pack) 146.2 146.2 146.2 482.1 36.1 36.1 189.8 
33 Retail price (TZS per 
pack) 
16.7 22.3 32.6 93.4 7.5 7.5 37.4 
34 Cigarette consumption 
(million cigarettes) 
-8.9 -11.4 -15.5 -32.1 -4.2 -4.2 -17.7 
35 Excise revenue (million 
TZS) 
124.4 118.2 108.0 295.4 30.3 30.3 121.1 
36 Industry revenue (million 
TZS) 
-8.9 -11.4 -15.5 -32.1 -4.2 -4.2 -16.1 
37 Total Consumption 
expenditure (million TZS) 
6.4 8.4 12.0 31.4 2.9 2.9 12.9 
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Table 1.3 Scenario 1: Uganda 
      SIMULATION         
Line   Imported 
Premium 
brand (KE) 
Imported High 
priced brand 
(KE) 
Imported Medium 
Priced Brand (KE) 
Imported Low 
priced brand 
(KE) 
Imported high 
priced brand 
(TZ) 
Total or 
Average 
  Inputs        
1 Price elasticity -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6  
2 Specific excise tax per 
pack local currency 
1383 1383 1383 1383 1383  
3 Specific excise tax per 
pack USD 
0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6  
4 VAT rate 18% 18% 18% 18% 0   
5 Perc. Change in NOT 
price 
 0 0 0 0    
6         
7 Outputs  
 
      
8 NOT price (UGS per 
pack) 
2290 1619 1195 771 1619 1174 
9 Excise tax (UGS per 
pack) 
1383 1383 1383 1383 1383 1383 
10 VAT  (UGS per pack) 661 540 464 388 540 460 
11 Retail price (UGS per 
pack) 
4334 3542 3042 2542 3542 3017 
12        
13 NOT price (USD per 
pack) 
0.99 0.70 0.52 0.33 0.70 0.51 
14 Excise tax (USD per 
pack) 
0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 
15 VAT  (USD per pack) 0.29 0.23 0.20 0.17 0.23 0.20 
16 Retail price (USD per 
pack) 
1.88 1.54 1.32 1.10 1.54 1.31 
17        
18 Binding excise tax 
(specific or ad valorem) 
Specific Specific Specific Specific Specific  
19 Excise tax as % of retail 
price 
32 39 45 54 39 46 
20         
21 Cigarette consumption 
(million cigarettes) 
9 45 541 114 11 719 
22         
23 Excise revenue (million 
UGS) 
602 3081 37437 7866 730 49718 
24 Industry revenue (million 
UGS) 
997 3606 32346 4386 855 42191 
25 Total Consumption 
Expenditure (million 
UGS) 
1888 7891 82345 14458 1871 108452 
26         
27 Excise revenue (million 
USD) 
0.26 1.34 16.24 3.41 0.32 21.57 
28 Industry revenue (million 
USD) 
0.43 1.56 14.03 1.90 0.37 18.30 
29 Total Consumption 
Expenditure (million 
USD) 
0.82 3.42 35.72 6.27 0.81 47.05 
30         
31 Percentage changes        
32 Excise tax (UGS per 
pack) 
25.7 176.6 176.6 176.6 176.6 174.8 
33 Retail price (UGS per 
pack) 
8.3 41.7 52.1 69.5 41.7 53.5 
34 Cigarette consumption 
(million cigarettes) 
-4.7 -18.8 -22.1 -26.8 -18.8 -22.4 
35 Excise revenue (million 
UGS) 
19.8 124.7 115.6 102.5 124.7 112.0 
36 Industry revenue (million 
UGS) 
-4.7 -18.8 -22.1 -26.8 -18.8 -21.9 
37 Total Consumption 
expenditure (million 
UGS) 
3.3 15.1 18.5 24.1 15.1 18.6 
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Table 1.4 Scenario 1: Burundi 
      SIMULATION           
Line   Premium 
brand 
High priced 
brand 
Medium 
Priced 
Brand 
Low 
priced 
brand 
Imported 
Premium brand 
(non-EAC) 
Imported 
Premium 
brand (EAC) 
Total or 
Average 
  Inputs         
1 Price elasticity -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6  
2 Specific Excise tax in 
local currency 
779 779 779 779 779 779  
3 Specific excise tax per 
pack USD 
0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6  
4 VAT rate 18% 18% 18% 18% 18% 18%  
5 Perc. Change in NOT 
price 
0 0 0 0 0 0   
6 Retail & Wholesale 
margin (% on EX-
WORKS PRICE) 
100 100 100 100 100 100   
7          
8 Outputs         
9 NOT price (BIF per pack) 2260 734 452 282 2119 734 492 
10 Excise tax (BIF per pack) 779 779 779 779 779 779 779 
11 VAT  (BIF per pack) 547 272 222 191 598 272 229 
12 Retail price (BIF per 
pack) 
3586 1786 1453 1253 3920 1786 1500 
13         
14 NOT price (USD per 
pack) 
1.74 0.57 0.35 0.22 1.63 0.57 0.38 
15 Excise tax (USD per 
pack) 
0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 
16 VAT  (USD per pack) 0.42 0.21 0.17 0.15 0.46 0.21 0.18 
17 Retail price (USD per 
pack) 
2.76 1.38 1.12 0.96 3.02 1.38 1.15 
18         
19 Binding excise tax 
(specific or ad valorem) 
ad 
valorem 
ad valorem ad valorem ad 
valorem 
ad valorem ad valorem  
20 Excise tax as % of retail 
price 
22 44 54 62 20 44 52 
21          
22 Cigarette consumption 
(million cigarettes) 
6 25 251 46 0 16 343 
23          
24 Excise revenue (million 
BIF) 
215 970 9796 1784 0 612 13377 
25 Industry revenue (million 
BIF) 
624 914 5681 646 1 577 8442 
26 Total Consumption 
Expenditure (million BIF) 
990 2223 18262 2867 2 1403 25747 
27          
28 Excise revenue (million 
USD) 
0.17 0.75 7.54 1.37 0.00 0.47 10.30 
29 Industry revenue (million 
USD) 
0.48 0.70 4.37 0.50 0.00 0.44 6.50 
30 Total Consumption 
Expenditure (million 
USD) 
0.76 1.71 14.06 2.21 0.00 1.08 19.82 
31          
32 Percentage changes         
33 Excise tax (BIF per pack) -31.0 112.2 244.9 451.8 -26.4 112.2 252.3 
34 Retail price (BIF per 
pack) 
-10.3 37.4 81.6 150.6 -2.0 37.4 79.7 
35 Cigarette consumption 
(million cigarettes) 
6.8 -17.3 -29.6 -41.0 1.2 -17.3 -29.8 
36 Excise revenue (million 
BIF) 
-26.4 75.6 142.7 225.7 -25.5 75.6 131.5 
37 Industry revenue (million 
BIF) 
6.8 -17.3 -29.6 -41.0 1.2 -17.3 -26.9 
38 Total Consumption 
expenditure (million BIF) 
-4.3 13.7 27.8 47.9 -0.8 13.7 25.9 
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Table 1.5 Scenario 1: Rwanda 
      SIMULATION         
Line   Imported 
Premium 
brand (KE) 
Imported High 
priced brand 
(KE) 
Imported Medium 
Priced Brand (KE) 
Imported Low 
priced brand 
(KE) 
Imported High 
priced brand 
(BU) 
Total or 
Average 
  Inputs        
1 Price elasticity -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6  
2 Excise tax per pack local 
currency 
357 357 357 357 357  
3 Excise tax per pack USD 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6  
4 VAT rate 18% 18% 18% 18% 18%  
5 Perc. Change in NOT 
price 
 0 0 0 0 0   
6 Retail & Wholesale 
margin (% on ex-works 
price) 
100 100 100 100 100   
7         
8 Outputs        
9 NOT price (RWF per 
pack) 
581 508 242 145 508 258 
10 Excise tax (RWF per 
pack) 
357 357 357 357 357 357 
11 VAT  (RWF per pack) 169 156 108 90 156 111 
12 Retail price (RWF per 
pack) 
1107 1021 707 593 1021 726 
13        
14 NOT price (USD per 
pack) 
0.98 0.85 0.41 0.24 0.85 0.43 
15 Excise tax (USD per 
pack) 
0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 
16 VAT  (USD per pack) 0.28 0.26 0.18 0.15 0.26 0.19 
17 Retail price (USD per 
pack) 
1.86 1.72 1.19 1.00 1.72 1.22 
18        
19 Binding excise tax 
(specific or ad valorem) 
Specific Specific Specific Specific Specific  
20 Excise tax as % of retail 
price 
32 35 50 60 35 50 
21         
22 Cigarette consumption 
(million packs) 
3 18 170 30 3 224 
23         
24 Excise revenue (million 
RWF) 
57 319 3026 542 50 3994 
25 Industry revenue (million 
RWF) 
92 454 2052 221 72 2890 
26 Total Consumption 
Expenditure (million 
RWF) 
175 911 5993 900 144 8123 
27         
28 Excise revenue (million 
USD) 
0.09 0.54 5.09 0.91 0.08 6.71 
29 Industry revenue (million 
USD) 
0.15 0.76 3.45 0.37 0.12 4.86 
30 Total Consumption 
Expenditure (million 
USD) 
0.29 1.53 10.07 1.51 0.24 13.65 
31         
32 Percentage changes        
33 Excise tax (RWF per 
pack) 
-18.1 -6.4 96.6 227.6 -6.4 103.2 
34 Retail price (RWF per 
pack) 
-7.8 -2.7 41.4 97.6 -2.7 44.2 
35 Cigarette consumption 
(million cigarettes) 
5.0 1.7 -18.7 -32.9 1.7 -19.2 
36 Excise revenue (million 
RWF) 
-14.0 -4.8 59.9 119.9 -4.8 54.1 
37 Industry revenue (million 
RWF) 
5.0 1.7 -18.7 -32.9 1.7 -16.4 
38 Total Consumption 
expenditure (million 
RWF) 
-3.2 -1.1 15.0 32.6 -1.1 13.8 
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Table 1.6 Scenario 1 Robustness of Price Elasticity (εp = -0.8): Kenya  
      SIMULATION         
Line   Premium 
Brand 
High Priced 
Brand 
Medium 
Priced 
Brand 
Low Priced 
Brand 
Imported 
Premium 
(non-EAC) 
Total or 
Average 
  Inputs        
1 Price elasticity -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8   
2 Specific excise tax per pack 
local currency 
50 50 50 50 50   
3 Specific excise tax per pack 
USD 
0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6  
4 VAT rate 16% 16% 16% 16% 16%   
5 Perc. Change in NOT price  0 0 0 0 0   
6         
7 Outputs        
8 NOT price (KES per pack) 72 46 36 19 53 38 
9 Excise tax (KES per pack) 50 50 50 50 50 50 
10 VAT  (KES per pack) 19 15 14 11 19 14 
11 Retail price (KES per pack) 141 111 99 80 141 102 
12        
13 NOT price (USD per pack) 0.87 0.56 0.43 0.23 0.64 0.45 
14 Excise tax (USD per pack) 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 
15 VAT  (USD per pack) 0.23 0.19 0.17 0.13 0.23 0.17 
16 Retail price (USD per pack) 1.70 1.34 1.20 0.96 1.70 1.23 
17        
18 Binding excise tax (specific or 
ad valorem) 
Specific Specific Specific Specific Specific  
19 Excise tax as % of retail price 35 45 50 62 35 49 
20         
21 Cigarette consumption (million 
cigarettes) 
279 581 2837 610 102 4408 
22         
23 Excise revenue (million KES) 692 1443 7048 1515 252 10950 
24 Industry revenue (million KES) 999 1338 5085 583 270 8275 
25 Total Consumption Expenditure 
(million KES) 
1962 3226 14074 2434 715 22410 
26         
27 Excise revenue (million USD) 8.36 17.42 85.12 18.30 3.05 132.25 
28 Industry revenue (million USD) 12.06 16.16 61.41 7.04 3.26 99.93 
29 Total Consumption Expenditure 
(million USD) 
23.69 38.96 169.97 29.39 8.63 270.65 
30         
31 Percentage changes        
32 Excise tax (KES per pack) 1.4 57.7 102.8 107.0 1.4 88.7 
33 Retail price (KES per pack) 0.6 23.4 41.7 59.6 0.6 37.5 
34 Cigarette consumption (million 
cigarettes) 
-0.4 -15.5 -24.3 -31.0 -0.4 -22.7 
35 Excise Revenue (million KES) 0.9 33.3 53.6 42.8 0.9 42.8 
36 Industry revenue (million KES) -0.4 -15.5 -24.3 -31.0 -0.4 -20.6 
37 Total Consumption expenditure 
(million KES) 
0.1 4.3 7.3 10.1 0.1 6.3 
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Table 1.7 Scenario 1 Robustness of Price Elasticity (εp = -0.8): Tanzania 
      SIMULATION         
Line   Premium 
Brand 
High 
Priced 
Brand 
Medium 
Priced 
Brand 
Low 
Priced 
Brand 
Imported 
Premium 
Brand (non-
EAC) 
Imported 
Premium 
Brand 
(EAC) 
Total or 
Average 
  Inputs         
1 Price elasticity -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8  
2 Specific excise tax per 
pack local currency 
956 956 956 956 956 956  
3 Specific excise tax per 
pack USD 
0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6  
4 VAT rate 18% 18% 18% 18% 18% 18%  
5 Perc. Change in NOT 
price 
0 0 0 0   0  
6          
7 Outputs         
8 NOT price (TZS per 
pack) 
3002 2154 1353 683 1991 2687 1360 
9 Excise tax (TZS per 
pack) 
956 956 956 956 956 956 956 
10 VAT  (TZS per pack) 712 560 416 295 656 656 418 
11 Retail price (TZS per 
pack) 
4670 3670 2725 1934 4299 4299 2740 
12         
13 NOT price (USD per 
pack) 
1.88 1.35 0.85 0.43 1.25 1.69 0.85 
14 Excise tax (USD per 
pack) 
0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 
15 VAT  (USD per pack) 0.45 0.35 0.26 0.19 0.41 0.41 0.26 
16 Retail price (USD per 
pack) 
2.93 2.30 1.71 1.21 2.70 2.70 1.72 
17         
18 Binding excise tax 
(specific or ad 
valorem) 
Specific Specific Specific Specific Specific Specific  
19 Excise tax as % of 
retail price 
20 26 35 49 22 22 35 
20          
21 Cigarette consumption 
(million cigarettes) 
53 297 3307 534 40 26 4257 
22          
23 Excise revenue 
(million TZS) 
2531 14190 158040 25528 1895 1263 203448 
24 Industry revenue 
(million TZS) 
7950 31981 223770 18249 3946 3552 289448 
25 Total Consumption 
Expenditure (million 
TZS) 
12368 54482 450536 51657 8522 5681 583247 
26          
27 Excise revenue 
(million USD) 
1.59 8.91 99.21 16.03 1.19 0.79 127.71 
28 Industry revenue 
(million USD) 
4.99 20.08 140.47 11.46 2.48 2.23 181.70 
29 Total Consumption 
Expenditure (million 
USD) 
7.76 34.20 282.82 32.43 5.35 3.57 366.13 
30          
31 Percentage changes         
32 Excise tax (TZS per 
pack) 
146.2 146.2 146.2 482.1 36.1 36.1 186.6 
33 Retail price (TZS per 
pack) 
16.7 22.3 32.6 93.4 7.5 7.5 37.9 
34 Cigarette consumption 
(million cigarettes) 
-11.6 -14.9 -20.2 -40.6 -5.6 -5.6 -22.9 
35 Excise Revenue 
(million TZS) 
117.6 109.6 96.6 245.8 28.5 28.5 107.2 
36 Industry revenue 
(million TZS) 
-11.6 -14.9 -20.2 -40.6 -5.6 -5.6 -20.8 
37 Total Consumption 
expenditure (million 
TZS) 
3.2 4.1 5.9 14.9 1.5 1.5 6.3 
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Table 1.8 Scenario 1 Robustness of Price Elasticity (εp = -0.8 ): Uganda 
      SIMULATION       
Line   Imported 
Premium 
Brand (KE) 
Imported High 
Priced Brand 
(KE) 
Imported Medium 
Priced Brand 
(KE) 
Imported Low 
priced brand 
(KE) 
Imported High 
priced brand 
(TZ) 
Total or 
Average 
  Inputs        
1 Price elasticity -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8  
2 Specific excise tax per 
pack local currency 
1383 1383 1383 1383 1383  
3 Specific excise tax per 
pack USD 
0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6  
4 VAT rate 18% 18% 18% 18% 18%  
5 Perc. Change in NOT 
price 
 0 0 0 0 0   
6         
7 Outputs        
8 NOT price (UGS per 
pack) 
2290 1619 1195 771 1619 1176 
9 Excise tax (UGS per 
pack) 
1383 1383 1383 1383 1383 1383 
10 VAT  (UGS per pack) 661 540 464 388 540 461 
11 Retail price (UGS per 
pack) 
4334 3542 3042 2542 3542 3020 
12        
13 NOT price (USD per 
pack) 
0.99 0.70 0.52 0.33 0.70 0.51 
14 Excise tax (USD per 
pack) 
0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 
15 VAT  (USD per pack) 0.29 0.23 0.20 0.17 0.23 0.20 
16 Retail price (USD per 
pack) 
1.88 1.54 1.32 1.10 1.54 1.31 
17        
18 Binding excise tax 
(specific or ad 
valorem) 
Specific Specific Specific Specific Specific  
19 Excise tax as % of 
retail price 
32 39 45 54 39 46 
20         
21 Cigarette consumption 
(million cigarettes) 
9 42 498 102 10 660 
22         
23 Excise revenue 
(million UGS) 
593 2873 34406 7071 681 45623 
24 Industry revenue 
(million UGS) 
981 3362 29727 3943 797 38810 
25 Total Consumption 
Expenditure (million 
UGS) 
1858 7357 75677 12996 1744 99632 
26         
27 Excise revenue 
(million USD) 
0.26 1.25 14.93 3.07 0.30 19.79 
28 Industry revenue 
(million USD) 
0.43 1.46 12.90 1.71 0.35 16.84 
29 Total Consumption 
Expenditure (million 
USD) 
0.81 3.19 32.83 5.64 0.76 43.22 
30         
31 Percentage changes        
32 Excise tax (UGS per 
pack) 
25.7 176.6 176.6 176.6 176.6 174.6 
33 Retail price (UGS per 
pack) 
8.3 41.7 52.1 69.5 41.7 53.4 
34 Cigarette consumption 
(million cigarettes) 
-6.2 -24.2 -28.4 -34.2 -24.2 -28.8 
35 Excise Revenue 
(million UGS) 
17.9 109.5 98.1 82.0 109.5 94.6 
36 Industry revenue 
(million UGS) 
-6.2 -24.2 -28.4 -34.2 -24.2 -28.2 
37 Total Consumption 
expenditure (million 
UGS) 
1.6 7.3 8.9 11.5 7.3 9.0 
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Table 1.9 Scenario 1 Robustness of Price Elasticity (εp = -0.8): Burundi 
      SIMULATION         
Line   Premium 
Brand 
High 
Priced 
Brand 
Medium 
Priced 
Brand 
Low 
Priced 
Brand 
Imported 
Premium Brand 
(non-EAC) 
Imported 
Premium 
Brand (EAC) 
Total or 
Average 
  Inputs         
1 Price elasticity -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8  
2 Specific excise tax per 
pack local currency 
779 779 779 779 779 779  
3 Specific excise tax per 
pack USD 
0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6  
4 VAT rate 18% 18% 18% 18% 18% 18% 
5 Perc. Change in NOT 
price 
0 0 0 0 0 0  
6 Retail & Wholesale 
margin (% on ex-works 
price) 
100 100 100 100 100 100   
7          
8 Outputs         
9 NOT price (BIF per pack) 2260 734 452 282 2119 734 492 
10 Excise tax (BIF per pack) 779 779 779 779 779 779 779 
11 VAT  (BIF per pack) 628 299 238 201 674 299 247 
12 Retail price (BIF per 
pack) 
4120 1960 1560 1320 4420 1960 1525 
13         
14 NOT price (USD per 
pack) 
1.74 0.57 0.35 0.22 1.63 0.57 0.38 
15 Excise tax (USD per 
pack) 
0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 
16 VAT  (USD per pack) 0.42 0.21 0.17 0.15 0.46 0.21 0.18 
17 Retail price (USD per 
pack) 
2.76 1.38 1.12 0.96 3.02 1.38 1.16 
18         
19 Binding excise tax 
(specific or ad valorem) 
ad valorem ad valorem ad valorem ad valorem ad valorem ad valorem  
20 Excise tax as % of retail 
price 
19 40 50 59 18 40 51 
21          
22 Cigarette consumption 
(million cigarettes) 
5 20 211 38 0 14 287 
23          
24 Excise revenue (million 
BIF) 
179 793 8218 1464 0 534 11188 
25 Industry revenue (million 
BIF) 
519 747 4766 531 1 503 7066 
26 Total Consumption 
Expenditure (million BIF) 
946 1993 16446 2479 2 1342 23208 
27          
28 Excise revenue (million 
USD) 
0.14 0.61 6.33 1.13 0.00 0.41 8.61 
29 Industry revenue (million 
USD) 
0.40 0.58 3.67 0.41 0.00 0.39 5.44 
30 Total Consumption 
Expenditure (million 
USD) 
0.73 1.53 12.66 1.91 0.00 1.03 17.87 
31          
32 Percentage changes         
33 Excise tax (BIF per pack) -31.0 112.2 244.9 451.8 -26.4 112.2 251.8 
34 Retail price (BIF per 
pack) 
3.0 50.7 95.0 163.9 10.5 50.7 83.7 
35 Cigarette consumption 
(million cigarettes) 
-2.3 -27.9 -41.0 -53.0 -7.7 -27.9 -41.3 
36 Excise revenus (million 
BIF) 
-32.6 53.1 103.6 159.5 -32.1 53.1 95.2 
37 Industry revenue (million 
BIF) 
-2.3 -27.9 -41.0 -53.0 -7.7 -27.9 -38.4 
38 Total Consumption 
expenditure (million BIF) 
0.6 8.7 15.1 24.1 2.0 8.7 14.4 
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Table 1.10 Scenario 1 Robustness of Price Elasticity (εp = -0.8): Rwanda 
  
 
    SIMULATION       
Line   Imported 
Premium 
Brand (KE) 
Imported High 
Priced Brand 
(KE) 
Imported 
Medium 
Priced Brand 
(KE) 
Imported 
Low Priced 
Brand (KE) 
Imported 
High Priced 
Brand (BU) 
Total or 
Average 
  Inputs        
1 Price elasticity -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8  
2 Excise tax per pack local currency 357 357 357 357 357  
3 Excise tax per pack USD 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6  
4 VAT rate 18% 18% 18% 18% 18%  
5 Perc. Change in NOT price  0 0 0 0 0   
6 Retail & Wholesale margin (% on ex-
works price) 
100 100 100 100 100   
7         
8 Outputs        
9 NOT price (RWF per pack) 581 508 242 145 508 258 
10 Excise tax (RWF per pack) 357 357 357 357 357 357 
11 VAT  (RWF per pack) 190 174 117 96 174 120 
12 Retail price (RWF per pack) 1244 1141 764 627 1141 787 
13        
14 NOT price (USD per pack) 0.98 0.85 0.41 0.24 0.85 0.43 
15 Excise tax (USD per pack) 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 
16 VAT  (USD per pack) 0.28 0.26 0.18 0.15 0.26 0.19 
17 Retail price (USD per pack) 1.86 1.72 1.19 1.00 1.72 1.22 
18        
19 Binding excise tax (specific or ad 
valorem) 
Specific Specific Specific Specific Specific  
20 Excise tax as % of retail price 29 31 47 57 31 46 
21         
22 Cigarette consumption (million packs) 3 15 149 26 3 195 
23         
24 Excise revenue (million RWF) 48 275 2655 466 46 3489 
25 Industry revenue (million RWF) 77 391 1800 190 66 2525 
26 Total Consumption Expenditure 
(million RWF) 
166 878 5682 818 148 7692 
27         
28 Excise revenue (million USD) 0.08 0.46 4.46 0.78 0.08 5.86 
29 Industry revenue (million USD) 0.13 0.66 3.03 0.32 0.11 4.24 
30 Total Consumption Expenditure 
(million USD) 
0.28 1.48 9.55 1.38 0.25 12.93 
31         
32 Percentage changes        
33 Excise tax (RWF per pack) -18.1 -6.4 96.6 227.6 -6.4 103.0 
34 Retail price (RWF per pack) 3.7 8.7 52.8 109.0 8.7 55.6 
35 Cigarette consumption (million 
cigarettes) 
-2.8 -6.4 -28.6 -44.0 -6.4 -29.4 
36 Excise revenue (million RWF) -20.4 -12.4 40.3 83.4 -12.4 35.6 
37 Industry revenue (million RWF) -2.8 -6.4 -28.6 -44.0 -6.4 -26.4 
38 Total Consumption expenditure 
(million RWF) 
0.7 1.7 9.1 17.0 1.7 8.6 
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Table 1.11 Scenario 1 Robustness of Price Elasticity (εp = -0.4): Kenya  
      SIMULATION       
Line   Premium 
brand 
High priced 
brand 
Medium Priced 
Brand 
low priced 
brand 
Imported 
Premium 
Total or 
Average 
  Inputs        
1 Price elasticity -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4   
2 Specific excise tax per pack local 
currency 
50 50 50 50 50   
3 Specific excise tax per pack USD 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6  
4 VAT rate 16% 16% 16% 16% 16%   
5 Perc. Change in NOT price   0 0 0 0   
6         
7 Outputs        
8 NOT price (KES per pack) 72 46 36 19 53 37 
9 Excise tax (KES per pack) 50 50 50 50 50 50 
10 VAT  (KES per pack) 19 15 14 11 19 14 
11 Retail price (KES per pack) 141 111 99 80 141 101 
12        
13 NOT price (USD per pack) 0.87 0.56 0.43 0.23 0.64 0.45 
14 Excise tax (USD per pack) 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 
15 VAT  (USD per pack) 0.23 0.19 0.17 0.13 0.23 0.17 
16 Retail price (USD per pack) 1.70 1.34 1.20 0.96 1.70 1.22 
17        
18 Binding excise tax (specific or ad 
valorem) 
Specific Specific Specific Specific Specific  
19 Excise tax as % of retail price 35 45 50 62 35 49 
20         
21 Cigarette consumption (million 
cigarettes) 
279 632 3262 736 102 5011 
22         
23 Excise revenue (million KES) 694 1570 8104 1828 253 12448 
24 Industry revenue (million KES) 1001 1456 5847 703 270 9277 
25 Total Consumption Expenditure 
(million KES) 
1966 3510 16183 2935 716 25310 
26         
27 Excise revenue (million USD) 8.38 18.96 97.87 22.07 3.05 150.33 
28 Industry revenue (million USD) 12.09 17.59 70.62 8.49 3.26 112.04 
29 Total Consumption Expenditure 
(million USD) 
23.74 42.39 195.45 35.45 8.65 305.68 
30         
31 Percentage changes        
32 Excise tax (KES per pack) 1.4 57.7 102.8 107.0 1.4 90.0 
33 Retail price (KES per pack) 0.6 23.4 41.7 59.6 0.6 36.9 
34 Cigarette consumption (million 
cigarettes) 
-0.2 -8.1 -12.9 -16.8 -0.2 -12.1 
35 Excise revenue (million KES) 1.2 45.0 76.6 72.2 1.2 62.3 
36 Industry revenue (million KES) -0.2 -8.1 -12.9 -16.8 -0.2 -10.9 
37 Total Consumption expenditure 
(million KES) 
0.3 13.5 23.4 32.7 0.3 20.0 
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Table 1.12 Scenario 1 Robustness of Price Elasticity (εp = -0.4): Tanzania  
      SIMULATION         
Line   Premium 
brand 
High 
priced 
brand 
Medium 
Priced 
Brand 
low 
priced 
brand 
Imported Premium 
from others 
Imported 
Premium in 
EAC 
Total or 
Average 
  Inputs         
1 Price elasticity -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4  
2 Specific excise tax per pack 
local currency 
956 956 956 956 956 956  
3 Specific excise tax per pack 
USD 
0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6  
4 VAT rate 18% 18% 18% 18% 18% 18%  
5 Perc. Change in NOT price 0 0 0 0   0  
6          
7 Outputs         
8 NOT price (TZS per pack) 3002 2154 1353 683 1991 2687 1342 
9 Excise tax (TZS per pack) 956 956 956 956 956 956 956 
10 VAT  (TZS per pack) 712 560 416 295 656 656 415 
11 Retail price (TZS per pack) 4670 3670 2725 1934 4299 4299 2719 
12         
13 NOT price (USD per pack) 1.88 1.35 0.85 0.43 1.25 1.69 0.84 
14 Excise tax (USD per pack) 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 
15 VAT  (USD per pack) 0.45 0.35 0.26 0.19 0.41 0.41 0.26 
16 Retail price (USD per pack) 2.93 2.30 1.71 1.21 2.70 2.70 1.71 
17         
18 Binding excise tax (specific or 
ad valorem) 
Specific Specific Specific Specific Specific Specific  
19 Excise tax as % of retail price 20 26 35 49 22 22 35 
20          
21 Cigarette consumption (million 
cigarettes) 
56 322 3702 696 41 27 4845 
22          
23 Excise revenue (million TZS) 2693 15382 176934 33266 1950 1300 231526 
24 Industry revenue (million TZS) 8458 34667 250522 23781 4062 3656 325146 
25 Total Consumption 
Expenditure (million TZS) 
13158 59058 504399 67315 8771 5848 658549 
26          
27 Excise revenue (million USD) 1.69 9.66 111.07 20.88 1.22 0.82 145.34 
28 Industry revenue (million 
USD) 
5.31 21.76 157.26 14.93 2.55 2.29 204.11 
29 Total Consumption 
Expenditure (million USD) 
8.26 37.07 316.63 42.26 5.51 3.67 413.40 
30          
31 Percentage changes         
32 Excise tax (TZS per pack) 146.2 146.2 146.2 482.1 36.1 36.1 192.9 
33 Retail price (TZS per pack) 16.7 22.3 32.6 93.4 7.5 7.5 36.9 
34 Cigarette consumption (million 
cigarettes) 
-6.0 -7.7 -10.6 -22.6 -2.8 -2.8 -12.2 
35 Excise revenue (million TZS) 131.5 127.2 120.1 350.6 32.2 32.2 135.8 
36 Industry revenue (million TZS) -6.0 -7.7 -10.6 -22.6 -2.8 -2.8 -11.0 
37 Total Consumption 
expenditure (million TZS) 
9.7 12.9 18.5 49.7 4.4 4.4 20.0 
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Table 1.13 Scenario 1 Robustness of Price Elasticity (εp = -0.4): Uganda 
      SIMULATION       
Line   Imported 
Premium brand 
(KE) 
Imported High 
priced brand (KE) 
Imported Medium 
Priced Brand (KE) 
Imported low 
priced brand (KE) 
Imported High 
priced brand (TZ) 
Total or 
Average 
  Inputs        
1 Price elasticity -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4  
2 Specific excise tax per 
pack local currency 
1383 1383 1383 1383 1383  
3 Specific excise tax per 
pack USD 
0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6  
4 VAT rate 18% 18% 18% 18% 18%  
5 Perc. Change in NOT price   0 0 0 0   
6         
7 Outputs        
8 NOT price (UGS per pack) 2290 1619 1195 771 1619 1171 
9 Excise tax (UGS per pack) 1383 1383 1383 1383 1383 1383 
10 VAT  (UGS per pack) 661 540 464 388 540 460 
11 Retail price (UGS per 
pack) 
4334 3542 3042 2542 3542 3014 
12        
13 NOT price (USD per pack) 0.99 0.70 0.52 0.33 0.70 0.51 
14 Excise tax (USD per pack) 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 
15 VAT  (USD per pack) 0.29 0.23 0.20 0.17 0.23 0.20 
16 Retail price (USD p.p) 1.88 1.54 1.32 1.10 1.54 1.31 
17        
18 Binding excise tax (specific 
or ad valorem) 
Specific Specific Specific Specific Specific  
19 Excise tax as % of retail 
price 
32 39 45 54 39 46 
20         
21 Cigarette consumption (M 
cigarettes) 
9 48 589 126 11 783 
22         
23 Excise revenue (M UGS) 612 3303 40700 8736 783 54134 
24 Industry revenue (M UGS) 1013 3866 35165 4871 916 45832 
25 Total Consumption 
Expenditure (M UGS) 
1918 8459 89522 16057 2005 117960 
26         
27 Excise revenue (M USD) 0.27 1.43 17.66 3.79 0.34 23.49 
28 Industry revenue (M USD) 0.44 1.68 15.26 2.11 0.40 19.88 
29 Total Consumption 
Expenditure (M USD) 
0.83 3.67 38.84 6.97 0.87 51.18 
30         
31 Percentage changes        
32 Excise tax (UGS p.p) 25.7 176.6 176.6 176.6 176.6 174.9 
33 Retail price (UGS p.p) 8.3 41.7 52.1 69.5 41.7 53.6 
34 Cigarette consumption (M 
cigarettes) 
-3.2 -12.9 -15.3 -18.7 -12.9 -15.5 
35 Excise revenue (M UGS) 21.8 140.9 134.4 124.9 140.9 130.9 
36 Industry revenue (M UGS) -3.2 -12.9 -15.3 -18.7 -12.9 -15.2 
37 Total Consumption 
expenditure (M UGS) 
4.9 23.4 28.9 37.8 23.4 29.0 
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Table 1.14 Scenario 1 Robustness of Price Elasticity (εp = -0.4): Burundi 
      SIMULATION         
Line   Premium 
brand 
High 
priced 
brand 
Medium 
Priced 
Brand 
low 
priced 
brand 
Imported 
Premium from 
others 
Imported 
Premium in 
EAC 
Total or 
Average 
  Inputs         
1 Price elasticity -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4  
2 Specific excise tax per 
pack local currency 
779 779 779 779 779 779  
3 Specific excise tax per 
pack USD 
0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6  
4 VAT rate 18% 18% 18% 18% 18% 18% 
5 Perc. Change in NOT 
price 
0 0 0 0 0 0   
6 Retail & Wholesale 
margin (% on EW) 
100 100 100 100 100 100   
7          
8 Outputs         
9 NOT price (BIF per pack) 2260 734 452 282 2119 734 479 
10 Excise tax (BIF per pack) 779 779 779 779 779 779 779 
11 VAT  (BIF per pack) 628 299 238 201 674 299 244 
12 Retail price (BIF per pack) 4120 1960 1560 1320 4420 1960 1509 
13         
14 NOT price (USD per 
pack) 
1.74 0.57 0.35 0.22 1.63 0.57 0.37 
15 Excise tax (USD per 
pack) 
0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 
16 VAT  (USD per pack) 0.42 0.21 0.17 0.15 0.46 0.21 0.17 
17 Retail price (USD per 
pack) 
2.76 1.38 1.12 0.96 3.02 1.38 1.14 
18         
19 Binding excise tax 
(specific or ad valorem) 
ad 
valorem 
ad 
valorem 
ad valorem ad 
valorem 
ad valorem ad valorem  
20 Excise tax as % of retail 
price 
19 40 50 59 18 40 52 
21        
22 Cigarette consumption 
(million cigarettes) 
5 24 276 56 0 16 376 
23          
24 Excise revenue (million 
BIF) 
181 934 10744 2163 0 629 14652 
25 Industry revenue (million 
BIF) 
525 880 6230 784 1 593 9014 
26 Total Consumption 
Expenditure (million BIF) 
957 2349 21500 3662 2 1582 30053 
27          
28 Excise revenue (million 
USD) 
0.14 0.72 8.27 1.67 0.00 0.48 11.28 
29 Industry revenue (million 
USD) 
0.40 0.68 4.80 0.60 0.00 0.46 6.94 
30 Total Consumption 
Expenditure (million USD) 
0.74 1.81 16.55 2.82 0.00 1.22 23.14 
31          
32 Percentage changes         
33 Excise tax (BIF per pack) -31.0 112.2 244.9 451.8 -26.4 112.2 257.9 
34 Retail price (BIF per pack) 3.0 50.7 95.0 163.9 10.5 50.7 82.2 
35 Cigarette consumption 
(million cigarettes) 
-1.2 -15.0 -22.8 -30.5 -3.9 -15.0 -23.1 
36 Excise revenue (million 
BIF) 
-31.8 80.4 166.2 283.3 -29.3 80.4 155.6 
37 Industry revenue (million 
BIF) 
-1.2 -15.0 -22.8 -30.5 -3.9 -15.0 -21.4 
38 Total Consumption 
expenditure (million BIF) 
1.8 28.2 50.5 83.3 6.2 28.2 48.1 
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Table 1.15 Scenario 1 Robustness of Price Elasticity (εp = -0.4): Rwanda 
      SIMULATION       
Line   Imported 
Premium brand 
(KE) 
Imported High 
priced brand (KE) 
Imported Medium 
Priced Brand (KE) 
Imported low 
priced brand (KE) 
Imported High 
priced brand (BU) 
Total or 
Average 
  Inputs        
1 Price elasticity -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4  
2 Excise tax per pack local 
currency 
357 357 357 357 357  
3 Excise tax per pack USD 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6  
4 VAT rate 18% 18% 18% 18% 18%  
5 Perc. Change in NOT price  0 0 0 0 0   
6 Retail & Wholesale margin 
(% on EW) 
100 100 100 100 100   
7         
8 Outputs        
9 NOT price (RWF per pack) 581 508 242 145 508 253 
10 Excise tax (RWF per pack) 357 357 357 357 357 357 
11 VAT  (RWF per pack) 190 174 117 96 174 119 
12 Retail price (RWF per pack) 1244 1141 764 627 1141 779 
13        
14 NOT price (USD per pack) 0.98 0.85 0.41 0.24 0.85 0.42 
15 Excise tax (USD per pack) 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 
16 VAT  (USD per pack) 0.28 0.26 0.18 0.15 0.26 0.18 
17 Retail price (USD per pack) 1.86 1.72 1.19 1.00 1.72 1.21 
18        
19 Binding excise tax (specific 
or ad valorem) 
Specific Specific Specific Specific Specific  
20 Excise tax as % of retail 
price 
29 31 47 57 31 47 
21         
22 Cigarette consumption 
(million packs) 
3 16 176 35 3 233 
23         
24 Excise revenue (million 
RWF) 
48 284 3146 626 48 4153 
25 Industry revenue (million 
RWF) 
79 405 2134 255 68 2940 
26 Total Consumption 
Expenditure (million RWF) 
168 908 6734 1100 153 9064 
27         
28 Excise revenue (million 
USD) 
0.08 0.48 5.29 1.05 0.08 6.98 
29 Industry revenue (million 
USD) 
0.13 0.68 3.59 0.43 0.11 4.94 
30 Total Consumption 
Expenditure (million USD) 
0.28 1.53 11.32 1.85 0.26 15.23 
31         
32 Percentage changes        
33 Excise tax (RWF per pack) -18.1 -6.4 96.6 227.6 -6.4 106.8 
34 Retail price (RWF per pack) 3.7 8.7 52.8 109.0 8.7 57.2 
35 Cigarette consumption 
(million cigarettes) 
-1.4 -3.3 -15.4 -24.7 -3.3 -16.0 
36 Excise revenue (million 
RWF) 
-19.3 -9.5 66.3 146.6 -9.5 61.4 
37 Industry revenue (million 
RWF) 
-1.4 -3.3 -15.4 -24.7 -3.3 -14.3 
38 Total Consumption 
expenditure (million RWF) 
2.2 5.1 29.2 57.3 5.1 28.0 
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Table 1.16 Scenario 1 Robustness of Industry Pricing Strategy (NOT increases by 
20%): Kenya 
      SIMULATION       
Line   Premium 
Brand 
High Priced 
Brand 
Medium Priced 
Brand 
Low 
Priced 
Brand 
Imported 
Premium 
(non-EAC) 
Total or 
Average 
  Inputs        
1 Price elasticity -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6   
2 Specific excise tax per pack local 
currency 
50 50 50 50 50   
3 Specific excise tax per pack USD 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6  
4 VAT rate 16% 16% 16% 16% 16%   
5 Perc. Change in NOT price 20 20 20 20 20   
6         
7 Outputs        
8 NOT price (KES per pack) 86 55 43 23 64 45 
9 Excise tax (KES per pack) 50 50 50 50 50 50 
10 VAT  (KES per pack) 22 17 15 12 22 15 
11 Retail price (KES per pack) 157 122 108 84 157 110 
12        
13 NOT price (USD per pack) 1.04 0.67 0.52 0.28 0.77 0.54 
14 Excise tax (USD per pack) 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 
15 VAT  (USD per pack) 0.26 0.20 0.18 0.14 0.26 0.18 
16 Retail price (USD per pack) 1.90 1.47 1.30 1.02 1.90 1.33 
17        
18 Binding excise tax (specific or ad 
valorem) 
Specific Specific Specific Specific Specific  
19 Excise tax as % of retail price 32 41 46 59 32 45 
20         
21 Cigarette consumption (million 
cigarettes) 
261 574 2903 650 95 4483 
22         
23 Excise revenue (million KES) 648 1425 7211 1614 236 11135 
24 Industry revenue (million KES) 1122 1586 6244 745 303 10000 
25 Total Consumption Expenditure 
(million KES) 
2054 3493 15608 2736 748 24639 
26         
27 Excise revenue (million USD) 7.83 17.21 87.09 19.49 2.85 134.48 
28 Industry revenue (million USD) 13.55 19.16 75.41 8.99 3.66 120.77 
29 Total Consumption Expenditure 
(million USD) 
24.80 42.19 188.50 33.05 9.04 297.57 
30         
31 Percentage changes        
32 Excise tax (KES per pack) 1.4 57.7 102.8 107.0 1.4 89.6 
33 Retail price (KES per pack) 12.4 35.3 53.6 68.4 12.4 48.8 
34 Cigarette consumption (million 
cigarettes) 
-6.8 -16.5 -22.5 -26.5 -6.8 -21.4 
35 Excise revenue (million KES) -5.5 31.7 57.1 52.1 -5.5 45.2 
36 Industry revenue (million KES) 11.9 0.2 -7.0 -11.8 11.9 -4.0 
37 Total Consumption expenditure 
(million KES) 
4.8 13.0 19.0 23.7 4.8 16.8 
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Table 1.17 Scenario 1 Robustness of Industry Pricing Strategy (NOT increases by 
20%): Tanzania 
      SIMULATION         
Line   Premium 
Brand 
High 
Priced 
Brand 
Medium 
Priced 
Brand 
Low 
Priced 
Brand 
Imported 
Premium Brand 
(non-EAC) 
Imported 
Premium 
Brand (EAC) 
Total or 
Average 
  Inputs         
1 Price elasticity -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6  
2 Specific excise tax per pack 
local currency 
956 956 956 956 956 956  
3 Specific excise tax per pack 
USD 
0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6  
4 VAT rate 18% 18% 18% 18% 18% 18%  
5 Perc. Change in NOT price 20 20 20 20   20  
6          
7 Outputs         
8 NOT price (TZS per pack) 3602 2585 1624 820 2389 3225 1618 
9 Excise tax (TZS per pack) 956 956 956 956 956 956 956 
10 VAT  (TZS per pack) 820 637 464 320 753 753 465 
11 Retail price (TZS per pack) 5378 4178 3044 2095 4933 4933 3045 
12         
13 NOT price (USD per pack) 2.26 1.62 1.02 0.51 1.50 2.02 1.02 
14 Excise tax (USD per pack) 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 
15 VAT  (USD per pack) 0.52 0.40 0.29 0.20 0.47 0.47 0.29 
16 Retail price (USD per pack) 3.38 2.62 1.91 1.32 3.10 3.10 1.91 
17         
18 Binding excise tax (specific 
or ad valorem) 
Specific Specific Specific Specific Specific Specific  
19 Excise tax as % of retail 
price 
18 23 31 46 19 19 31 
20          
21 Cigarette consumption 
(million cigarettes) 
50 286 3278 584 37 25 4261 
22          
23 Excise revenue (million TZS) 2401 13680 156672 27922 1770 1180 203626 
24 Industry revenue (million 
TZS) 
9047 36999 266200 23952 4425 3982 344606 
25 Total Consumption 
Expenditure (million TZS) 
13509 59802 498989 61212 9138 6092 648741 
26          
27 Excise revenue (million 
USD) 
1.51 8.59 98.35 17.53 1.11 0.74 127.83 
28 Industry revenue (million 
USD) 
5.68 23.23 167.11 15.04 2.78 2.50 216.33 
29 Total Consumption 
Expenditure (million USD) 
8.48 37.54 313.24 38.43 5.74 3.82 407.24 
30          
31 Percentage changes         
32 Excise tax (TZS per pack) 146.2 146.2 146.2 482.1 36.1 36.1 190.7 
33 Retail price (TZS per pack) 34.5 39.3 48.1 109.5 23.3 23.3 53.3 
34 Cigarette consumption 
(million cigarettes) 
-16.2 -17.9 -20.9 -35.0 -11.8 -11.8 -22.8 
35 Excise revenue (million TZS) 106.3 102.1 94.9 278.2 20.0 20.0 107.4 
36 Industry revenue (million 
TZS) 
0.6 -1.5 -5.0 -22.0 5.8 5.8 -5.7 
37 Total Consumption 
expenditure (million TZS) 
12.7 14.3 17.2 36.1 8.8 8.8 18.2 
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Table 1.18 Scenario 1 Robustness of Industry Pricing Strategy (NOT increases by 
20%): Uganda 
      SIMULATION       
Line   Imported 
Premium 
brand (KE) 
Imported High 
priced brand 
(KE) 
Imported 
Medium Priced 
Brand (KE) 
Imported Low 
priced brand 
(KE) 
Imported 
High priced 
brand (TZ) 
Total or 
Average 
  Inputs        
1 Price elasticity -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6  
2 Specific excise tax per 
pack local currency 
1383 1383 1383 1383 1383  
3 Specific excise tax per 
pack USD 
0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6  
4 VAT rate 18% 18% 18% 18% 18%  
5 Perc. Change in NOT 
price 
20 20 20 20 20   
6         
7 Outputs        
8 NOT price (UGS per 
pack) 
2748 1942 1434 925 1942 1407 
9 Excise tax (UGS per 
pack) 
1383 1383 1383 1383 1383 1383 
10 VAT  (UGS per pack) 744 599 507 416 599 502 
11 Retail price (UGS per 
pack) 
4874 3924 3324 2724 3924 3292 
12        
13 NOT price (USD per 
pack) 
1.19 0.84 0.62 0.40 0.84 0.61 
14 Excise tax (USD per 
pack) 
0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 
15 VAT  (USD per pack) 0.32 0.26 0.22 0.18 0.26 0.22 
16 Retail price (USD per 
pack) 
2.11 1.70 1.44 1.18 1.70 1.43 
17        
18 Binding excise tax 
(specific or ad 
valorem) 
Specific Specific Specific Specific Specific  
19 Excise tax as % of 
retail price 
28 35 42 51 35 42 
20         
21 Cigarette consumption 
(million cigarettes) 
8 42 514 109 10 684 
22         
23 Excise revenue 
(million UGS) 
561 2902 35562 7562 688 47276 
24 Industry revenue 
(million UGS) 
1116 4076 36871 5060 966 48089 
25 Total Consumption 
Expenditure (million 
UGS) 
1979 8234 85471 14894 1952 112530 
26         
27 Excise revenue 
(million USD) 
0.24 1.26 15.43 3.28 0.30 20.51 
28 Industry revenue 
(million USD) 
0.48 1.77 16.00 2.20 0.42 20.86 
29 Total Consumption 
Expenditure (million 
USD) 
0.86 3.57 37.08 6.46 0.85 48.82 
30         
31 Percentage changes        
32 Excise tax (UGS per 
pack) 
25.7 176.6 176.6 176.6 176.6 174.8 
33 Retail price (UGS per 
pack) 
21.9 57.0 66.2 81.6 57.0 67.4 
34 Cigarette consumption 
(million cigarettes) 
-11.2 -23.5 -26.0 -29.6 -23.5 -26.2 
35 Excise revenue 
(million UGS) 
11.7 111.7 104.8 94.7 111.7 101.6 
36 Industry revenue 
(million UGS) 
6.6 -8.2 -11.2 -15.5 -8.2 -11.0 
37 Total Consumption 
expenditure (million 
UGS) 
8.3 20.1 23.0 27.8 20.1 23.1 
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Table 1.19 Scenario 1 Robustness of Industry Pricing Strategy (NOT increases by 
20%): Burundi 
      SIMULATION         
Line   Premium 
Brand 
High 
Priced 
Brand 
Medium 
Priced 
Brand 
Low Priced 
Brand 
Imported 
Premium brand 
(non-EAC) 
Imported 
Premium 
brand (EAC) 
Total or 
Average 
  Inputs         
1 Price elasticity -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6  
2 Specific excise tax per pack 
local currency 
779 779 779 779 779 779  
3 Specific excise tax per pack 
USD 
0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6  
4 Ad valorem excise rate 100% on 
EW 
100% on 
EW 
100% on 
EW 
100% on EW 100% on EW 100% on EW 
5 VAT rate 18% 18% 18% 18% 18% 18%  
6 Perc. Change in NOT price 20 20 20 20 20 20   
7 Retail & Wholesale margin (% 
on EW) 
100 100 100 100 100 100   
8          
9 Outputs         
10 NOT price (BIF per pack) 2712 881 542 339 2542 881 580 
11 Excise tax (BIF per pack) 779 779 779 779 779 779 779 
12 VAT  (BIF per pack) 726 331 257 214 781 331 266 
13 Retail price (BIF per pack) 4760 2168 1688 1400 5120 2168 1633 
14         
15 NOT price (USD per pack) 2.09 0.68 0.42 0.26 1.96 0.68 0.45 
16 Excise tax (USD per pack) 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 
17 VAT  (USD per pack) 0.48 0.23 0.18 0.15 0.53 0.23 0.19 
18 Retail price (USD per pack) 3.17 1.51 1.20 1.02 3.48 1.51 1.24 
19         
20 Binding excise tax (specific or 
ad valorem) 
ad 
valorem 
ad 
valorem 
ad valorem ad valorem ad valorem ad valorem  
21 Excise tax as % of retail price 16 36 46 56 15 36 48 
22          
23 Cigarette consumption (million 
cigarettes) 
4 21 231 45 0 14 315 
24          
25 Excise revenue (million BIF) 165 812 9011 1736 0 547 12271 
26 Industry revenue (million BIF) 574 918 6270 755 1 618 9137 
27 Total Consumption 
Expenditure (million BIF) 
1008 2258 19511 3117 2 1521 27418 
28          
29 Excise revenue (million USD) 0.13 0.63 6.94 1.34 0.00 0.42 9.45 
30 Industry revenue (million USD) 0.44 0.71 4.83 0.58 0.00 0.48 7.03 
31 Total Consumption 
Expenditure (million USD) 
0.78 1.74 15.02 2.40 0.00 1.17 21.11 
32          
33 Percentage changes         
34 Excise tax (BIF per pack) -31.0 112.2 244.9 451.8 -26.4 112.2 255.7 
35 Retail price (BIF per pack) 19.0 66.7 111.0 179.9 28.0 66.7 96.9 
36 Cigarette consumption (million 
cigarettes) 
-9.9 -26.1 -35.3 -44.3 -13.7 -26.1 -35.6 
37 Excise revenue (million BIF) -37.8 56.8 123.2 207.6 -36.5 56.8 114.0 
38 Industry revenue (million BIF) 8.1 -11.3 -22.3 -33.1 3.5 -11.3 -20.3 
39 Total Consumption 
expenditure (million BIF) 
7.2 23.2 36.6 56.0 10.4 23.2 35.1 
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Table 1.20 Scenario 1 Robustness of Industry Pricing Strategy (NOT increases by 
20%): Rwanda 
      SIMULATION       
Line   Imported 
Premium 
brand (KE) 
Imported High 
priced brand 
(KE) 
Imported Medium 
Priced Brand 
(KE) 
Imported low 
priced brand 
(KE) 
Imported High 
priced brand 
(BU) 
Total or 
Average 
  Inputs        
1 Price elasticity -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6  
2 Excise tax per pack 
local currency 
357 357 357 357 357  
3 Excise tax per pack 
USD 
0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6  
4 VAT rate 18% 18% 18% 18% 18%  
5 Perc. Change in NOT 
price 
20 20 20 20 20   
6 Retail & Wholesale 
margin (% on EW) 
100 100 100 100 100   
7         
8 Outputs        
9 NOT price (RWF per 
pack) 
697 610 291 174 610 306 
10 Excise tax (RWF per 
pack) 
357 357 357 357 357 357 
11 VAT  (RWF per pack) 215 196 127 102 196 130 
12 Retail price (RWF per 
pack) 
1409 1285 833 668 1285 854 
13        
14 NOT price (USD per 
pack) 
1.17 1.03 0.49 0.29 1.03 0.51 
15 Excise tax (USD per 
pack) 
0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 
16 VAT  (USD per pack) 0.32 0.29 0.20 0.16 0.29 0.20 
17 Retail price (USD per 
pack) 
2.09 1.92 1.28 1.05 1.92 1.31 
18        
19 Binding excise tax 
(specific or ad valorem) 
Specific Specific Specific Specific Specific  
20 Excise tax as % of retail 
price 
25 28 43 53 28 43 
21         
22 Cigarette consumption 
(million packs) 
2 15 154 29 2 203 
23         
24 Excise revenue (million 
RWF) 
44 260 2751 523 44 3622 
25 Industry revenue 
(million RWF) 
87 445 2239 255 75 3101 
26 Total Consumption 
Expenditure (million 
RWF) 
175 937 6416 979 158 8665 
27         
28 Excise revenue (million 
USD) 
0.07 0.44 4.62 0.88 0.07 6.09 
29 Industry revenue 
(million USD) 
0.15 0.75 3.76 0.43 0.13 5.21 
30 Total Consumption 
Expenditure (million 
USD) 
0.29 1.57 10.78 1.64 0.27 14.56 
31         
32 Percentage changes        
33 Excise tax (RWF per 
pack) 
-18.1 -6.4 96.6 227.6 -6.4 105.5 
34 Retail price (RWF per 
pack) 
17.4 22.4 66.5 122.7 22.4 70.3 
35 Cigarette consumption 
(million cigarettes) 
-9.2 -11.4 -26.1 -37.2 -11.4 -26.7 
36 Excise revenue (million 
RWF) 
-25.6 -17.1 45.4 105.9 -17.1 40.8 
37 Industry revenue 
(million RWF) 
9.0 6.3 -11.3 -24.6 6.3 -9.6 
38 Total Consumption 
expenditure (million 
RWF) 
6.6 8.5 23.1 40.0 8.5 22.3 
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Table 1.21 Scenario 1 Robustness of Industry Pricing Strategy (NOT decreases by 
20%): Kenya 
      SIMULATION       
Line   Premium 
Brand 
High 
Priced 
Brand 
Medium 
Priced Brand 
Low 
Priced 
Brand 
Imported 
Premium 
(non-EAC) 
Total or 
Average 
  Inputs        
1 Price elasticity -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6   
2 Specific excise tax per pack local 
currency 
50 50 50 50 50   
3 Specific excise tax per pack USD 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6  
4 VAT rate 16% 16% 16% 16% 16%   
5 Perc. Change in NOT price -20 -20 -20 -20 -20   
6         
7 Outputs        
8 NOT price (KES per pack) 57 37 29 15 42 30 
9 Excise tax (KES per pack) 50 50 50 50 50 50 
10 VAT  (KES per pack) 17 14 13 10 17 13 
11 Retail price (KES per pack) 124 100 91 75 124 93 
12        
13 NOT price (USD per pack) 0.69 0.45 0.35 0.18 0.51 0.36 
14 Excise tax (USD per pack) 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 
15 VAT  (USD per pack) 0.21 0.17 0.15 0.13 0.21 0.15 
16 Retail price (USD per pack) 1.50 1.21 1.10 0.91 1.50 1.12 
17        
18 Binding excise tax (specific or ad 
valorem) 
Specific Specific Specific Specific Specific  
19 Excise tax as % of retail price 40 49 55 66 40 54 
20         
21 Cigarette consumption (million 
cigarettes) 
301 644 3205 693 110 4952 
22         
23 Excise revenue (million KES) 747 1599 7961 1721 272 12300 
24 Industry revenue (million KES) 863 1186 4595 530 233 7406 
25 Total Consumption Expenditure 
(million KES) 
1867 3231 14565 2611 680 22955 
26         
27 Excise revenue (million USD) 9.02 19.31 96.14 20.79 3.29 148.56 
28 Industry revenue (million USD) 10.42 14.33 55.50 6.40 2.81 89.45 
29 Total Consumption Expenditure 
(million USD) 
22.55 39.02 175.90 31.54 8.22 277.23 
30         
31 Percentage changes        
32 Excise tax (KES per pack) 1.4 57.7 102.8 107.0 1.4 89.1 
33 Retail price (KES per pack) -11.3 11.6 29.8 50.7 -11.3 25.5 
34 Cigarette consumption (million 
cigarettes) 
7.5 -6.3 -14.5 -21.6 7.5 -13.1 
35 Excise revenue (million KES) 9.0 47.7 73.5 62.2 9.0 60.4 
36 Industry revenue (million KES) -14.0 -25.1 -31.6 -37.3 -14.0 -28.9 
37 Total Consumption expenditure 
(million KES) 
-4.7 4.5 11.1 18.1 -4.7 8.8 
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Table 1.22 Scenario 1 Robustness of Industry Pricing Strategy (NOT decreases by 
20%): Tanzania 
      SIMULATION         
Line   Premium 
Brand 
High 
Priced 
Brand 
Medium 
Priced 
Brand 
Low 
Priced 
Brand 
Imported 
Premium Brand 
(non-EAC) 
Imported 
Premium 
Brand (EAC) 
Total or 
Average 
  Inputs         
1 Price elasticity -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6  
2 Specific excise tax per 
pack local currency 
956 956 956 956 956 956  
3 Specific excise tax per 
pack USD 
0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6  
4 VAT rate 18% 18% 18% 18% 18% 18%  
5 Perc. Change in NOT 
price 
-20 -20 -20 -20 -20 -20  
6          
7 Outputs         
8 NOT price (TZS per pack) 2401 1723 1083 547 1593 2150 1084 
9 Excise tax (TZS per pack) 956 956 956 956 956 956 956 
10 VAT  (TZS per pack) 604 482 367 270 559 559 368 
11 Retail price (TZS per 
pack) 
3961 3161 2405 1773 3665 3665 2413 
12         
13 NOT price (USD per pack) 1.51 1.08 0.68 0.34 1.00 1.35 0.68 
14 Excise tax (USD per pack) 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 
15 VAT  (USD per pack) 0.38 0.30 0.23 0.17 0.35 0.35 0.23 
16 Retail price (USD per 
pack) 
2.49 1.98 1.51 1.11 2.30 2.30 1.51 
17         
18 Binding excise tax 
(specific or ad valorem) 
Specific Specific Specific Specific Specific Specific  
19 Excise tax as % of retail 
price 
24 30 40 54 26 26 40 
20          
21 Cigarette consumption 
(million cigarettes) 
60 338 3769 642 44 30 4883 
22          
23 Excise revenue (million 
TZS) 
2882 16153 180127 30661 2115 1410 233348 
24 Industry revenue (million 
TZS) 
7240 29125 204034 17534 3525 3172 264630 
25 Total Consumption 
Expenditure (million TZS) 
11944 53428 453310 56871 8111 5407 589070 
26          
27 Excise revenue (million 
USD) 
1.81 10.14 113.07 19.25 1.33 0.89 146.48 
28 Industry revenue (million 
USD) 
4.54 18.28 128.08 11.01 2.21 1.99 166.12 
29 Total Consumption 
Expenditure (million USD) 
7.50 33.54 284.56 35.70 5.09 3.39 369.79 
30          
31 Percentage changes         
32 Excise tax (TZS per pack) 146.2 146.2 146.2 482.1 36.1 36.1 188.7 
33 Retail price (TZS per 
pack) 
-1.0 5.4 17.1 77.3 -8.4 -8.4 21.5 
34 Cigarette consumption 
(million cigarettes) 
0.6 -3.1 -9.0 -28.7 5.4 5.4 -11.5 
35 Excise revenue (million 
TZS) 
147.7 138.6 124.0 315.3 43.4 43.4 137.7 
36 Industry revenue (million 
TZS) 
-19.5 -22.5 -27.2 -42.9 -15.7 -15.7 -27.6 
37 Total Consumption 
expenditure (million TZS) 
-0.4 2.1 6.5 26.5 -3.4 -3.4 7.3 
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Table 1.23 Scenario 1 Robustness of Industry Pricing Strategy (NOT decreases by 
20%): Uganda 
      SIMULATION       
Line   Imported 
Premium 
brand (KE) 
Imported High 
priced brand 
(KE) 
Imported Medium 
Priced Brand (KE) 
Imported low 
priced brand 
(KE) 
Imported High 
priced brand 
(TZ) 
Total or 
Average 
  Inputs        
1 Price elasticity -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6  
2 Specific excise tax per 
pack local currency 
1383 1383 1383 1383 1383  
3 Specific excise tax per 
pack USD 
0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6  
4 VAT rate 18% 18% 18% 18% 18%  
5 Perc. Change in NOT 
price 
-20 -20 -20 -20 -20   
6         
7 Outputs        
8 NOT price (UGS per 
pack) 
1832 1295 956 617 1295 940 
9 Excise tax (UGS per 
pack) 
1383 1383 1383 1383 1383 1383 
10 VAT  (UGS per pack) 579 482 421 360 482 418 
11 Retail price (UGS per 
pack) 
3794 3160 2760 2360 3160 2741 
12        
13 NOT price (USD per 
pack) 
0.79 0.56 0.41 0.27 0.56 0.41 
14 Excise tax (USD per 
pack) 
0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 
15 VAT  (USD per pack) 0.25 0.21 0.18 0.16 0.21 0.18 
16 Retail price (USD per 
pack) 
1.65 1.37 1.20 1.02 1.37 1.19 
17        
18 Binding excise tax 
(specific or ad valorem) 
Specific Specific Specific Specific Specific  
19 Excise tax as % of 
retail price 
36 44 50 59 44 51 
20         
21 Cigarette consumption 
(million cigarettes) 
9 48 573 119 11 760 
22         
23 Excise revenue (million 
UGS) 
652 3296 39637 8211 781 52578 
24 Industry revenue 
(million UGS) 
864 3086 27397 3663 732 35742 
25 Total Consumption 
Expenditure (million 
UGS) 
1790 7532 79101 14011 1785 104218 
26         
27 Excise revenue (million 
USD) 
0.28 1.43 17.20 3.56 0.34 22.81 
28 Industry revenue 
(million USD) 
0.37 1.34 11.89 1.59 0.32 15.51 
29 Total Consumption 
Expenditure (million 
USD) 
0.78 3.27 34.32 6.08 0.77 45.21 
30         
31 Percentage changes        
32 Excise tax (UGS per 
pack) 
25.7 176.6 176.6 176.6 176.6 174.7 
33 Retail price (UGS per 
pack) 
-5.2 26.4 38.0 57.3 26.4 39.6 
34 Cigarette consumption 
(million cigarettes) 
3.2 -13.1 -17.5 -23.6 -13.1 -18.0 
35 Excise revenue (million 
UGS) 
29.8 140.4 128.2 111.4 140.4 124.2 
36 Industry revenue 
(million UGS) 
-17.4 -30.5 -34.0 -38.9 -30.5 -33.8 
37 Total Consumption 
expenditure (million 
UGS) 
-2.1 9.9 13.9 20.2 9.9 14.0 
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Table 1.24 Scenario 1 Robustness of Industry Pricing Strategy (NOT decreases by 
20%): Burundi 
      SIMULATION         
Line   Premium 
brand 
High 
priced 
brand 
Medium 
Priced 
Brand 
low 
priced 
brand 
Imported 
Premium from 
others 
Imported 
Premium in 
EAC 
Total or 
Average 
  Inputs         
1 Price elasticity -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6  
2 Specific excise tax per 
pack local currency 
779 779 779 779 779 779  
3 Specific excise tax per 
pack USD 
0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6  
4 VAT rate 18% 18% 18% 18% 18% 18%  
5 Perc. Change in NOT 
price 
-20 -20 -20 -20 -20 -20   
6 Retail & Wholesale margin 
(% on EW) 
100 100 100 100 100 100   
7          
8 Outputs         
9 NOT price (BIF per pack) 1808 588 362 226 1695 588 390 
10 Excise tax (BIF per pack) 779 779 779 779 779 779 779 
11 VAT  (BIF per pack) 531 267 218 189 567 267 225 
12 Retail price (BIF per pack) 3480 1752 1432 1240 3720 1752 1400 
13         
14 NOT price (USD per pack) 1.39 0.45 0.28 0.17 1.30 0.45 0.30 
15 Excise tax (USD per pack) 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 
16 VAT  (USD per pack) 0.36 0.19 0.16 0.14 0.39 0.19 0.16 
17 Retail price (USD per 
pack) 
2.35 1.24 1.04 0.91 2.56 1.24 1.06 
18         
19 Binding excise tax 
(specific or ad valorem) 
Specific Specific Specific Specific Specific Specific  
20 Excise tax as % of retail 
price 
22 44 54 63 21 44 56 
21          
22 Cigarette consumption 
(million cigarettes) 
5 24 253 47 0 16 346 
23          
24 Excise revenue (million 
BIF) 
199 920 9878 1848 0 619 13465 
25 Industry revenue (million 
BIF) 
462 693 4583 536 1 467 6742 
26 Total Consumption 
Expenditure (million BIF) 
889 2067 18146 2939 2 1392 25435 
27          
28 Excise revenue (million 
USD) 
0.15 0.71 7.60 1.42 0.00 0.48 10.37 
29 Industry revenue (million 
USD) 
0.36 0.53 3.53 0.41 0.00 0.36 5.19 
30 Total Consumption 
Expenditure (million USD) 
0.68 1.59 13.97 2.26 0.00 1.07 19.58 
32          
33 Percentage changes         
34 Excise tax (BIF per pack) -31.0 112.2 244.9 451.8 -26.4 112.2 254.0 
35 Retail price (BIF per pack) -13.0 34.7 79.0 147.9 -7.0 34.7 68.8 
36 Cigarette consumption 
(million cigarettes) 
8.7 -16.3 -29.0 -40.7 4.5 -16.3 -29.3 
37 Excise revenue (million 
BIF) 
-25.0 77.6 144.7 227.5 -23.1 77.6 134.9 
38 Industry revenue (million 
BIF) 
-13.0 -33.1 -43.2 -52.5 -16.4 -33.1 -41.2 
39 Total Consumption 
expenditure (million BIF) 
-5.4 12.8 27.0 47.1 -2.9 12.8 25.3 
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Table 1.25 Scenario 1 Robustness of Industry Pricing Strategy (NOT decreases by 
20%): Rwanda 
      SIMULATION       
Line   Imported 
Premium 
brand (KE) 
Imported High 
priced brand 
(KE) 
Imported Medium 
Priced Brand (KE) 
Imported low 
priced brand 
(KE) 
Imported High 
priced brand 
(BU) 
Total or 
Average 
  Inputs        
1 Price elasticity -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6  
2 Excise tax per pack 
local currency 
357 357 357 357 357  
3 Excise tax per pack 
USD 
0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6  
4 VAT rate 18% 18% 18% 18% 18%  
5 Perc. Change in NOT 
price 
-20 -20 -20 -20 -20   
6 Retail & Wholesale 
margin (% on EW) 
100 100 100 100 100   
7         
8 Outputs        
9 NOT price (RWF per 
pack) 
465 407 194 116 407 205 
10 Excise tax (RWF per 
pack) 
357 357 357 357 357 357 
11 VAT  (RWF per pack) 165 152 106 89 152 109 
12 Retail price (RWF per 
pack) 
1080 997 696 586 997 712 
13        
14 NOT price (USD per 
pack) 
0.78 0.68 0.33 0.20 0.68 0.34 
15 Excise tax (USD per 
pack) 
0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 
16 VAT  (USD per pack) 0.25 0.23 0.17 0.14 0.23 0.17 
17 Retail price (USD per 
pack) 
1.63 1.51 1.09 0.94 1.51 1.11 
18        
19 Binding excise tax 
(specific or ad valorem) 
Specific Specific Specific Specific Specific  
20 Excise tax as % of retail 
price 
33 36 51 61 36 51 
21         
22 Cigarette consumption 
(million packs) 
3 17 171 31 3 225 
23         
24 Excise revenue (million 
RWF) 
52 303 3055 562 51 4024 
25 Industry revenue 
(million RWF) 
68 345 1658 183 58 2312 
26 Total Consumption 
Expenditure (million 
RWF) 
158 846 5953 923 142 8022 
27         
28 Excise revenue (million 
USD) 
0.09 0.51 5.13 0.94 0.09 6.76 
29 Industry revenue 
(million USD) 
0.11 0.58 2.79 0.31 0.10 3.89 
30 Total Consumption 
Expenditure (million 
USD) 
0.27 1.42 10.00 1.55 0.24 13.48 
31         
32 Percentage changes        
33 Excise tax (RWF per 
pack) 
-18.1 -6.4 96.6 227.6 -6.4 104.4 
34 Retail price (RWF per 
pack) 
-10.0 -5.0 39.1 95.3 -5.0 42.4 
35 Cigarette consumption 
(million cigarettes) 
6.5 3.1 -17.9 -32.4 3.1 -18.6 
36 Excise revenue (million 
RWF) 
-12.7 -3.4 61.5 121.4 -3.4 56.4 
37 Industry revenue 
(million RWF) 
-14.8 -17.5 -34.3 -46.0 -17.5 -32.6 
38 Total Consumption 
expenditure (million 
RWF) 
-4.1 -2.0 14.2 31.9 -2.0 13.2 
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Table 1.26 Scenario 1 Robustness of Excise Tax (excise=0.8): Kenya 
      SIMULATION       
Line   Premium 
brand 
High priced 
brand 
Medium Priced 
Brand 
low priced 
brand 
Imported 
Premium 
Total or 
Average 
  Inputs        
1 Price elasticity -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6   
2 Specific excise tax per pack local 
currency 
66 66 66 66 66  
3 Specific excise tax per pack USD 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8  
5 VAT rate 16% 16% 16% 16% 16%   
6 Perc. Change in NOT price  0 0 0 0 0   
9         
10 Outputs        
11 NOT price (KES per pack) 72 46 36 19 53 37 
12 Excise tax (KES per pack) 66 66 66 66 66 66 
13 VAT  (KES per pack) 22 18 16 14 22 17 
14 Retail price (KES per pack) 160 130 118 99 160 121 
15        
16 NOT price (USD per pack) 0.87 0.56 0.43 0.23 0.64 0.45 
17 Excise tax (USD per pack) 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 
18 VAT  (USD per pack) 0.27 0.22 0.20 0.16 0.27 0.20 
19 Retail price (USD per pack) 1.93 1.57 1.43 1.20 1.93 1.46 
20        
21 Binding excise tax (specific or ad 
valorem) 
Specific Specific Specific Specific Specific  
22 Excise tax as % of retail price 41 51 56 67 41 55 
23         
24 Cigarette consumption (million 
cigarettes) 
258 551 2745 593 94 4242 
25         
26 Excise revenue (million KES) 856 1826 9093 1964 312 14050 
27 Industry revenue (million KES) 926 1270 4921 566 250 7933 
28 Total Consumption Expenditure 
(million KES) 
2067 3592 16256 2935 753 25603 
29         
30 Excise revenue (million USD) 10.33 22.05 109.82 23.72 3.77 169.69 
31 Industry revenue (million USD) 11.19 15.34 59.43 6.84 3.02 95.81 
32 Total Consumption Expenditure 
(million USD) 
24.96 43.38 196.32 35.45 9.10 309.21 
33         
34 Percentage changes        
35 Excise tax (KES per pack) 35.2 110.3 170.4 176.0 35.2 152.1 
36 Retail price (KES per pack) 14.3 44.8 69.2 98.0 14.3 63.5 
37 Cigarette consumption (million 
cigarettes) 
-7.7 -19.8 -26.7 -33.0 -7.7 -25.6 
38 Excise revenue (million KES) 24.8 68.7 98.1 85.0 24.8 83.2 
39 Industry revenue (million KES) -7.7 -19.8 -26.7 -33.0 -7.7 -23.8 
40 Total Consumption expenditure 
(million KES) 
5.5 16.1 24.0 32.7 5.5 21.4 
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Table 1.27 Scenario 1 Robustness of Excise Tax (excise=0.8): Tanzania 
      SIMULATION         
Line   Premium 
brand 
High 
priced 
brand 
Medium 
Priced 
Brand 
low 
priced 
brand 
Imported 
Premium from 
others 
Imported 
Premium in 
EAC 
Total or 
Average 
  Inputs         
1 Price elasticity -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6  
2 Specific excise tax per 
pack local currency 
1274 1274 1274 1274 1274 1274  
3 Specific excise tax per 
pack USD 
0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8  
5 VAT rate 18% 18% 18% 18% 18% 18%  
6 Perc. Change in NOT price 0 0 0 0  0 0  
9          
10 Outputs         
11 NOT price (TZS per pack) 3002 2154 1353 683 1991 2687 1355 
12 Excise tax (TZS per pack) 1274 1274 1274 1274 1274 1274 1274 
13 VAT  (TZS per pack) 770 617 473 352 713 713 474 
14 Retail price (TZS per pack) 5046 4046 3101 2310 4675 4675 3110 
15         
16 NOT price (USD per pack) 1.88 1.35 0.85 0.43 1.25 1.69 0.85 
17 Excise tax (USD per pack) 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 
18 VAT  (USD per pack) 0.48 0.39 0.30 0.22 0.45 0.45 0.30 
19 Retail price (USD per 
pack) 
3.17 2.54 1.95 1.45 2.93 2.93 1.95 
20         
21 Binding excise tax (specific 
or ad valorem) 
Specific Specific Specific Specific Specific Specific  
22 Excise tax as % of retail 
price 
25 31 41 55 27 27 41 
23          
24 Cigarette consumption 
(million cigarettes) 
52 292 3243 554 38 26 4205 
25          
26 Excise revenue (million 
TZS) 
3324 18591 206660 35309 2437 1625 267946 
27 Industry revenue (million 
TZS) 
7830 31425 219458 18930 3808 3427 284878 
28 Total Consumption 
Expenditure (million TZS) 
13162 59018 502819 64002 8942 5961 653905 
29          
30 Excise revenue (million 
USD) 
2.09 11.67 129.73 22.16 1.53 1.02 168.20 
31 Industry revenue (million 
USD) 
4.92 19.73 137.76 11.88 2.39 2.15 178.83 
32 Total Consumption 
Expenditure (million USD) 
8.26 37.05 315.64 40.18 5.61 3.74 410.49 
33          
34 Percentage changes         
35 Excise tax (TZS per pack) 228.3 228.3 228.3 676.1 81.5 81.5 285.1 
36 Retail price (TZS per pack) 26.1 34.9 50.9 131.0 16.9 16.9 56.6 
37 Cigarette consumption 
(million cigarettes) 
-13.0 -16.4 -21.7 -38.4 -8.9 -8.9 -23.8 
38 Excise revenue (million 
TZS) 
185.7 174.6 157.1 378.3 65.3 65.3 172.9 
39 Industry revenue (million 
TZS) 
-13.0 -16.4 -21.7 -38.4 -8.9 -8.9 -22.1 
40 Total Consumption 
expenditure (million TZS) 
9.8 12.8 18.1 42.3 6.4 6.4 19.1 
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Table 1.28 Scenario 1 Robustness of Excise Tax (excise=0.8): Uganda 
      SIMULATION       
Line   Imported 
Premium 
brand (KE) 
Imported High 
priced brand 
(KE) 
Imported 
Medium Priced 
Brand (KE) 
Imported low 
priced brand 
(KE) 
Imported high 
priced brand 
(TZ) 
Total or 
Average 
  Inputs        
1 Price elasticity -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6  
2 Specific excise tax 
per pack local 
currency 
1844 1844 1844 1844 1844  
3 Specific excise tax 
per pack USD 
0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8  
5 VAT rate 18% 18% 18% 18% 18%  
6 Perc. Change in NOT 
price 
0 0 0 0 0   
9         
10 Outputs        
11 NOT price (UGS per 
pack) 
2290 1619 1195 771 1619 1175 
12 Excise tax (UGS per 
pack) 
1844 1844 1844 1844 1844 1844 
13 VAT  (UGS per pack) 744 623 547 471 623 543 
14 Retail price (UGS per 
pack) 
4878 4086 3586 3086 4086 3563 
15        
16 NOT price (USD per 
pack) 
0.99 0.70 0.52 0.33 0.70 0.51 
17 Excise tax (USD per 
pack) 
0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 
18 VAT  (USD per pack) 0.32 0.27 0.24 0.20 0.27 0.24 
19 Retail price (USD per 
pack) 
2.12 1.77 1.56 1.34 1.77 1.55 
20        
21 Binding excise tax 
(specific or ad 
valorem) 
Specific Specific Specific Specific Specific  
22 Excise tax as % of 
retail price 
38 45 51 60 45 52 
23         
24 Cigarette 
consumption (million 
cigarettes) 
8 41 492 102 10 653 
25         
26 Excise revenue 
(million UGS) 
748 3780 45403 9403 896 60229 
27 Industry revenue 
(million UGS) 
929 3318 29421 3932 786 38387 
28 Total Consumption 
Expenditure (million 
UGS) 
1980 8375 88292 15735 1985 116367 
29         
30 Excise revenue 
(million USD) 
0.32 1.64 19.70 4.08 0.39 26.13 
31 Industry revenue 
(million USD) 
0.40 1.44 12.76 1.71 0.34 16.65 
32 Total Consumption 
Expenditure (million 
USD) 
0.86 3.63 38.30 6.83 0.86 50.48 
33         
34 Percentage changes        
35 Excise tax (UGS per 
pack) 
67.6 268.8 268.8 268.8 268.8 266.3 
36 Retail price (UGS per 
pack) 
21.9 63.4 79.3 105.7 63.4 81.5 
37 Cigarette 
consumption (million 
cigarettes) 
-11.2 -25.2 -29.1 -34.4 -25.2 -29.5 
38 Excise revenue 
(million UGS) 
48.9 175.7 161.4 142.1 175.7 156.8 
39 Industry revenue 
(million UGS) 
-11.2 -25.2 -29.1 -34.4 -25.2 -29.0 
40 Total Consumption 
expenditure (million 
UGS) 
8.3 22.2 27.1 35.0 22.2 27.3 
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Table 1.29 Scenario 1 Robustness of Excise Tax (excise=0.8): Burundi 
    SIMULATION         
  Premium 
brand 
High 
priced 
brand 
Medium 
Priced 
Brand 
Low 
priced 
brand 
Imported Premium 
from others 
Imported 
Premium in 
EAC 
Total or 
Average 
Inputs         
Price elasticity -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6  
Specific excise tax per pack 
local currency 
1039 1039 1039 1039 1039 1039  
Specific excise tax per pack 
USD 
0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8  
VAT rate 18% 18% 18% 18% 18% 18%  
Perc. Change in NOT price 0 0 0 0 0 0   
         
Outputs         
NOT price (BIF per pack) 2260 734 452 282 2119 734 487 
Excise tax (BIF per pack) 1039 1039 1039 1039 1039 1039 1039 
VAT  (BIF per pack) 675 346 285 248 721 346 292 
Retail price (BIF per pack) 4426 2266 1866 1626 4726 2266 1826 
        
NOT price (USD per pack) 1.74 0.57 0.35 0.22 1.63 0.57 0.38 
Excise tax (USD per pack) 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 
VAT  (USD per pack) 0.46 0.25 0.21 0.18 0.50 0.25 0.21 
Retail price (USD per pack) 3.00 1.61 1.35 1.20 3.25 1.61 1.39 
        
Binding excise tax (specific or 
ad valorem) 
ad 
valorem 
ad 
valorem 
ad valorem ad 
valorem 
ad valorem ad valorem  
Excise tax as % of retail price 23 46 56 64 22 46 57 
         
Cigarette consumption (million 
cigarettes) 
4 20 219 41 0 14 299 
         
Excise revenue (million BIF) 230 1055 11377 2149 0 711 15523 
Industry revenue (million BIF) 500 746 4948 584 1 502 7281 
Total Consumption 
Expenditure (million BIF) 
979 2302 20431 3363 2 1550 28627 
         
Excise revenue (million USD) 0.18 0.81 8.76 1.65 0.00 0.55 11.95 
Industry revenue (million USD) 0.38 0.57 3.81 0.45 0.00 0.39 5.61 
Total Consumption 
Expenditure (million USD) 
0.75 1.77 15.73 2.59 0.00 1.19 22.04 
         
Percentage changes         
Excise tax (BIF per pack) -8.0 183.0 359.8 635.8 -1.9 183.0 372.5 
Retail price (BIF per pack) 10.7 74.3 133.3 225.3 18.2 74.3 120.3 
Cigarette consumption (million 
cigarettes) 
-5.9 -28.0 -38.7 -48.2 -9.5 -28.0 -38.9 
Excise revenue (million BIF) -13.4 103.8 181.9 280.9 -11.2 103.8 170.8 
Industry revenue (million BIF) -5.9 -28.0 -38.7 -48.2 -9.5 -28.0 -36.5 
Total Consumption 
expenditure (million BIF) 
4.1 25.6 43.0 68.4 6.9 25.6 41.1 
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Table 1.30 Scenario 1 Robustness of Excise Tax (excise=0.8): Rwanda 
      SIMULATION       
Line   Imported 
Premium 
brand (KE) 
Imported High 
priced brand 
(KE) 
Imported 
Medium Priced 
Brand (KE) 
Imported low 
priced brand 
(KE) 
Imported low 
priced brand 
(TZ) 
Total or 
Average 
  Inputs        
1 Price elasticity -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6  
2 Excise tax per pack 
local currency 
476 476 476 476 476  
3 Excise tax per pack 
USD 
0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8  
5 VAT rate 18% 18% 18% 18% 18%  
6 Perc. Change in NOT 
price 
  0 0 0 0   
9         
10 Outputs        
11 NOT price (RWF per 
pack) 
581 508 242 145 508 256 
12 Excise tax (RWF per 
pack) 
476 476 476 476 476 476 
13 VAT  (RWF per pack) 211 196 138 117 196 141 
14 Retail price (RWF per 
pack) 
1385 1282 905 767 1282 925 
15        
16 NOT price (USD per 
pack) 
0.98 0.85 0.41 0.24 0.85 0.43 
17 Excise tax (USD per 
pack) 
0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 
18 VAT  (USD per pack) 0.32 0.30 0.22 0.19 0.30 0.22 
19 Retail price (USD per 
pack) 
2.10 1.95 1.42 1.23 1.95 1.45 
20        
21 Binding excise tax 
(specific or ad 
valorem) 
Specific Specific Specific Specific Specific  
22 Excise tax as % of 
retail price 
34 37 53 62 37 52 
23         
24 Cigarette 
consumption (million 
packs) 
3 15 147 27 2 194 
25         
26 Excise revenue 
(million RWF) 
60 348 3498 648 59 4612 
27 Industry revenue 
(million RWF) 
73 371 1780 198 62 2484 
28 Total Consumption 
Expenditure (million 
RWF) 
174 936 6648 1044 158 8960 
29         
30 Excise revenue 
(million USD) 
0.10 0.58 5.88 1.09 0.10 7.75 
31 Industry revenue 
(million USD) 
0.12 0.62 2.99 0.33 0.11 4.18 
32 Total Consumption 
Expenditure (million 
USD) 
0.29 1.57 11.17 1.76 0.26 15.06 
33         
34 Percentage changes        
35 Excise tax (RWF per 
pack) 
9.2 24.8 162.1 336.9 24.8 172.6 
36 Retail price (RWF per 
pack) 
15.4 22.1 80.9 155.8 22.1 85.4 
37 Cigarette 
consumption (million 
cigarettes) 
-8.2 -11.3 -29.5 -41.6 -11.3 -30.0 
38 Excise revenue 
(million RWF) 
0.2 10.8 84.9 155.1 10.8 79.3 
39 Industry revenue 
(million RWF) 
-8.2 -11.3 -29.5 -41.6 -11.3 -27.6 
40 Total Consumption 
expenditure (million 
RWF) 
5.9 8.3 27.6 49.4 8.3 26.5 
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Table 1.31 Scenario 1 Robustness of Excise Tax (excise=0.4): Kenya 
      SIMULATION       
Line   Premium 
Brand 
High Priced 
Brand 
Medium Priced 
Brand 
Low 
Priced 
Brand 
Imported 
Premium 
(non-EAC) 
Total or 
Average 
  Inputs        
1 Price elasticity -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6   
2 Specific excise tax per pack local 
currency 
33 33 33 33 33  
3 Specific excise tax per pack USD 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4  
4 VAT rate 16% 16% 16% 16% 16%   
5 Perc. Change in NOT price  0 0 0 0 0   
6         
7 Outputs        
8 NOT price (KES per pack) 72 46 36 19 53 37 
9 Excise tax (KES per pack) 33 33 33 33 33 33 
10 VAT  (KES per pack) 17 13 11 8 17 11 
11 Retail price (KES per pack) 122 92 80 61 122 82 
12        
13 NOT price (USD per pack) 0.87 0.56 0.43 0.23 0.64 0.45 
14 Excise tax (USD per pack) 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 
15 VAT  (USD per pack) 0.20 0.15 0.13 0.10 0.20 0.14 
16 Retail price (USD per pack) 1.47 1.11 0.97 0.73 1.47 0.99 
17        
18 Binding excise tax (specific or ad 
valorem) 
Specific Specific Specific Specific Specific  
19 Excise tax as % of retail price 27 36 41 55 27 41 
20         
21 Cigarette consumption (million 
cigarettes) 
305 679 3458 788 111 5341 
22         
23 Excise revenue (million KES) 504 1124 5727 1306 184 8845 
24 Industry revenue (million KES) 1092 1564 6198 753 295 9902 
25 Total Consumption Expenditure 
(million KES) 
1852 3118 13833 2388 675 21866 
26         
27 Excise revenue (million USD) 6.09 13.57 69.16 15.77 2.22 106.82 
28 Industry revenue (million USD) 13.19 18.89 74.86 9.10 3.56 119.59 
29 Total Consumption Expenditure 
(million USD) 
22.36 37.66 167.06 28.84 8.15 264.08 
30         
31 Percentage changes        
32 Excise tax (KES per pack) -32.4 5.1 35.2 38.0 -32.4 26.5 
33 Retail price (KES per pack) -13.2 2.1 14.3 21.2 -13.2 10.8 
34 Cigarette consumption (million 
cigarettes) 
8.8 -1.2 -7.7 -10.9 8.8 -6.3 
35 Excise revenue (million KES) -26.4 3.8 24.8 23.0 -26.4 15.3 
36 Industry revenue (million KES) 8.8 -1.2 -7.7 -10.9 8.8 -4.9 
37 Total Consumption expenditure 
(million KES) 
-5.5 0.8 5.5 8.0 -5.5 3.7 
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Table 1.32 Scenario 1 Robustness of Excise Tax (excise=0.4): Tanzania 
      SIMULATION         
Line   Premium 
Brand 
High 
Priced 
Brand 
Medium 
Priced 
Brand 
Low 
Priced 
Brand 
Imported 
Premium Brand 
(non-EAC) 
Imported 
Premium 
Brand (EAC) 
Total or 
Average 
  Inputs         
1 Price elasticity -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6  
2 Specific excise tax per 
pack local currency 
637 637 637 637 637 637  
3 Specific excise tax per 
pack USD 
0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4  
4 VAT rate 18% 18% 18% 18% 18% 18%  
5 Perc. Change in NOT 
price 
0 0 0 0  0 0  
6          
7 Outputs         
8 NOT price (TZS per 
pack) 
3002 2154 1353 683 1991 2687 1345 
9 Excise tax (TZS per 
pack) 
637 637 637 637 637 637 637 
10 VAT  (TZS per pack) 655 502 358 238 598 598 358 
11 Retail price (TZS per 
pack) 
4294 3294 2349 1558 3923 3923 2347 
12         
13 NOT price (USD per 
pack) 
1.88 1.35 0.85 0.43 1.25 1.69 0.84 
14 Excise tax (USD per 
pack) 
0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 
15 VAT  (USD per pack) 0.41 0.32 0.22 0.15 0.38 0.38 0.22 
16 Retail price (USD per 
pack) 
2.70 2.07 1.47 0.98 2.46 2.46 1.47 
17         
18 Binding excise tax 
(specific or ad valorem) 
Specific Specific Specific Specific Specific Specific  
19 Excise tax as % of retail 
price 
15 19 27 41 16 16 27 
20          
21 Cigarette consumption 
(million cigarettes) 
57 330 3823 691 42 28 4972 
22          
23 Excise revenue (million 
TZS) 
1830 10507 121805 22017 1354 903 158417 
24 Industry revenue (million 
TZS) 
8623 35521 258698 23609 4229 3807 334487 
25 Total Consumption 
Expenditure (million TZS) 
12335 54314 448994 53839 8335 5557 583373 
26          
27 Excise revenue (million 
USD) 
1.15 6.60 76.46 13.82 0.85 0.57 99.45 
28 Industry revenue (million 
USD) 
5.41 22.30 162.40 14.82 2.66 2.39 209.97 
29 Total Consumption 
Expenditure (million 
USD) 
7.74 34.10 281.85 33.80 5.23 3.49 366.21 
30          
31 Percentage changes         
32 Excise tax (TZS per 
pack) 
64.1 64.1 64.1 288.1 -9.3 -9.3 94.2 
33 Retail price (TZS per 
pack) 
7.3 9.8 14.3 55.8 -1.9 -1.9 18.1 
34 Cigarette consumption 
(million cigarettes) 
-4.2 -5.4 -7.7 -23.2 1.2 1.2 -9.9 
35 Excise revenue (million 
TZS) 
57.3 55.2 51.5 198.2 -8.2 -8.2 61.4 
36 Industry revenue (million 
TZS) 
-4.2 -5.4 -7.7 -23.2 1.2 1.2 -8.5 
37 Total Consumption 
expenditure (million TZS) 
2.9 3.8 5.5 19.7 -0.8 -0.8 6.3 
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Table 1.33 Scenario 1 Robustness of Excise Tax (excise=0.4): Uganda 
      SIMULATION       
Line   Imported 
Premium 
brand (KE) 
Imported High 
priced brand 
(KE) 
Imported 
Medium Priced 
Brand (KE) 
Imported Low 
Priced Brand 
(KES) 
Imported 
High priced 
brand (TZ) 
Total or 
Average 
  Inputs        
1 Price elasticity -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6  
2 Specific excise tax 
per pack local 
currency 
922 922 922 922 922 922 
3 Specific excise tax 
per pack USD 
0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 
4 VAT rate 18% 18% 18% 18% 18% 18% 
5 Perc. Change in NOT 
price 
 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6         
7 Outputs        
8 NOT price (UGS per 
pack) 
2290 1619 1195 771 1619 1171 
9 Excise tax (UGS per 
pack) 
922 922 922 922 922 922 
10 VAT  (UGS per pack) 578 457 381 305 457 377 
11 Retail price (UGS per 
pack) 
3790 2998 2498 1998 2998 2470 
12        
13 NOT price (USD per 
pack) 
0.99 0.70 0.52 0.33 0.70 0.51 
14 Excise tax (USD per 
pack) 
0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 
15 VAT  (USD per pack) 0.25 0.20 0.17 0.13 0.20 0.16 
16 Retail price (USD per 
pack) 
1.64 1.30 1.08 0.87 1.30 1.07 
17        
18 Binding excise tax 
(specific or ad 
valorem) 
Specific Specific Specific Specific Specific  
19 Excise tax as % of 
retail price 
24 31 37 46 31 38 
20         
21 Cigarette 
consumption (million 
cigarettes) 
9 49 608 131 12 809 
22         
23 Excise revenue 
(million UGS) 
435 2268 28034 6036 538 37310 
24 Industry revenue 
(million UGS) 
1081 3981 36333 5049 944 47387 
25 Total Consumption 
Expenditure (million 
UGS) 
1789 7373 75953 13080 1748 99942 
26         
27 Excise revenue 
(million USD) 
0.19 0.98 12.16 2.62 0.23 16.19 
28 Industry revenue 
(million USD) 
0.47 1.73 15.76 2.19 0.41 20.56 
29 Total Consumption 
Expenditure (million 
USD) 
0.78 3.20 32.95 5.67 0.76 43.36 
30         
31 Percentage changes        
32 Excise tax (UGS per 
pack) 
-16.2 84.4 84.4 84.4 84.4 83.2 
33 Retail price (UGS per 
pack) 
-5.3 19.9 24.9 33.2 19.9 25.5 
34 Cigarette 
consumption (million 
cigarettes) 
3.3 -10.3 -12.5 -15.7 -10.3 -12.7 
35 Excise revenue 
(million UGS) 
-13.4 65.4 61.4 55.4 65.4 59.1 
36 Industry revenue 
(million UGS) 
3.3 -10.3 -12.5 -15.7 -10.3 -12.3 
37 Total Consumption 
expenditure (million 
UGS) 
-2.1 7.6 9.3 12.2 7.6 9.3 
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Table 1.34 Scenario 1 Robustness of Excise Tax (excise=0.4): Burundi 
      SIMULATION         
Line   Premium 
brand 
High 
priced 
brand 
Medium 
Priced 
Brand 
low 
priced 
brand 
Imported 
Premium from 
others 
Imported 
Premium in 
EAC 
Total or 
Average 
  Inputs         
1 Price elasticity -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6  
2 Specific excise tax per 
pack local currency 
520 520 520 520 520 520  
3 Specific excise tax per 
pack USD 
0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4  
4 VAT rate 18% 18% 18% 18% 18% 18%  
5 Perc. Change in NOT 
price 
0 0 0 0 0 0   
6 Retail & Wholesale 
margin (% on EW) 
100 100 100 100 100 100  
7          
8 Outputs         
9 NOT price (BIF per pack) 2260 734 452 282 2119 734 482 
10 Excise tax (BIF per pack) 520 520 520 520 520 520 520 
11 VAT  (BIF per pack) 582 252 191 155 627 252 198 
12 Retail price (BIF per 
pack) 
3813 1653 1253 1013 4113 1653 1206 
13         
14 NOT price (USD per 
pack) 
1.74 0.57 0.35 0.22 1.63 0.57 0.37 
15 Excise tax (USD per 
pack) 
0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 
16 VAT  (USD per pack) 0.39 0.17 0.13 0.11 0.42 0.17 0.14 
17 Retail price (USD per 
pack) 
2.52 1.14 0.88 0.73 2.78 1.14 0.91 
18         
19 Binding excise tax 
(specific or ad valorem) 
Specific Specific Specific Specific Specific Specific  
20 Excise tax as % of retail 
price 
14 31 41 51 13 31 43 
21          
22 Cigarette consumption 
(million cigarettes) 
5 24 274 53 0 16 372 
23          
24 Excise revenue (million 
BIF) 
126 635 7110 1374 0 427 9671 
25 Industry revenue (million 
BIF) 
547 897 6184 747 1 604 8980 
26 Total Consumption 
Expenditure (million BIF) 
922 2019 17147 2679 2 1360 24128 
27          
28 Excise revenue (million 
USD) 
0.10 0.49 5.47 1.06 0.00 0.33 7.45 
29 Industry revenue (million 
USD) 
0.42 0.69 4.76 0.58 0.00 0.46 6.91 
30 Total Consumption 
Expenditure (million 
USD) 
0.71 1.55 13.20 2.06 0.00 1.05 18.57 
31          
32 Percentage changes         
33 Excise tax (BIF per pack) -54.0 41.5 129.9 267.9 -50.9 41.5 137.4 
34 Retail price (BIF per 
pack) 
-4.7 27.2 56.6 102.6 2.8 27.2 45.3 
35 Cigarette consumption 
(million cigarettes) 
2.9 -13.4 -23.4 -33.8 -1.7 -13.4 -23.9 
36 Excise revenue (million 
BIF) 
-52.7 22.5 76.2 143.5 -51.8 22.5 68.7 
37 Industry revenue (million 
BIF) 
2.9 -13.4 -23.4 -33.8 -1.7 -13.4 -21.7 
38 Total Consumption 
expenditure (million BIF) 
-1.9 10.1 20.0 34.1 1.1 10.1 18.9 
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Table 1.35 Scenario 1 Robustness of Excise Tax (excise=0.4): Rwanda 
      SIMULATION       
Line   Imported 
Premium 
brand (KE) 
Imported High 
priced brand 
(KE) 
Imported Medium 
Priced Brand (KE) 
Imported low 
priced brand 
(KE) 
Imported High 
priced brand 
(BU) 
Total or 
Average 
  Inputs        
1 Price elasticity -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6  
2 Excise tax per pack 
local currency 
238 238 238 238 238  
3 Excise tax per pack 
USD 
0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4  
4 VAT rate 18% 18% 18% 18% 18%  
5 Perc. Change in NOT 
price 
 0 0 0 0 0  
6 Retail & Wholesale 
margin (% on EW) 
100 100 100 100 100  
7         
8 Outputs        
9 NOT price (RWF per 
pack) 
581 508 242 145 508 254 
10 Excise tax (RWF per 
pack) 
238 238 238 238 238 238 
11 VAT  (RWF per pack) 168 153 95 74 153 98 
12 Retail price (RWF per 
pack) 
1104 1001 624 487 1001 641 
13        
14 NOT price (USD per 
pack) 
0.98 0.85 0.41 0.24 0.85 0.43 
15 Excise tax (USD per 
pack) 
0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 
16 VAT  (USD per pack) 0.25 0.23 0.15 0.12 0.23 0.15 
17 Retail price (USD per 
pack) 
1.62 1.48 0.95 0.76 1.48 0.98 
18        
19 Binding excise tax 
(specific or ad valorem) 
Specific Specific Specific Specific Specific  
20 Excise tax as % of 
retail price 
22 24 38 49 24 38 
21         
22 Cigarette consumption 
(million packs) 
3 17 183 35 3 240 
23         
24 Excise revenue (million 
RWF) 
34 202 2173 417 34 2859 
25 Industry revenue 
(million RWF) 
84 431 2211 254 72 3052 
26 Total Consumption 
Expenditure (million 
RWF) 
159 847 5694 852 143 7695 
27         
28 Excise revenue (million 
USD) 
0.06 0.34 3.65 0.70 0.06 4.81 
29 Industry revenue 
(million USD) 
0.14 0.72 3.72 0.43 0.12 5.13 
30 Total Consumption 
Expenditure (million 
USD) 
0.27 1.42 9.57 1.43 0.24 12.93 
31         
32 Percentage changes        
33 Excise tax (RWF per 
pack) 
-45.4 -37.6 31.1 118.4 -37.6 37.2 
34 Retail price (RWF per 
pack) 
-8.0 -4.7 24.7 62.2 -4.7 27.4 
35 Cigarette consumption 
(million cigarettes) 
5.1 2.9 -12.4 -24.9 2.9 -13.3 
36 Excise revenue (million 
RWF) 
-42.6 -35.8 14.8 64.0 -35.8 11.1 
37 Industry revenue 
(million RWF) 
5.1 2.9 -12.4 -24.9 2.9 -11.0 
38 Total Consumption 
expenditure (million 
RWF) 
-3.3 -1.9 9.3 21.8 -1.9 8.6 
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Table 2.1 Scenario 2: Kenya 
      SIMULATION         
Line   Premium 
Brand 
High Priced 
Brand 
Medium Priced 
Brand 
Low Priced 
Brand 
Imported 
Premium 
(non-EAC) 
Total or 
Average 
  Inputs        
1 Price elasticity -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6   
2 Specific excise tax per pack local 
currency 
62 50 50 50 62  
3 Specific excise tax per pack USD  0.6 0.6 0.6   
4 Ad valorem excise rate on RSP 40%    40%  
5 VAT rate 16% 16% 16% 16% 16%   
6 Perc. Change in NOT price 0  0 0 0 0   
7         
8 Outputs        
9 NOT price (KES per pack) 72 46 36 19 53 37 
10 Excise tax (KES per pack) 62 50 50 50 62 51 
11 VAT  (KES per pack) 21 15 14 11 21 14 
12 Retail price (KES per pack) 155 111 99 80 155 102 
13        
14 NOT price (USD per pack) 0.87 0.56 0.43 0.23 0.64 0.45 
15 Excise tax (USD per pack) 0.75 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.75 0.61 
16 VAT  (USD per pack) 0.26 0.19 0.17 0.13 0.26 0.17 
17 Retail price (USD per pack) 1.87 1.34 1.20 0.96 1.87 1.24 
18        
19 Binding excise tax (specific or ad 
valorem) 
Ad 
valorem 
Specific Specific Specific Ad valorem  
20 Excise tax as % of retail price 40 45 50 62 40 50 
21         
22 Cigarette consumption (million 
cigarettes) 
263 606 3043 670 96 4678 
23         
24 Excise revenue (million KES) 817 1505 7559 1665 298 11844 
25 Industry revenue (million KES) 943 1396 5454 640 255 8688 
26 Total Consumption Expenditure 
(million KES) 
2042 3365 15096 2674 744 23921 
27         
28 Excise revenue (million USD) 9.87 18.18 91.30 20.11 3.60 143.05 
29 Industry revenue (million USD) 11.39 16.86 65.87 7.73 3.07 104.93 
30 Total Consumption Expenditure 
(million USD) 
24.66 40.64 182.31 32.30 8.99 288.90 
31         
32 Percentage changes        
33 Excise tax (KES per pack) 26.7 57.7 102.8 107.0 26.7 91.7 
34 Retail price (KES per pack) 10.9 23.4 41.7 59.6 10.9 38.4 
35 Cigarette consumption (million 
cigarettes) 
-6.0 -11.8 -18.8 -24.2 -6.0 -17.9 
36 Excise revenue (million KES) 19.1 39.0 64.7 56.9 19.1 54.4 
37 Industry revenue (million KES) -6.0 -11.8 -18.8 -24.2 -6.0 -16.6 
38 Total Consumption expenditure 
(million KES) 
4.2 8.8 15.1 20.9 4.2 13.4 
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Table 2.2 Scenario 2: Tanzania 
      SIMULATION         
Line   Premium 
Brand 
High 
Priced 
Brand 
Medium 
Priced 
Brand 
Low 
Priced 
Brand 
Imported 
Premium Brand 
(non-EAC) 
Imported 
Premium 
Brand (EAC) 
Total or 
Average 
  Inputs         
1 Price elasticity -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6  
2 Specific excise tax per pack 
local currency 
2676 1928 1211 956 2405 2676  
3 Specific excise tax per pack 
USD 
   0.6    
4 Ad valorem excise rate on 
RSP 
40% 40% 40%  40% 40%  
5 VAT rate 18% 18% 18% 18% 18% 18%  
6 Perc. Change in NOT price 0 0 0 0  0 0  
7          
8 Outputs         
9 NOT price (TZS per pack) 3002 2154 1353 683 1991 2687 1336 
10 Excise tax (TZS per pack) 2676 1928 1211 956 2405 2405 1249 
11 VAT  (TZS per pack) 1022 735 462 295 917 917 466 
12 Retail price (TZS per pack) 6700 4816 3026 1934 6010 6010 3056 
13         
14 NOT price (USD per pack) 1.88 1.35 0.85 0.43 1.25 1.69 0.84 
15 Excise tax (USD per pack) 1.68 1.21 0.76 0.60 1.51 1.51 0.78 
16 VAT  (USD per pack) 0.64 0.46 0.29 0.19 0.58 0.58 0.29 
17 Retail price (USD per pack) 4.21 3.02 1.90 1.21 3.77 3.77 1.92 
18         
19 Binding excise tax (specific 
or ad valorem) 
Ad 
valorem 
Ad 
valorem 
Ad valorem Specific Ad valorem Ad valorem  
20 Excise tax as % of retail 
price 
40 40 40 49 40 40 41 
21          
22 Cigarette consumption 
(million cigarettes) 
44 263 3290 611 33 22 4264 
23          
24 Excise revenue (million 
TZS) 
5912 25389 199166 29190 3965 2643 266266 
25 Industry revenue (million 
TZS) 
6631 28374 222632 20867 3282 2953 284740 
26 Total Consumption 
Expenditure (million TZS) 
14802 63441 497721 59068 9907 6604 651542 
27          
28 Excise revenue (million 
USD) 
3.71 15.94 125.03 18.32 2.49 1.66 167.15 
29 Industry revenue (million 
USD) 
4.16 17.81 139.76 13.10 2.06 1.85 178.74 
30 Total Consumption 
Expenditure (million USD) 
9.29 39.82 312.44 37.08 6.22 4.15 409.00 
31          
32 Percentage changes         
33 Excise tax (TZS per pack) 589.4 396.5 211.9 482.1 242.5 242.5 266.3 
34 Retail price (TZS per pack) 67.5 60.5 47.2 93.4 50.2 50.2 53.7 
35 Cigarette consumption 
(million cigarettes) 
-26.3 -24.5 -20.6 -32.1 -21.5 -21.5 -22.8 
36 Excise revenue (million 
TZS) 
408.1 275.0 147.7 295.4 168.8 168.8 171.2 
37 Industry revenue (million 
TZS) 
-26.3 -24.5 -20.6 -32.1 -21.5 -21.5 -22.1 
38 Total Consumption 
expenditure (million TZS) 
23.4 21.3 16.9 31.4 17.9 17.9 18.7 
 
 
 
 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
 
 
115 
Table 2.3 Scenario 2: Uganda 
      SIMULATION       
Line   Imported 
Premium Brand 
(KE) 
Imported High 
Priced Brand (KE) 
Imported Medium 
Priced Brand (KE) 
Imported Low 
Priced Brand 
(KE) 
Imported Low 
Priced Brand 
(TZ) 
Total or 
Average 
  Inputs        
1 Price elasticity -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6  
2 Specific excise tax per 
pack local currency 
2051 1445 1383 1383 1383  
3 Specific excise tax per 
pack USD 
  0.6 0.6 0.6  
4 Ad valorem excise rate on 
RSP 
40% 40%     
5 VAT rate 18% 18% 18% 18% 18%  
6 Perc. Change in NOT 
price 
 0 0 0 0 0   
7         
8 Outputs        
9 NOT price (UGS per 
pack) 
2290 1619 1195 771 1619 1172 
10 Excise tax (UGS per 
pack) 
2051 1445 1383 1383 1383 1394 
11 VAT  (UGS per pack) 781 551 464 388 540 462 
12 Retail price (UGS per 
pack) 
5123 3615 3042 2542 3542 3028 
13        
14 NOT price (USD per pack) 0.99 0.70 0.52 0.33 0.70 0.51 
15 Excise tax (USD per pack) 0.89 0.63 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 
16 VAT  (USD per pack) 0.34 0.24 0.20 0.17 0.23 0.20 
17 Retail price (USD per 
pack) 
2.22 1.57 1.32 1.10 1.54 1.31 
18        
19 Binding excise tax 
(specific or ad valorem) 
Ad valorem Ad valorem Specific Specific Specific  
20 Excise tax as % of retail 
price 
40 40 45 54 39 46 
21         
22 Cigarette consumption 
(million cigarettes) 
8 44 541 114 11 718 
23         
24 Excise revenue (million 
UGS) 
809 3181 37437 7866 730 50024 
25 Industry revenue (million 
UGS) 
903 3563 32346 4386 855 42053 
26 Total Consumption 
Expenditure (million UGS) 
2019 7958 82345 14458 1871 108650 
27         
28 Excise revenue (million 
USD) 
0.35 1.38 16.24 3.41 0.32 21.70 
29 Industry revenue (million 
USD) 
0.39 1.55 14.03 1.90 0.37 18.24 
30 Total Consumption 
Expenditure (million USD) 
0.88 3.45 35.72 6.27 0.81 47.14 
31         
32 Percentage changes        
33 Excise tax (UGS per 
pack) 
86.5 189.0 176.6 176.6 176.6 176.4 
34 Retail price (UGS per 
pack) 
28.1 44.6 52.1 69.5 41.7 54.0 
35 Cigarette consumption 
(million cigarettes) 
-13.8 -19.7 -22.1 -26.8 -18.8 -22.6 
36 Excise revenue (million 
UGS) 
60.8 132.0 115.6 102.5 124.7 113.3 
37 Industry revenue (million 
UGS) 
-13.8 -19.7 -22.1 -26.8 -18.8 -22.2 
38 Total Consumption 
expenditure (million UGS) 
10.5 16.1 18.5 24.1 15.1 18.8 
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Table 2.4 Scenario 2: Burundi 
      SIMULATION         
Line   Premium 
Brand 
High 
Priced 
Brand 
Medium 
Priced 
Brand 
Low 
Priced 
Brand 
Imported 
Premium (non-
EAC) 
Imported 
Premium 
(EAC) 
Total or 
Average 
  Inputs         
1 Price elasticity -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6  
2 Specific excise tax per 
pack local currency 
2024 779 779 779 2273 779  
3 Specific excise tax per 
pack USD 
 0.6 0.6 0.6  0.6  
4 Ad valorem excise rate of 
RSP 
40%    40%   
5 VAT rate 18% 18% 18% 18% 18% 18%  
6 Perc. Change in NOT 
price 
0 0 0 0 0 0   
7 Retail & Wholesale margin 
(% on EW) 
100 100 100 100 100 100  
8          
9 Outputs         
10 NOT price (BIF per pack) 2260 734 452 282 2119 734 487 
11 Excise tax (BIF per pack) 2024 779 779 779 2273 779 796 
12 VAT  (BIF per pack) 771 272 222 191 867 272 231 
13 Retail price (BIF per pack) 5055 1786 1453 1253 5682 1786 1513 
14         
15 NOT price (USD per pack) 1.74 0.57 0.35 0.22 1.63 0.57 0.37 
16 Excise tax (USD per pack) 1.56 0.60 0.60 0.60 1.75 0.60 0.61 
17 VAT  (USD per pack) 0.59 0.21 0.17 0.15 0.67 0.21 0.18 
18 Retail price (USD per 
pack) 
3.89 1.38 1.12 0.96 4.37 1.38 1.16 
19         
20 Binding excise tax 
(specific or ad valorem) 
Ad 
valorem 
Specific Specific Specific Ad valorem Specific  
21 Excise tax as % of retail 
price 
40 44 54 62 40 44 53 
22          
23 Cigarette consumption 
(million cigarettes) 
4 25 251 46 0 16 342 
24          
25 Excise revenue (million 
BIF) 
455 970 9796 1784 1 612 13617 
26 Industry revenue (million 
BIF) 
508 914 5681 646 1 577 8326 
27 Total Consumption 
Expenditure (million BIF) 
1136 2223 18262 2867 2 1403 25893 
29          
30 Excise revenue (million 
USD) 
0.35 0.75 7.54 1.37 0.00 0.47 10.48 
31 Industry revenue (million 
USD) 
0.39 0.70 4.37 0.50 0.00 0.44 6.41 
32 Total Consumption 
Expenditure (million USD) 
0.87 1.71 14.06 2.21 0.00 1.08 19.93 
33          
34 Percentage changes         
35 Excise tax (BIF per pack) 79.1 112.2 244.9 451.8 114.6 112.2 254.6 
36 Retail price (BIF per pack) 26.4 37.4 81.6 150.6 42.1 37.4 81.3 
37 Cigarette consumption 
(million cigarettes) 
-13.1 -17.3 -29.6 -41.0 -18.9 -17.3 -30.0 
38 Excise revenue (million 
BIF) 
55.7 75.6 142.7 225.7 74.1 75.6 135.7 
39 Industry revenue (million 
BIF) 
-13.1 -17.3 -29.6 -41.0 -18.9 -17.3 -27.9 
40 Total Consumption 
expenditure (million BIF) 
9.9 13.7 27.8 47.9 15.2 13.7 26.6 
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Table 2.5 Scenario 2: Rwanda 
      SIMULATION       
Line   Imported 
Premium 
Brand (KE) 
Imported High 
Priced Brand 
(KE) 
Imported Medium 
Priced Brand (KE) 
Imported Low 
Priced Brand 
(KE) 
Imported High 
Priced Brand 
(BU) 
Total or 
Average 
  Inputs        
1 Price elasticity -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6  
2 Excise tax per pack 
local currency 
521 455 357 357 455  
3 Specific Excise tax per 
pack USD 
  0.6 0.6   
4 Ad valorem excise rate 
of RSP 
40% 40%   40%  
5 VAT rate 18% 18% 18% 18% 18%  
6 Perc. Change in NOT 
price 
 0 0 0 0 0  
7 Retail & Wholesale 
margin (% on EW) 
100 100 100 100 100  
8         
9 Outputs        
10 NOT price (RWF per 
pack) 
581 508 242 145 508 257 
11 Excise tax (RWF per 
pack) 
521 455 357 357 455 368 
12 VAT  (RWF per pack) 198 173 108 90 173 112 
13 Retail price (RWF per 
pack) 
1300 1137 707 593 1137 737 
14        
15 NOT price (USD per 
pack) 
0.98 0.85 0.41 0.24 0.85 0.43 
16 Excise tax (USD per 
pack) 
0.88 0.77 0.60 0.60 0.77 0.62 
17 VAT  (USD per pack) 0.33 0.29 0.18 0.15 0.29 0.19 
18 Retail price (USD per 
pack) 
2.18 1.91 1.19 1.00 1.91 1.24 
19        
20 Binding excise tax 
(specific or ad valorem) 
Ad valorem Ad valorem Specific Specific Ad valorem  
21 Excise tax as % of retail 
price 
40 40 50 60 40 51 
22         
23 Cigarette consumption 
(million packs) 
3 17 170 30 3 222 
24         
25 Excise revenue (million 
RWF) 
75 381 3026 542 60 4084 
26 Industry revenue 
(million RWF) 
84 425 2052 221 67 2849 
27 Total Consumption 
Expenditure (million 
RWF) 
187 951 5993 900 150 8181 
28         
29 Excise revenue (million 
USD) 
0.13 0.64 5.09 0.91 0.10 6.86 
30 Industry revenue 
(million USD) 
0.14 0.71 3.45 0.37 0.11 4.79 
31 Total Consumption 
Expenditure (million 
USD) 
0.31 1.60 10.07 1.51 0.25 13.75 
32         
33 Percentage changes        
34 Excise tax (RWF per 
pack) 
19.5 19.4 96.6 227.6 19.4 106.8 
35 Retail price (RWF per 
pack) 
8.3 8.3 41.4 97.6 8.3 45.8 
36 Cigarette consumption 
(million cigarettes) 
-4.7 -4.7 -18.7 -32.9 -4.7 -19.8 
37 Excise revenue (million 
RWF) 
13.9 13.8 59.9 119.9 13.8 57.6 
38 Industry revenue 
(million RWF) 
-4.7 -4.7 -18.7 -32.9 -4.7 -17.6 
39 Total Consumption 
expenditure (million 
RWF) 
3.3 3.2 15.0 32.6 3.2 14.6 
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List of Abbreviations 
 
Tobacco Control        TC 
Ministry of Health        MoH 
Ministry of Finance        MoF 
East African Community       EAC  
World Health Organisation       WHO  
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control     FCTC 
price elasticity of demand       εP 
International Agency for Research on Cancer    IARC   
United Nations        UN 
low or middle income countries      LMIC 
low-income countries        LICs 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa    COMESA 
Southern African Development Community     SADC  
Tobacco Products Regulation Act of 2003     TPRA 
Ugandan Tobacco Control Bill       UTCB 
Demographic and Health Surveys      DHS 
American Cancer Society       ACS  
Economic Research Council       ERC 
Global Youth Tobacco Survey       GYTS 
Gross Domestic Product       GDP 
Net of Tax         NOT 
Retail Selling Price        RSP 
Institute for Legislative Affairs      ILA 
Value Added Tax        VAT 
Consumer Price Index        CPI 
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Most Popular Price Category       MPPC 
European Union        EU 
Cost Insurance Freight       CIF 
British American Tobacco       BAT 
Legacy Tobacco Documents Library      LTDL 
Jerusalem Cigarette Company Ltd.      JCC 
Monopolies and Pricing Commission      MPC 
Retail Wholesale Margin       RWM  
Memorandum of Understanding      MoU 
